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Party Identification in Mexico

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Political Science

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Party Identification in Mexico

by

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According to the American voting literature, party identification is the most important determinant of vote choice. Party identification is the emotional attachment individuals develop towards political parties, which may increase or decrease over time based on individuals' retrospective evaluations of government performance. Party identification may also color the way individuals understand their political environment, acting as a filter lens through which political life is observed. Because of its characteristics, I compare party identification with the preference for a sports team.

In Mexico, party identification has not been the subject of much analysis. Some scholars argued that survey respondents confuse party ID and vote intention. I demonstrate, however, that party identification is different from, and more stable than vote choice. Further, I develop a model of party identification for the Mexican case, in which retrospective evaluations of government performance and negative, not only positive feelings towards parties, are its major determinants. My findings are consistent both at the national and the state levels.

Moreover, I perform an age cohort analysis that suggests that older cohorts are more likely than younger cohorts to contain Priistas while the reverse is true for independents. On the other hand, younger cohorts are more likely than older cohorts to contain individuals with negative feelings towards the PRI, while the reverse is true for individuals with negative feelings towards the PAN and the PRD.

Ideology is determined by party identification in Mexico. I demonstrate that ideological self-placements are determined by partisanship rather than by issue preferences. Further, through a 'Granger test', I demonstrate that lagged values of party identification determine current values of ideology after having controlled for lagged values of ideology.

The seven-decade hegemony of the PRI at the national level did not hinder the emergence and development of political attachments towards other parties. Even more, there are some individuals who, despite not being identified with a political party, hold strong antipathy towards a specific one, in most cases, the PRI.

The Mexican democratic transition and consolidation provides suitable grounds for observing the origins, meaning, and development of party identification.

Introduction

The dispute about the electoral results of the 1988 presidential election denotes the outbreak of the survey industry in Mexico. The victory of the PRI candidate was full of doubts, and even today, there is no certainty about the official results. For the 1994 presidential election, many pre-election surveys were carried out, as well as exit polls on Election Day. Several survey firms, both private and governmental, provided data for analyzing electoral trends and results. Today, the survey industry in Mexico is firmly established, led by top-practitioners and well-educated scholars, who conduct surveys using verified instruments and trustworthy techniques.

The main concern of the researchers who analyzed surveys for explaining Mexicans' electoral behavior was the determinants of vote choice. Such concern, however, has been expanding over the years, and today there is an enormous collection of electoral studies of all sorts, both in topic and in methodologies. Despite more than a decade of electoral studies, however, party identification in Mexico has not been the subject of as much research. The objective of the present dissertation is to provide the first systematic analysis of Mexicans partisan attachments.

Most studies in the American electoral behavior literature agree that political party identification is the best predictor of vote choice. Party identification was first mentioned in the early 1950s as equivalent to a 'standing vote decision' (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Key 1952). It was later defined as the psychological

attachment individuals may develop towards political parties (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Campbell et al. 1960), that may start in early childhood, and that may be strengthened over time (Converse 1969). In other words, it is likely that individuals become identified with the same party as their parents' (Jennings and Niemi 1968), and that could reinforce their own attachment through the accumulation of political 'experience', as the chances individuals have to vote *their* party.

For several years it was thought that individuals' party identification could only increase over time. Due to its alleged stability, party identification would rarely be modified by the influence of short-term factors, such as the information obtained through electoral campaigns. Further research, however, demonstrated that individuals' both political experience and evaluations of government performance (retrospective and prospective), may not only increase, but also decrease the intensity of the party allegiance (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981). Party identification was considered a 'summary judgment' that encapsulates individuals' retrospective evaluations of government performance. In addition, it was found that partisans (those individuals who are identified with a political party) are more interested in politics than independents (those who are not identified with any party) (Keith et al. 1992). The interpretation partisans make of political environment tends to be biased accordingly to the intensity of their own party identification. That is, partisans tend to view their own party favorably, as if they were using a filter lenses: the most intense the partisan allegiance, the more biased the analyses and interpretation of the political environment (Stokes 1966).

In Mexico, despite more than a decade of electoral studies, party identification has not been the subject of much research. This has been a result of a misconception: Some

scholars have not included party identification as an independent variable to explain vote choice because they argue that survey respondents confuse party ID and vote intention (Buendía 1995; Buendía 1996; Mercado 1997; Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001; Zechmeister 2004). Similarly, it was argued that the trends of party identification and vote choice ‘traveled together’ in Britain (Butler and Stokes 1969), Canada (Jenson 1975), and the Netherlands (Thomassen 1976), although it was later demonstrated that party identification was nearly as stable as in the United States, and that it was different from vote choice (Cain and Ferejohn 1981; Eijk and Niemöller 1983; LeDuc 1981).

In chapter two, I will demonstrate that party identification is different from and more stable than vote choice in Mexico. Using panel data, I compare the stability of party identification and vote choice over the period 2000-2002. To find out if party identification is different from vote choice, I will observe the proportion of partisans who vote their party. Moreover, to find out if party identification is more stable than vote choice, I will compare the proportion of individuals who were identified with the same party with the proportion of those who voted the same party in both waves of the panel. I will further explore the length of the allegiance and party preference of those ‘stable’ partisans to identify the main dynamics of party identification at the first ever defeat of the PRI after over seven decades of consecutive incumbency.

The length of the PRI’s ruling period has been compared to the uninterrupted tenures of Communist parties in Soviet bloc countries (Garrido 1986), the Grand National Party in South Korea (Kishikawa 2000; Solinger 2001), and the Kuomintang in Taiwan (Cheng forthcoming). The PRI’s failures and successes made it the most loved and hated party in Mexico.

In chapter three I hypothesize that negative –not only positive– feelings determine party identification in Mexico. The hostility towards parties has been explored as an element that may improve the measurement of party identification (Goot 1972; Maggiotto and Piereson 1977; Weisberg 1980), and as a major source of the decline of partisanship in the United States in the past decades (Craig 1987; Wattenberg 1981; Wattenberg 1984). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that individuals are more likely in multiparty systems than in two-party systems, to be identified with more than one party (Eijk and Niemöller 1983; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).

I argue that Mexican voters nurture their party allegiances according to both their likes and dislikes of parties. Specifically, some of them would prefer anything but the long-ruling PRI, as if they hold a ‘negative party identification’ towards the PRI. To better understand the dynamics of individuals’ likes and dislikes of parties, I criticize the alleged resemblance of party identification with religion (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Miller and Shanks 1996), and by emphasizing the ‘running tally’ feature of party identification instead (Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Goldberg 1969; Popkin et al. 1976), I draw on research on social psychology (Cialdini et al. 1976; Dietz-Uhler and Murrell 1999; Hirt et al. 1992; Murrell and Dietz-Uhler 1992; Schafer 1969; Sloan 1979; Snyder, Higgins, and Stucky 1983; Tajfel 1978; Turner and Oakes 1989; Wann and Dolan 1994; Wann, Tucker, and Schrader 1996) to explore instead the analogy of party identification to the preference for sports teams. Using six national household surveys carried out over the period 1988-2003 that correspond to each major national election (presidential and mid-term congressional), I suggest a model of party identification in Mexico that includes negative

feelings towards the PRI and retrospective evaluations of government performance as its major determinants.

In chapter four, I test the findings of the previous chapter at the state level. Several studies underscore the importance of sub-national politics in Mexico, demonstrating that individuals reveal different political attitudes according to distinct political contexts: national, state, and municipal (Cornelius 1999; Hiskey and Bowler 2005; Klesner 2005; Snyder 2001). In fact, there are some scholars who have found that some individuals are identified with different parties at distinct levels of government, at least in the United States and Canada (Clarke et al. 1979; Jennings and Niemi 1966; Martinez 1990; Niemi, Wright, and Powell 1987; Uslander 1989).

Unfortunately, there are no surveys that center on party identification at different levels of government in Mexico. I can compare, however, the effects of governors' and presidential approval on party identification as a way to assess the evaluations of different levels of government. Moreover, I argue that there are differences in individuals' party identification in groups of states that were about to change government from the PRI either to the PAN or to the PRD, that were about to change back from the PAN to the PRI, and in states that were still under PRI government. To analyze these differences, I collected twenty state household surveys that correspond to the period 1997-2000. I later suggest a model of party identification in which retrospective evaluations of governors' and presidents' performance, as well as negative feelings towards parties are major determinants of party identification in the states.

In the fifth chapter, I carry out an age cohort analysis of party identification in Mexico. I follow the debate in the American voting literature that analyzed the dynamics

of partisanship through individuals' aging, and the 'aging', 'life-cycle' and 'period' effects (Abramson 1976; Abramson 1979; Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981; Converse 1969; Glenn 1972; Mason et al. 1973; Niemi et al. 1985; Norpoth 1978; Norpoth 1984). I group individuals in ten six-year cohorts according to the first year they were eligible to vote in a federal election, in order to observe: 1) whether there are more partisans in younger or older cohorts; 2) which party has been attracting more partisans in younger cohorts; and 3) which cohorts contain more individuals with anti-party feelings and against which party. This analysis is carried out using the state-level surveys dataset, which allows me to compare the distribution of party identification among cohorts and across different groups of states according to their alternation experiences.

Throughout my dissertation I argue that retrospective evaluations and negative feelings towards parties are major determinants of party identification in Mexico. In the sixth chapter I examine the relation between issues, ideology, and party identification. Some scholars argue that social cleavages have been the source of ideological orientations, which in turn determine partisan attachments (Converse and Dupeux 1962; Fleury and Lewis-Beck 1993; McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Piña 1988; McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Piña 1998; Sani 1976a; Shively 1972; Sivini 1967). Other scholars argue, however, that the relative importance of social cleavages in these countries has been declining, whereas party labels have become more salient to the electorate (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984).

It has been argued that both partisanship and ideological identifications are political cues that help orient individuals' political attitudes by reducing information costs (Downs 1957; Popkin et al. 1976; Shively 1979). Moreover, it has been argued that

issue and partisan evaluations provide the content of ideological labels (Conover and Feldman 1981; Levitin and Miller 1979), and that ideological self and party placements are partisan based rather than issue based, supporting the argument that ideology is a derivative of partisan attachments (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Inglehart and Sidjanski 1976; Knutsen 1997; Knutsen 1998).

I argue that in Mexico ideology is a product of partisan attachments. That is, party identification determines ideology, rather than vice versa. This implies that Mexicans, when placing themselves or the parties over the ‘left-right’ ideological continuum, are most likely to rely on their partisan attachments rather than consider their issue preferences. To explore the relationship between party identification and ideology I assess the content of individuals’ ideological self and party placements to know whether issues or partisan attachments is the most important component. To test if ideology is a determinant of party identification in Mexico, I run a model that includes lagged values of ideology and party identification, as well as current values of retrospective evaluations and negative feelings towards parties as predictors of party identification. Finally, to test which is prior, either party identification or ideology, I run a ‘cross-lagged effects’ model of party identification and ideology (which corresponds to a ‘Granger test’ for causality) on longitudinal data (Mexico 2000-2002 Panel Study).

The Mexican democratic transition and consolidation provides suitable grounds to observe the dynamics of the emergence and development of partisan attachments. The present dissertation contributes to the understanding of party identification in Mexico as a key variable to understand and explain Mexicans’ political attitudes. As I demonstrate, party identification in Mexico is determined by negative –not only positive –feelings

towards parties, and by retrospective evaluations of government performance. In the last chapter I conclude by summarizing the main findings, and by suggesting possible new lines of research on party identification in the years to come.

Party Identification Stability in Mexico

2.1.1. Introduction

In the American voting literature, political party identification is the main predictor of vote intention. Party identification (party ID) was first mentioned in the mid 1950s as equivalent to a ‘standing vote decision’ (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Key 1952), and was later defined as a ‘psychological attachment’ individuals develop towards political parties (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Campbell et al. 1960). The theoretical concept of party ID has been studied alike by scholars in other countries (Budge, Crewe, and Farlie 1976). In Mexico, despite more than a decade of electoral studies, party ID has not been the subject of as much research as it is in most developed democracies where survey data are available. Indeed, the inclusion of party ID as an independent variable has been questioned. Some scholars have not included party ID as an independent variable to explain vote choice in Mexico because they argue that survey respondents confuse party ID and vote intention (Buendía 1995; Buendía 1996). Even those who do use party ID as the main predictor of vote choice have not explained its determinants (Moreno and Yanner 1995). Party ID in Mexico has been described (Moreno 2003), but has not been theoretically analyzed as a dependent variable.

This chapter will review previous studies that analyzed the stability of party ID and whether it is different from vote choice. Using panel data, I will compare party ID and vote intention to observe if Mexicans change their party when they change their vote.

The controversy in the Mexican voting literature has been about whether vote choice determines party ID or the reverse. American scholars find party ID as the variable that best predicts vote intention: According to the authors of *The American Voter*, even though party ID and vote intention were correlated, party ID was theoretically distinguishable from vote intention since vote choice was a decision based not only on an enduring allegiance, but also on short-term events (Campbell et al. 1960). That is, while party ID is the long-term ‘emotional’ bond individuals develop towards political parties, vote choice entails a short-term decision, which could be ‘emotionally’ shaped by party ID, but that could also be determined by the information obtained during the course of electoral campaigns, such as candidate traits or political parties’ stance on public issues. Thus, while there could be a high degree of correlation between vote choice and party ID, the direction of causality establishes that party ID determines vote choice and not the other way around; consequently, we should find party ID to be more stable than vote choice over time.

According to scholars who had studied party ID in other countries, an appropriate way to measure how different party ID is from vote choice is to compare how stable or fluctuating these two variables are over time (Butler and Stokes 1969; Cain and Ferejohn 1981; LeDuc 1981; Thomassen 1976). A hypothetical case where party ID is more stable than (and therefore different from) vote choice is portrayed in table 2.1

Table 2.1

**HYPOTHETICAL CASE:
PID STABILITY**

		Vote intention		
		<i>Stable</i>	<i>Variable</i>	
PID	<i>Stable</i>	75	15	90
	<i>Variable</i>	3	7	10
		78	22	100%

Table 2.1 shows the stability of party ID and vote choice of a group of individuals who were re-interviewed at least once after a certain period of time. Following the same framework used by the aforementioned scholars, I highlight the following elements in this hypothetical case, and in the cases to follow:

- 1) Party ID is more stable than vote choice. 90 percent of individuals had the same party ID in t_1 , t_2 , and t_3 (if the panel study includes three waves), while 78 percent had the intention to vote for the same party also in t_1 , t_2 , and t_3 .
- 2) A large majority of individuals (75%) held the same party ID and the same vote choice over the duration of the panel study.
- 3) The proportion of individuals who had the same party ID but changed their vote (15%) is larger than the proportion of who had the same vote choice but changed their party ID (3%). The latter should be the least numerous among all entries in the table.

- 4) Among those who switch party ID, the proportion of those who change vote is higher (7 of 10) than the proportion of those who change party ID among those who switch vote (7 of 22).

Initial research in Britain, the Netherlands, and Canada demonstrated that party ID was less stable there than in the United States. Even in some countries, researchers showed that party ID was less stable than vote choice, and suggested that it was very likely that when individuals changed their vote they changed their party, that is, party ID was not causally prior to vote intention (Butler and Stokes 1969; Jenson 1975; Thomassen 1976). Nevertheless, as will be described in this chapter, further research revealed methodological disagreements which suggest that in such countries, party ID was nearly as stable as in the United States, and that party ID was clearly different from vote choice (Cain and Ferejohn 1981; Eijk and Niemöller 1983; LeDuc 1981). The analytical framework utilized in such studies will be useful not only to measure party ID stability relative to vote intention in Mexico, but also to observe the difference between these two variables.

2.1.2. Party ID Stability in Britain and the United States

Early research in Britain showed that while in the United States individuals' party ID remained fixed when they changed their vote, in Britain it was more likely that these two variables changed "in tandem". From the 1956 to the 1960 Presidential elections in the United States, Butler and Stokes show that 35 percent of those who changed their vote changed their party, while in Britain, from the 1964 to the 1966 Parliamentary elections, more than half (57%) of those who changed vote changed party (Butler and

Stokes 1969), p. 24. Subsequently, Butler and Stokes compared three-wave panel studies from both Britain (1963-1964-1966) and the United States (1956-1958-1960) in order to analyze party support *in a lasting sense*, which they call “partisan self-images” for the Conservative, the Labor, and the Liberal parties¹.

Table 2.2 reproduces Butler and Stokes’ table that shows that while British voters were twice as likely to change their vote but retain their party ID as the other way around (8 versus 4%), in table 2.3, American voters were eight times more likely to change their vote choice but retain their party ID as the reverse (16 versus 2%). That is, voters in the United States were four times as likely as British voters to change their vote choice but retain their party ID as the opposite. More important, but not mentioned in the original study by Butler and Stokes, while in the United States 27 percent of those who changed their vote for Congressional elections changed their party (6 of 22), in Britain 62 percent of those who changed their vote for Parliamentary elections changed their party (13 of 21), confirming their claim that party ID, relative to choice, is more volatile in Britain than in the United States².

¹ Butler and Stokes (1969) defined that partisan ‘self-images’ in Britain and party ID in the United States were ‘stable’ if the respondent was identified with the same party in all three waves of the panel. Conversely, respondents’ partisan ‘self-images’ or party ID were ‘variable’ if they were identified with different parties, or declared being independents in any wave of the panel. Independent leaners were coded as partisans in the case of the United States, while independents, as a single category, were not included in either case since authors mentioned that there was no real British equivalent for this term. Vote choice was codified similarly in both countries: respondents who mentioned having voted for the same party in each wave were categorized as ‘stable’, and respondents who voted for different parties or abstained in any wave, were classified as ‘variable’.

² The first wave of the British panel was carried out in England, Scotland, and Wales in 1963 outside of the context of an electoral process. Second and third waves of this panel were carried out after Parliamentary elections took place, in 1964 and 1966. See, Butler, D., and Donald Stokes. 1969. *Political Change in Great Britain*. New York: St. Martin's., p.17 and appendix.

Table 2.2

PID STABILITY IN GREAT BRITAIN
1963-1964-1966

		Vote intention (Parliament)		
		<i>Stable</i>	<i>Variable</i>	
Partisan self-image	<i>Stable</i>	75	8	83
	<i>Variable</i>	4	13	17
		79	21	<i>N = n.a.</i>

*Includes small parties (Liberals)

Source : Butler and Stokes, 1969.

Table 2.3

PID STABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
1956-1958-1960

		Vote intention (Congress)		
		<i>Stable</i>	<i>Variable</i>	
PID	<i>Stable</i>	76	16	92
	<i>Variable</i>	2	6	8
		78	22	<i>N = n.a.</i>

*Excludes independents

Source : Butler and Stokes, 1969.

Butler and Stokes argued that the main reason why party ID and vote intention were more similar in Britain than in the United States was that Britain used a different balloting system. While British ballots contained candidates' names and parties competing only for seats in the House of Commons, American ballots were extensive, including not only candidates' names and parties competing for several offices (local, state and national), but at occasions also referendum propositions. That is, British voters

face ballots where they vote for one office at a single level of government, while Americans face ‘crowded’ ballots that ask for the usage of party ID as the tool that simplifies the process of choosing candidates (Popkin 1994). Butler and Stokes concluded that,

“British voters are less likely than American ones to make distinctions between their current electoral choices and more general partisan dispositions. The majority of voters do in fact have general dispositions towards party which give continuity to their behavior in a succession of specific choices. But in transferring their vote from one party to another they are less likely to retain a conscious identification with a party other than the one they currently support” (Butler and Stokes 1969), p.26.

Nevertheless, further research demonstrated that British voters were just as likely as Americans to keep their party ID when they changed their vote. Cain and Ferejohn (1981) observed that British party ID was as stable as in the United States, and that it was not equal to vote intention, arguing that voters’ choice consists not only of “standing decisions”, but is also influenced by ‘short-term forces’, such as candidate, policy, and national leadership evaluations.

Cain and Ferejohn replicated Butler and Stokes’ analysis although they classified small parties and independents differently, excluding small parties (Liberals) in the British case (table 2.4), and including independents as a third party in the case of the United States (table 2.5)³.

³ Cain and Ferejohn (1981) defined that partisan ‘self-images’ were considered ‘stable’ in Britain if respondents mentioned only Conservative and Labour parties, while in the United States, party ID was ‘stable’ if the respondent was identified with the same party, or was an independent in all three waves of the panel.

Table 2.4

PID STABILITY IN GREAT BRITAIN
1963-1964-1966

		Vote intention (Parliament)		
		<i>Stable</i>	<i>Variable</i>	
Partisan self-image	<i>Stable</i>	85	7	92
	<i>Variable</i>	2	6	8
		87	13	<i>N</i> = 783

*Excludes small parties (Liberals)

Source : Cain and Ferejohn, 1981.

Table 2.5

PID STABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
1956-1958-1960

		Vote intention (Congress)		
		<i>Stable</i>	<i>Variable</i>	
PID	<i>Stable</i>	67	16	83
	<i>Variable</i>	7	10	17
		74	26	<i>N</i> = 569

*Includes independents

Source : Cain and Ferejohn, 1981.

Cain and Ferejohn show in table 2.5 that, when independents are included as a third party, American voters were twice as likely to change their vote but retain their party ID as the other way around (16 versus 7%) similar to the proportion in the British case showed by Butler and Stokes when small parties are included (8 versus 4%, -see table 2.2). On the other hand, table 2.4 shows that when Cain and Ferejohn excluded

small parties from the analysis, British voters were over three times as likely to change their vote and maintain their party ID as the opposite (7 versus 2%), a similar proportion found by Butler and Stokes for the American case (16 versus 2%, -see table 2.3). If small parties are excluded from the analysis, however, 46 percent of British voters changed their party when they changed their vote (6%/13%), whereas, 38 percent of American voters changed their party when they changed their vote (10%/26%) when independents were included as a partisan category. Therefore, comparing the British case that excludes small parties (table 2.4) with the American in which independents are included (table 2.5) we see that the alleged difference between party ID in Britain and the United States diminishes, having been the main discrepancy on how small parties and independents were coded. Cain and Ferejohn showed that considering only partisanship among major parties in both countries while including independents as a third category in the American case, party ID came to be only slightly less stable in Britain than in the United States.

2.1.3. Party ID Stability in the Netherlands

In the case of the Netherlands, in contrast, it was argued that the rise of new issues as well as a highly dynamic party system accounted for most of the variability in party ID in the early '70s, making it more unstable than vote intention, just a mere reflection of the vote (Miller 1976; Thomassen 1976). Thomassen utilized a three-year panel study⁴ (1970-1971-1972) containing one provincial and two parliamentary elections, expecting that,

⁴ Thomassen mentioned that if party ID was not stable in the three-year period he analyzed, it would not be stable over longer periods of time.

“Since religion and social class are strongly connected to political parties, party ID should score low as an independent motivational force among Dutch voters” (Thomassen 1976), p. 65.

Thomassen argued that, given the difficulty to measure the influence party ID had on the electorate when there is a close relationship between political parties and social classes (Campbell and Valen 1966), party ID should not be a strong attitude among Dutch voters, and therefore should have a less important meaning than in the United States. According to Thomassen, Dutch voters were twice as likely to change their party ID vote but retain their vote choice as the reverse (10 versus 6%), and most important, 79 percent of those who changed their vote changed their party (23 of 29), which is double the proportion of British or American voters, as table 2.6 shows.

Table 2.6

**PID STABILITY IN THE NETHERLANDS
1970-1971-1972**

		Vote intention (Provincial, Parliamentary)		
		<i>Stable</i>	<i>Variable</i>	
PID	<i>Stable</i>	61	6	67
	<i>Variable</i>	10	23	33
		71	29	<i>N = n.a.</i>

*Excludes independents. 1970 is for Provincial elections,

1971 and 1972 are for Parliamentary elections

Source: Thomassen, 1976.

It has been argued that changes in party ID driven by changes in vote choice were mainly a consequence of the fluidity of the Dutch party system at the time, which suffered a strong realignment due to the arrival of new parties (Miller 1976). Further, the

existence of numerous parties could have also precluded strong attachments, which are more likely to materialize when only two major parties get most of the attention, as in the American or British cases (Jennings 1972). Nevertheless, further research proved that these conclusions were not definitive, showing that there were discrepancies not only in how the party ID question tried to unveil the meaning of the original concept, but also (again) in how independents were classified (Eijk and Niemöller 1983). Eijk and Niemöller found that when Thomassen excluded independents as a third category, he reduced the proportion of individuals with a stable party ID. They confirmed, however, that party ID was unstable in the Netherlands.

By both replicating Thomassen's data and employing a different new three-wave panel (1971-1972-1977), as well as a three-month panel for 1981, Eijk and Niemöller argued that party ID was highly unstable in the Netherlands because voters 'switched' among parties that were close together in the ideological spectrum. That is, changes of party ID were found more often among parties that were ideologically similar than between independents and partisans. On the other hand, they argued that a question that could tap the same properties as the original party ID concept did not exist in the Dutch case. Therefore, Eijk and Niemöller created an option for the 1981 panel study that allowed respondents to express their identification with several parties, arguing that individuals could have a 'secondary' identification, especially in multiparty systems⁵. According to Eijk and Niemöller, individuals with a strong party ID were less likely to identify with another party, and concluded that in multiparty systems,

⁵ Multiple party ID was not considered originally. The party ID analogy used by the authors of *The American Voter* was religion. According to Campbell et al., individuals felt exclusively attached to one party the same way they followed one religion. Nevertheless, if party ID is compared, for instance, with a

“Identification with a party cannot be construed to imply the absence of attachments to other parties” (Eijk and Niemöller 1983), p. 338.

Multiple party ID in the Netherlands was fostered by a multiparty system as well as voters’ strong reliance on ideological cues which oriented them to identify with a set of parties rather than with just one party, similar to voters in France (Converse and Dupeux 1962), post-Fascist Italy (Sani 1976b) and some post-Communist countries (Miller and Klobucar 2000; Miller and Klobucar 2002). In sum, it was considered that to measure party ID in the Netherlands using a similar question developed by the authors of *The American Voter* was unsatisfactory to understand the concept of party ID and, as a consequence, strict comparisons of party ID across these two countries were inadequate. According to Eijk and Niemöller, Dutch voters do not have a single party ID, but build up an ‘ideological identification’ instead.

2.1.4. Party ID Stability in Canada

Many scholars argued that Canadians exhibited weaker loyalties to major political parties than Americans or British. The obsession with national unity and the fear of fragmentation drove major parties to be ideologically identical, making leaders and candidates the focal point of voter loyalty (Beck and Dooley 1978; Dawson 1971; Scarrow 1965).

For others, party ID and vote choice represented ‘substantially’ the same thing in Canada (Meisel 1972). Based on the similarity and intensity of the relationship between

preference for a sports team, then individuals could relate emotionally to more than one party. This idea will be further developed in the third chapter of the present dissertation.

these two variables, they observed that almost all partisans either voted their party or abstained. After comparing the distribution of party ID and vote in the 1965 and 1968 elections, John Meisel concluded that

“Party identification seems to be as volatile in Canada as the vote itself” (Meisel 1972), p.65.

Parties’ ideological similarity, as well as voters’ weak loyalties that compelled them to prefer candidates over parties, caused a high electoral volatility. Such contentions were so frequently mentioned in the Canadian voting literature that they were labeled as the “textbook theory of party politics” (Sniderman, Forbes, and Melzer 1974). Sniderman et al., disagree with such arguments by showing that electoral volatility in Canada is not greater than in the United States or Britain, and that party ID and vote choice are not equal⁶. Nevertheless, they admit that the different sorts of data used in their own studies make their comparisons ‘suggestive’ and ‘inconclusive’ (Sniderman, Forbes, and Melzer 1974), p.280.

Moreover, further research that used recall data demonstrated that Canadian voters could distinguish party ID and vote intention, just as Americans do:

“For the period including the 1963 and 1965 elections, 15 percent of the Canadian voters reported a change in vote without a change in party identification. Examination of the alternative possibility reveals that only 7 percent of the Canadians reported that both their party identification and their vote changed in that period” (Jenson 1975), p. 546.

Jenson showed that changes in vote intention were associated with the strength of party ID, and mentioned that if voters considered that party ID and vote choice were

⁶ Sniderman et al. (1974) used recall data for the Canadian case, and panel data for both the American and the British case.

equivalent, then partisans should vote their party every time, which was not the case, at least in Canada as she demonstrated.

That party ID was more stable than vote choice was confirmed with the 1974-1979 Canadian panel data. LeDuc shows that the proportion of Canadians that changed their vote choice but maintained their party ID was double than the reverse (10 versus 5% –see table 2.7), a smaller proportion than in the United States, a similar proportion as in Britain, but definitely the contrary as in the Netherlands (LeDuc 1981). Moreover, the proportion of Canadians who changed their party when they changed their vote was not considerably different from the one in the United States or Britain (40%). LeDuc concludes that despite the difference in the preferences of the electorates outside the United States, the usage of party ID as a general concept in voting behavior should not be affected.

Table 2.7

PID STABILITY IN CANADA				
1974-1979				
Vote intention (National elections)				
		<i>Stable</i>	<i>Variable</i>	
PID	<i>Stable</i>	70	10	80
	<i>Variable</i>	5	15	20
		75	25	<i>N = 841</i>

*Excludes independents and non-voters.

Source : Leduc, 1981.

2.1.5. Party ID Stability in Mexico

Despite more than a decade of electoral studies, party ID in Mexico has not been studied as a dependent variable, mainly because some scholars were uncertain about its differentiation from vote choice (Buendía 1995; Buendía 1996; Magaloni 1999; Mercado 1997; Zechmeister 2004). I will utilize survey data from the first panel study in Mexico, which covers the period 2000-2002, in order to observe if party ID is different from, and more stable than, vote intention⁷. Using the same analytical framework that settled the debate in the countries already described, the present study resolves the controversy about the value and utility of party ID as both as a dependent and an independent variable.

Some scholars refused to use party ID as an independent variable to explain vote choice in Mexico because they argue that the high correlation observed between party ID and vote choice derived from the fact that Mexican voters' response confused the party they identify with as the party they would vote for. Buendía mentions,

“Party identification (PID) is a variable that in the United States has been very useful to predict party choice. In the case of Mexico, however, is practically equivalent to the vote and therefore the concept loses most of its explanatory power (PID's high correlation with the vote makes it also useless for statistical purposes)” (Buendía 1995), p.7.

In his study, Buendía gives neither a theoretical explanation on why party ID was highly correlated with vote intention, nor an analysis that could give at least an

⁷ Participants in the Mexico 2000 Panel Study included (in alphabetical order) Miguel Basañez, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Federico Estévez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Pablo Parás, and Alejandro Poiré. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-9905703) and *Reforma* newspaper. Technical details on the Mexico 2000 Panel Study, as well as copies of the survey instruments, are available at: http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/lawson/Explanation_of_data.pdf.

implication of the degree of similarity of these two variables over time. This chapter has demonstrated that party ID and vote choice are different concepts for American, British, Canadian, and even Dutch voters. According to Buendía, retrospective economic evaluations are the most important predictors of vote choice (Buendía 1995; Buendía 1996).

Conversely, those who have included party ID in their studies as an independent variable had given to it the most important role in explaining vote choice, although they overlooked the reasons why party ID was highly correlated with vote intention. Moreno and Yanner argue that party ID was the main predictor of the 1994 Presidential vote, although they admitted that a reliable measure of party ID should be found for the Mexican case (Moreno and Yanner 1995). These authors mention that,

“Because partisanship seems to be a consistent predictor of vote choice in Mexico, a standard measure should be developed. The concept of party identification applied to the American electorate needs to find its counterpart among analysts of Mexican politics. Otherwise, it will be difficult to assess the changing patterns of electoral behavior in Mexico in the coming years” (Moreno and Yanner 1995), p. 22.

A third approach was that of those scholars who included in some of their studies a lagged value of party ID as an independent variable to explain vote choice, not without acknowledging its high correlation with vote intention (Magaloni and Poiré 2003a; Magaloni and Poiré 2003b)⁸. In Magaloni and Poiré’s results, one-wave lagged party ID is statistically significant as a vote choice predictor for each major party. Just as Buendía, and Moreno and Yanner, these authors did not focus on explaining why there is a high correlation between party ID and vote choice.

In Mexico, do citizens change their party when they change their vote? Having observed the approach carried out in the studies that compared party ID and vote choice in the aforementioned developed democracies, I look at party ID stability over time by analyzing the 1st and 5th waves of the Mexico 2000-2002 Panel Study⁹ to determine if party ID is different from vote choice, and therefore if it is relevant to be included as an independent variable when explaining vote choice. I suggest the following hypotheses:

H₁: in Mexico, party ID is different from vote intention.

Although party ID and vote choice are highly correlated (party ID is the main predictor of vote intention), partisans do not vote their party at all times. It is expected that short-term forces, such as political campaigns or candidate traits, also influence vote choice without necessarily modifying voters' party ID. That is, partisans may keep their party ID even if they sporadically voted for a party different from the one they identify with. To test *H₁*, I observe partisans' party voting over a two-year period using panel data and examine if changes in vote intention led to changes in party ID, or vice-versa.

H₂: in Mexico, party ID is more stable than vote choice.

To test *H₂*, I contrast party ID with vote intention from 2000 to 2002, and expect that the proportion of individuals with a stable party ID is higher than the proportion of those with a stable vote choice (as in the United States, Britain, and Canada). I also

⁸ Following Fiorina (1981), retrospective evaluations are the input that makes party ID increase or decrease over time. Nonetheless, if party ID at time *t* already encompasses retrospective evaluations of performance at time *t-1*, then party ID at time *t* should be used, and not party ID at time *t-1*.

⁹ The 1st and 5th waves of the 2000-2002 Mexico Panel Study were chosen because they are the most similar in many ways: 1) They are the farthest apart from election day (the 1st wave was carried out 5 months previous to the 2000 presidential election, while the 5th wave was carried out 11 months previous to the 2003 mid-term Congressional election; 2) The 5th wave was the only wave carried out before the 2003 mid-term congressional election; 3) While the 1st wave contains the most cases of all panel waves (N=2355), the 5th wave contains an additional battery of party ID questions that were not asked in previous

expect that the proportion of stable partisans who change their vote is higher than the proportion of those who voted the same party but changed their party ID, just as the abovementioned studies demonstrated. Finally, if it is demonstrated that party ID is more stable than vote choice then H_1 (party ID is different from vote intention) will be supported, making party ID worthwhile for further research.

Table 2.8

PID IN MEXICO BY PARTY, 2000-2002					
	Party Identification			Party Voting for Congress^a	
	<i>1st wave</i>	<i>5th wave</i>	<i>Loyalty^b</i>	<i>1st wave</i>	<i>5th wave</i>
PRI	41%	33%	60%	77%	77%
PAN	28	34	65	72	80
PRD	11	12	56	62	74
Other Parties	1	1	33	50	65
Independents^c	15	17	28	-	-
DK	5	3	5	-	-
TOTAL	100%	100%			

^a Percentage of partisans who voted their party at the Congressional election.

^b Percentage of partisans in the 1st wave who had the same party ID in the 5th wave.

^c Independent leaners were coded as partisans.

Source : 1st and 5th waves, Mexico 2000-2002 Panel Study

The losses in the number of partisans the PRI could have suffered in the past were more evident after 2000, when the PRI lost the Presidency to the PAN for the first time

waves, and that enhances the present analysis. It is important to mention that even though the N for the 5th wave is 2183, only 994 respondents were interviewed in both waves.

after more than seven decades. Table 2.8 shows that among the major parties, from 2000 to 2002, the PRI was the only one that lost partisans (from 41 to 33%), while the PAN earned the most (from 28 to 34%); and the proportion of Perredistas and independents remained basically intact (from 11 to 12% for Perredistas; from 15 to 17% for independents). Half of those Priístas that changed their party ID became Panistas (52%), and one fifth (20%) became identified with the PRD and other parties, while around a third (28%) turned to be ‘pure’ independents (data not shown). Although the high proportion of Priístas that changed to the PAN from 2000 to 2002 suggests a partisan ‘realignment’, it is indispensable to observe this variable again right before the 2006 Presidential elections through an additional wave in this panel study to confirm such idea. That is, if the exodus of Priístas in 2006 follows the same routes as in 2002, then a stronger argument could be made in favor of a partisan realignment, from the PRI to the PAN, and in favor of a dealignment, from the PRI to ‘pure’ independents.

Even though there were major changes in the vote that led to the historical outcome of the 2000 Presidential election, the proportion of those partisans who remained identified with the same party from 2000 to 2002 was equivalent across parties. The PAN, besides being the party that was favored the most with the conversion of partisans from other parties, also had the highest proportion of *loyal* partisans: Two thirds of Panistas in February 2000 were Panistas in August 2002 (65%), three out of five Priístas were *loyal* (60%) despite their party’s significant loss in 2000, and more than half of Perredistas (56%) mentioned still being attached to their party over the same period. Only less than a third of independents remained unattached to any party (28%). The PAN’s first-ever Presidential victory in 2000 was crucial not only in converting more

partisans to the PAN, but also in preserving the emotional bond of those who were already Panistas.

How did changes in party ID affect vote intention? And most importantly, to what extent did changes in vote choice approximate changes in party ID? If party ID and vote intention are ‘identical’ in Mexico, as has been suggested in previous studies, then it should be very likely that partisans vote their party consistently. The last two columns of table 2.8 show that this is not the case. Among the three major parties (PRI, PAN and PRD), the proportion of partisans who voted their party for Congress ranges from 62 to 77 percent in 2000, and from 74 to 80 percent in 2002. Panistas and Priistas were the partisans that voted the most their party for Congress (77 percent of Priistas did so in both elections; 72 of Panistas did it in 2000 and 80 percent in 2002), while Perredistas were the partisans that voted their party the least (62% in 2000, and 74% in 2002). The fact that partisans of the three major Mexican parties did not vote their party at all times, neither in 2000 nor in 2002, gives preliminary evidence that will lead to rejecting the null hypothesis that party ID and vote intention are ‘identical’ in Mexico: Party ID does not change simultaneously with vote choice: It takes at least an electoral cycle to change party ID.

Table 2.9 compares the stability of party ID and vote choice for the three major parties in Mexico¹⁰ using the same format from previous studies that analyzed party ID

¹⁰ Table 2.9 excludes independents, small parties and ‘do not know’ as individual categories. That is, either those that claimed to be independents, that were identified with a small party, that voted a small party, or that did not know which party they were going to vote for *in both waves* were excluded from the analysis. Such decision was taken on the grounds that 1) Independents were not a major group in the distribution (-see table 2.8); and 2) The difference between including them or not was negligible (the table that includes these categories is in the appendix -see table A2.1).

stability in other countries, and shows that party ID is more stable than (and different from) vote choice.

Table 2.9

PID STABILITY IN MEXICO*				
2000-2002				
Vote intention (Congress)				
		<i>Stable</i>	<i>Variable</i>	
PID	<i>Stable</i>	38	16	54
	<i>Variable</i>	7	38	46
		46	54	<i>N</i> = 869

*Excludes independents, small parties, and do not know.

Pearson chi-square (1) Pr = 0.000; Cramer's V = 0.5437

Source: 1st and 5th waves, Mexico 2000-2002 Panel Study

Party ID in Mexico was more stable than vote choice from 2000 to 2002 (54% remained identified with the same party, while 46% voted the same party). The Mexican case resembles those of Britain, the United States and Canada where individuals usually do not change their party when they change their vote. That is, Mexicans were over twice as likely to change their vote but retain their party ID as the reverse (16 versus 7%), just as the evidence shown from these countries also suggested that party ID was more stable than vote choice¹¹. That is, along with the fact that Mexican partisans did not vote their party at all times (table 2.8), showing that party ID is more stable than vote choice strongly suggests that party ID is different from vote choice in Mexico. This finding

¹¹ In order to most resemble the studies by Cain and Ferejohn, and by Butler and Stokes, independent leaners were coded as partisans, which is also in compliance with previous research on the subject. See: Keith, Bruce, David Magleby, Candice Nelson, Elizabeth Orr, Mark Westlye, and Raymond Wolfinger. 1992. *The Myth of the Independent Voter*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

shows that Mexican voters maintain their party ID similarly to voters in other developed democracies.

Nevertheless, around 70% of those Mexicans who changed their vote changed their party (38%/54%), a similar proportion to the one observed in the Netherlands, which suggests a high fluidity in the Mexican party system. The fluidity in the Dutch party system was used to explain that party ID was less stable than vote choice, emphasizing that there were more voters that changed their party ID without changing their vote choice than the other way around (10 versus 6% -see table 2.6). While in the Netherlands, however, party system fluidity was said to cause party ID instability, in the Mexican case such fluidity does not modify the fact that the proportion of those with a stable party ID is higher than the proportion of individuals with a stable vote intention¹². Contrary to the Dutch case, where individuals seem to have a lax emotional attachment that allows them to switch their allegiances across parties adjacent in the ideological spectrum, partisan conversions in Mexico, when applicable, seem to be mostly from the PRI either to other parties or to independents. Overall, individuals' party ID was less affected than their electoral choices by the fluidity in the Mexican party system,

¹² The existence of a multiparty system in Mexico is fostered with a low percentage of the national vote (2%) political parties need, among other requirements, to keep their registration, together with the election of members of Congress by a mixed electoral system, with 300 in single-member majority districts, and 200 using proportional representation. Thus, while 11 political parties took part in the 2000 presidential election and 8 of them remained registered for the next election, for the 2003 mid-term congressional election there were also registered 11 parties (3 were new), although many of them have been re-grouped in different alliances and coalitions, not only at the federal but also at the local level. After the 2003 mid-term election, only 6 of them remain registered for the 2006 Presidential election. A proof of such fluidity is the victory of the Panista presidential candidate Vicente Fox in 2000, attracting most of the independents' vote. At the congressional mid-term election in 2003, however, most of those independents abandoned Fox's party either to support other party or to abstain. See, Moreno, Alejandro. 2002. *The Coalition for Change: Voters, Parties, and Democratic Transition in Mexico*. Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Review, at Boston, MA, Moreno, Alejandro. 2003. *El Votante Mexicano*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica and Estrada, Luis. 2003a. *Determinantes y Características de los Independientes en México*. Paper read at the Seminario para el Análisis de Encuestas Nacionales sobre Cultura Política y Prácticas Ciudadanas, 8-10 de septiembre de 2003, at Ciudad de México.

supporting the idea that party ID can be useful as a theoretical concept, even in times of party change.

Another way of showing the stability of party ID in Mexico is to observe the distribution of the length of stable partisanship across different age groups. As individuals age, they strengthen their party ID (Converse 1969), and is expected that the proportion of stable partisans also increases. Table 2.10 shows the distribution of the length of stable partisanship from 2000 to 2002 by age cohorts.

Table 2.10

<i>Since when do you consider yourself... (Panista, Priista, or Perredista)</i>	LENGTH OF STABLE PID IN MEXICO BY AGE, 2000-2002^a				
	<i>AGE GROUPS^b</i>				
	18 to 26*	27 to 38**	39 to 50**	51 + **	All**
Less than 2 years	32	11	9	5	13
Between 2 and 5 years	43	26	9	9	20
Between 5 and 10 years	16	19	12	15	15
More than 10 years	9	45	70	69	52
DK/NR	1	0	0	2	1
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>N</i>	82	114	115	128	439

** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$ (Pearson χ^2 test)

^aEach age cluster is divided by groups of individuals who turned 18 years old in the same year of a federal election, presidential or mid-term congressional. Those who were 18 in 2000 were 20 in 2002; those who were 18 in 1997 were 23 in 2002; those who were 18 in 1994 were 26 in 2002; those who were 18 in 1991 were 29 in 2002, and so on.

^bThe *N* for each age group is: 18-26 years old = 210; 27-38 = 269; 39-50 = 225; at least 51 years old = 225; All = 931.

Source: 1st and 5th waves, Mexico 2000-2002 Panel Study

The number of stable partisans increases as age increases: it goes from 82 among those individuals between 18 and 26 years old to 128 among those over 50 years old.

Nevertheless, although more than half of stable partisans have been attached to their party at least for a decade (52%), a considerable third of stable partisans (33%) claim to have been identified with the same party for five years or less. An important portion of new stable partisans has been attached to the same party since 1997, year in which the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time.

In general, larger proportions of *older* stable partisans have been attached to their party for longer periods of time (69% of those over 50 years old have been identifying with their party over a decade), while larger proportions of *younger* stable partisans have had their party allegiance only for a few years (75% of those younger than 27 years old have been identifying with the same party no more than five years). This finding is in agreement with Converse (1969), who argued that party ID increases with age, being the length of stable partisanship a key element in observing the endurance of the emotional allegiance towards political parties. Nevertheless, the length of stable partisanship is categorically different for each major party. The 5th wave of the Mexico 2000-2002 Panel Study included a battery of questions that were useful to gain insight about the acquisition of party ID. Table 2.11 shows the distribution of the length of stable party ID among partisans of the three major parties, PAN, PRI, and PRD¹³.

¹³ It should not be true that stable partisans are equally distributed among parties, since there is an important asymmetry in parties' performance retrospective evaluations (Magaloni 1999). At the federal level, the PRI was the ruling party until 2000, while at the local level, the PAN won its first governorship in 1989 (Baja California), and the PRD did so in 1997 (Mexico City). Today, the PRI still holds a majority of state governorships.

Table 2.11

LENGTH OF STABLE PID IN MEXICO BY PARTY, 2000-2002

<i>Since when do you consider yourself... (Panista, Priista, or Perredista)</i>	<i>PRI**</i>	<i>PAN</i>	<i>PRD*</i>	<i>All three parties**</i>
Less than 2 years	5	27	6	13
Between 2 and 5 years	10	32	27	20
Between 5 and 10 years	14	13	27	15
More than 10 years	71	28	37	52
DK/NR	1	0	2	1
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>N</i>	237	151	51	439

** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$ (Pearson χ^2 test)

Source : 1st and 5th waves, Mexico 2000-2002 Panel Study

The distribution of stable partisans according to the length of their partisan attachment is not parallel across parties. The PRI is the party with the most individuals with a stable partisanship ($N = 237$), that is sixty percent more than the PAN ($N = 151$), and over four times than the PRD, which is the party with the least individuals with a stable party ID ($N = 51$). Such disparity is mainly the result of the PRI dominance in Mexican politics: The golden years of economic stability and growth that lasted until the early '70s generated strong sympathies towards the PRI that appear to be difficult to vanish, while the recurrent economic crises since the early '80s have not helped the PRI to recruit new partisans. A very large proportion of stable PRI partisans has been with its party at least over a decade (71%), while only 15 percent have been stable Priístas since 1997, same year when the PRI lost for the first time the majority in the Chamber of Deputies. This finding suggests that the PRI, despite being the party that has more individuals with a stable partisanship, it has been stimulating the least number of

individuals with stable allegiances since 1997, being perhaps one of the main reasons of its historical defeat in the 2000 Presidential election.

Table 2.11 also shows that the PAN is the party that has established new stable emotional connections with the citizenry over the past few years, even before its first-ever victory in the 2000 Presidential election. Nearly two thirds of stable Panistas (59%) have been identified with its party since 1997, and half of them (27%) have been doing so since 2000. Similarly to the PRI, most of stable Perredistas (64%) are those who have had an allegiance towards their party at least for five years (the PRD was founded in 1989). In sum, this evidence suggests that winning or losing elections has a strong impact on whether individuals become attached to any party, or in its case, whether partisans remain attached or not to their own political party, especially between the PRI and the PAN¹⁴.

2.1.6. Conclusions

The present chapter has demonstrated that party ID in Mexico is different from, and more stable than, vote choice. Previous studies on the subject carried out in the late '70s and early '80s for developed democracies reached a similar conclusion by demonstrating that these two variables are different, and that most of those who change their vote do not change their party. An examination on party ID was not carried out in Mexico before mainly because panel data was only available until 2003. Party ID in Mexico has been misconceived in the past. It is an important predictor of vote intention

and not its duplicate, and it is necessary to further study party ID in Mexico, which is the purpose of the present dissertation.

The main findings of this chapter are:

- Around two thirds of partisans of the three major parties in Mexico were loyal to its party allegiance from 2000 to 2002, even after the ‘pivotal’ 2000 Presidential election took place¹⁵, in which the PRI lost for the first time in more than 70 years.
- Nearly 75% of partisans voted their party in 2000 and also nearly two thirds of all partisans did so in 2002, being Priístas and Panistas the partisans that voted their party the most in each of these years.
- Party ID is more stable than vote choice in Mexico, even though 7 out of 10 individuals who changed their vote changed their party. This finding suggests high fluidity and a major change in the Mexican party system, as was demonstrated by the victory of the PAN Presidential candidate in 2000, Vicente Fox.
- As age increases, the number of stable partisans also increases. The proportion of stable partisans is larger among those who have been identifying with the same party for longer periods of time, although there

¹⁴ This hypothesis will be tested in the fourth chapter of the present dissertation, where I use surveys from Mexican states where there has been alternation in gubernatorial elections, from the PRI to the PAN or PRD, and in some cases, where it has gone back to the PRI after being governed by a different party.

¹⁵ See, for example, Dominguez, Jorge, and Chappell Lawson, eds. 2003. *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Candidates, Voters, and the Presidential Campaign of 2000*. Stanford and La Jolla, CA: Stanford University Press and the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD.

is an important portion of new stable partisans since 1997, when the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time.

- As the time length of party allegiance increases, the proportion of stable partisans also increases. This surge is different across parties: 71% of stable Priistas have been with their party at least for a decade, while 64% of stable Perredistas have been attached to their party since 1997. On the contrary, nearly two thirds of stable Panistas (59%) have been with their party since 1997. While the PRI in recent years is not succeeding in attracting loyal partisans, the PAN seems to be the party that is attracting more committed partisans recently, even more after the electoral decline of the PRI since the mid-term 1997 Congressional election.

Although the evidence presented in this chapter suggests partisan realignment (from the PRI to the PAN), and dealignment (from the PRI to pure independents), it is not sufficient to confirm such major changes in partisanship. It has been demonstrated, however, that parties' electoral fate has severe consequences in party allegiances. The 2000 Presidential election marked a critical moment for Mexico, not only because a party different from the PRI won the Presidency for the first time in seven decades, but also because the relationship between individuals and their political parties suffered a main adjustment.

Specifically, confirming that party ID in Mexico is different from vote choice provides the necessary tools to observe the Mexican democratic transition from a different perspective, that one of individuals' relationships with the parties they like and dislike. In the next chapter I will explore the main determinants of party ID in order to

discuss the model that best suits the Mexican case. In the second chapter of the present dissertation I will assess the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of party ID and analyze its validity for the Mexican case, arguing that not only individuals' positive but also negative feelings towards political parties affect party ID.

Negative Party Identification in Mexico

3.1.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter I showed that party identification in Mexico is different from vote choice, just as in other well-established democracies. While the proportion of stable Priistas (still the largest among major parties) has been declining in the past few years, the percentage of stable Panistas has been on the rise, especially after the victory of the PAN's candidate, Vicente Fox, in the presidential election of 2000. Major changes in partisanship and increasing alternation in public office, especially at the state level, have also occurred in recent years.

For over seven consecutive decades, the PRI held the presidency in Mexico. The length of the PRI's ruling period has been compared to the uninterrupted tenures of Communist parties in Soviet bloc countries (Garrido 1986), the Grand National Party in South Korea, and the Kuomintang in Taiwan (Cheng forthcoming; Kishikawa 2000; Solinger 2001). Individuals relentlessly evaluated these parties' long-lasting performance in government, and these evaluations have become the main source of positive as well as negative opinions that portray their current partisan affections. The PRI's failures and successes over its seventy-year ruling period, among other things made it the most loved and hated party in Mexico.

Contrary to what some scholars have previously argued about party identification being *only* the ‘affection’ individuals develop towards political parties (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996; Moreno 2003), I hypothesize that negative feelings –not only positive feelings– determine party identification in Mexico. That is, I argue that Mexican voters nurture their party identification according to both their likes and dislikes of parties. Specifically, some Mexican voters would prefer *anything but* the long-ruling PRI, just as if they hold a ‘negative party identification’ towards the PRI. Negative party identification, however, should not be exclusive to Mexico: It is more likely to find strong aversion either to former long-ruling parties or to some specific parties in most multiparty systems, as political competition in two-party systems is *per se* antagonistic.

The present chapter proceeds as follows: First, I will analyze the concept of party identification (party ID) criticizing its alleged resemblance to religion, and exploring in more detail the analogy of party ID with preferences for sports teams which, I argue, is more suitable for multiparty emerging democracies. Second, I will review the literature on negativity towards political parties by highlighting the main shortcomings of the idea of “negative party ID” developed for the British case and for some post-Communist countries. Third, I will suggest a model that includes individuals’ retrospective evaluations of government performance as well as negative feelings towards the PRI as the main determinants of party ID in Mexico, testing data from six national household surveys carried out in election years over the period 1988-2003 (three from presidential elections and three from mid-term congressional elections). Finally, I will discuss the

impact of incorporating negative feelings as a major determinant of party ID, particularly in multiparty emerging democracies.

3.1.2. Is Party Identification Analogous to Religion?

Some scholars argue that two of the most important features of party ID are its early acquisition in life, as well as its growth as individuals age (Converse 1969). Studies of political socialization argued that individuals obtain their party ID at the bosom of their families, directly from one or both of their parents (Jennings and Niemi 1968), although later, Jennings and Niemi demonstrated that such ‘inherited’ party ID was less than perfect, resulting in offspring identified with a party different than any or both their parents’ (Jennings and Niemi 1974). Moreover, it was found that party ID increases with age: As individuals get older, their allegiance towards a political party is strengthened, since they are more likely to increase their electoral experience (measured as the opportunities they have to vote their party) which may, in turn, reinforce their party ID (Converse 1969). In other words, once children acquire their party ID, it will be reinforced through the accumulation of voting experience in the course of their adult life. Further, it has been argued that social characteristics are key in orienting individuals’ political preferences, since interpersonal relationships and group membership mediate the acquisition and processing of political information as states, “A person thinks, politically, as he is socially” (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948). Both the origins and development of party ID, as well as its endurance as an individual’s self-conception, has led some authors to explicitly suggest that party ID is analogous to religion

(Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Miller and Shanks 1996).

Based on the premise that political parties are “standard-setting groups” that, by evoking special interests, discriminate the population in clusters with similar characteristics, Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954) mentioned that a party attachment is similar to “church preference” because parents pass it to their children (who are subject to the “same group influences” as their parents) and remains stable over time (p. 98).

Moreover, Miller and Shanks (1996) referred to the same analogy, more than four decades later, to indicate that party ID is similar to following a religion because it is often originated within the family through a process of early socialization; partisans, as church followers, identify with a larger group of adherents that are not formally enrolled; and a political party provides, just as the Church, not only the structure that helps to understand the external world, but also the elements to judge it normatively:

“The sense of self in the religious context is clearly established by the sense of ‘We are Roman Catholic,’ ‘I am a Jew’; in politics, ‘We are Democrats’ or ‘I am a Republican’.” (Miller and Shanks 1996), p. 120.

Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) agree that party ID is analogous to religion because it starts in early adulthood and is stable over time. They also emphasize that religion worship and political partisanship are both forms of social identifications:

“Our view, which hearkens back to earlier social-psychological perspectives on partisanship, draws a parallel between party identification and religious identification. Partisan attachments form relatively early in adulthood. To be sure, party issue positions have something to do with the attractiveness

of partisan labels to young adults, much as religion doctrines have something to do with the attractiveness of religious denominations. But causality also flows in the other direction: When people feel a sense of belonging to a given social group, they absorb the doctrinal positions that the group advocates. However party and religious identification come about, once they take root in early adulthood, they often persist.” (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), p. 4.

Based on its alleged stability over time and its immunity against short-term events such as political campaigns, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler believe that party ID is a social identity that may resemble religion, ethnicity, or social class, and in which partisan groups are clear references for social orientation. According to these authors, individuals identify with a political party because they become part of a group of like-minded people that share similar interests and opinions, to a varying degree, that distinguish themselves from other social groups.

The analogy of party ID as a religion emphasizes the idea that party ID is a stable emotional bond that is not easily shed once acquired. Some caveats, however, should be considered: The stability of the American bipartisan system and other well-established democracies¹⁶ cultivates the idea of the resemblance of party ID with religion; multiparty systems and emerging democracies are relatively less stable, while their different dynamics may diminish the accuracy of the comparison between party ID and religion; and comparing party ID with following a religion seems more suitable when religions are strongly associated with political parties. In the United States, for instance, Protestantism has been related to the Republican Party while Catholicism has been associated with the

¹⁶ For Green, Schickler and Palmquist, the analogy of party ID with religion stands throughout their argument, since the countries they include in their comparative chapter are Great Britain, Germany, and Canada, all of which have, at least for the period analyzed, an ‘effective’ number of national parties near to

Democratic Party (Belknap and Campbell 1952; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948), which reinforces the idea of the ‘exclusivity’ of group identification.

The comparison of party ID with following a religion, however, leaves aside the role of retrospective evaluations of parties’ performance, which is not only one of the major reasons for voting for or against a specific party, but is also among the most important sources individuals consider when choosing which party they will root for at first. As will be explained in the next section, since parties’ reputations depend on retrospective evaluations, especially in the context of multiparty emerging democracies, it seems more apt to compare party identification with a preference for a sports team.

3.1.3. Party Identification as a Preference for a Sports Team

The comparison of party ID with religion is premised upon the assumptions about the origins and the stability of party ID. Further research, however, has demonstrated that individuals’ party ID is dynamic: it could either increase or decrease mostly as a function of individuals’ retrospective evaluations of parties’ performance (Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Goldberg 1969; Popkin et al. 1976). Moreover, the electoral experience individuals consolidate through their adult life is more than just their opportunities to vote. Party ID is a summary judgment that encapsulates individuals’ evaluations of political parties’ performance, not only directly being in function of early

two. Their analogy does not fit their argument when they include Italy, which its effective number of parties is more than two.

socialization, but also indirectly in function of individuals' accumulation of parties' performance evaluations (Fiorina 1981, p. 76).

Three main factors contribute to make it more convenient to think of party ID as a preference for a sports team rather than following a religion: First, the possibility that individuals can adjust the intensity of party ID based on retrospective evaluations of parties' performance; second, a pervasive rivalry in politics among political parties as well as among candidates; and third, in most of the cases, individuals *choose* their party ID as well as their sports team, contrary to following a religion, which is usually *inherited* right after birth. It is true that the analogy of party ID with following a religion is not entirely mistaken, since both are social identities, but to think of party ID as a preference for a sports team, however, helps not only explaining the initial stages of partisanship configuration, but also reinforces the argument about its dynamics through adult life¹⁷. When competition among political parties is novel, just as in many emerging democracies, retrospective evaluations about government performance become a major source of individuals' party ID. Ultimately, as retrospective evaluations cumulate, they may strengthen or 'erode' individual party allegiances, which in the extreme, might be re-oriented towards another party, or even disappear, as it will be discussed in the next section.

Party identification is analogous to a preference for a sports team because: 1) sports 'fanship' is a social identity that is usually originated early in life within the family, assembled by supporters that are not formally enrolled; 2) sports 'fanship' and

¹⁷ For instance, Moreno (2003) does not favor either one or the other for the Mexican case, although his argument seems to follow the traditional analogy of party ID with religion.

political partisanship are perceptual screens that ease and color the interpretation of their environment; 3) fans, as well as partisans, show different attitudes according to their degree of allegiance; 4) fans keep rooting for their team despite the realization that their contribution to its outcomes is marginal; and most important, 5) as a result of the competition in both sports and politics, fans and partisans are more likely to support successful teams or parties, making the assessment of their performance one of the most important factors in deciding which team/party they will support.

According to research in social psychology, support for a sports team represents an extension of the self, and helps reaffirm individuals' own identity (Schafer 1969). Moreover, it has been argued that social categorization guides individuals to create and define their own place in society (Turner and Oakes 1989), since individuals satisfy their emotional needs by becoming part of a social group as long as it has a positive-valued distinctiveness from other groups (Tajfel 1978).

Some experiments in sports psychology found that the most common reason for fans to *originally* support a sports team was that their parents or members of their family followed that team; the most important reason to *currently* follow a sports team was that the team was successful; and the most important reason to *no longer* support a sports team was that it became unsuccessful (Wann, Tucker, and Schrader 1996). The assessment of a team's performance is, therefore, the key link between a team and its fans. Individuals tend to partake the victory of a successful other, with whom they share some association (basking in reflected glory, or *BIRG*) (Cialdini et al. 1976), while they also actively avoid being associated to unsuccessful or negatively-evaluated others (cutting off reflected failure, or *CORFing*) (Snyder, Higgins, and Stucky 1983).

“People display even the most noninstrumental connections between themselves and the success of others so as to receive positive evaluations from the observers of those connections.” (Cialdini et al. 1976), p. 372.

The team’s record is seen through a fan’s eyes as a personal record (Sloan 1979). Researchers have shown that every victory of the team is a personal success while a team’s defeat is a personal failure. If their team wins, fans tend to say WE won, and if their team loses, fans tend to say THEY lost (Cialdini, et al. 1976, p. 370). Individuals’ both self-esteem and mood are affected by their team’s outcome (Hirt et al. 1992).

Fans choose their team based on its record, but once chosen, the difficulty of switching teams is proportional to their fanship intensity: Weaker (run-of-the-mill/fair-weather) fans are more likely than strong (die-hard) supporters to abandon their team once it starts losing; conversely, stronger fans are more likely to stick with their party despite any bad patch (Hirt et al. 1992), and are more affected than weaker fans by their team’s outcome: When their team loses, stronger fans usually blame their team’s loss on the referees’ decisions or simply on bad luck rather than acknowledge their rival’s skills (Wann and Dolan 1994). Stronger fans are more likely than weaker fans to think positively of their own team after it has suffered a defeat (Dietz-Uhler and Murrell 1999).

The similarity of political parties and sports teams has been discussed before, comparing parties’ electoral behavior as firms’ behavior in a competitive market (Downs 1957; North 1990). Even some scholars who defend the party ID analogy with following a religion have mentioned that party ID may be like a preference for a sports team, although had not completely admitted its resemblance, supporting the notion about the impossibility fans have to influence their team’s outcomes (Green, Palmquist, and

Schickler 2002), p. 219. It has been argued, however, that stronger fans keep cheering for their team despite knowing that their contribution for their team's victory is marginal (Murrell and Dietz-Uhler 1992), just as voters realize that the probability that their vote will be decisive in an election outcome is virtually zero (Riker and Ordeshook 1968).

The competition and rivalry among political parties as well as among sports teams, and the resulting evaluations of performance, support the analogy of party ID with a preference for a sports team: 'I am a Democrat', or 'We are Priístas' in the same sense as 'I cheer for the Cubs', or 'We are Real Madrid fans'. As it will be explained below, in multiparty systems, just as in sports, individuals are more likely to identify simultaneously with more than one party. Moreover, it is also more likely that even though individuals do not hold a preference for a specific party (may not cheer for any team), they may dislike one (they would root for any team but one in particular). In emerging democracies, after one party has ruled for a long period of time, its extended performance generates individuals' preference and aversion. The connection between positive and negative feelings as a main source of party ID is explored in the next section.

3.1.4. Hostility and Negative Feelings towards Parties

'Active' learning theories affirm that individuals choose what to learn from both positive and negative information (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). It has been argued that individuals' endorsement of parties' performance may produce positive feelings that enhance individuals' allegiance towards parties, just as disapproving evaluations may generate negative sentiments that decrease individuals' party ID, even up to a point where

it fades completely (Fiorina 1981). Not only positive, but also negative feelings towards parties, derived from retrospective evaluations on their performance, are a main component of party ID.

The ‘hostility’ towards political parties has been explored in two-party systems as an element that may improve the correct measurement of party ID (Goot 1972; Maggiotto and Piereson 1977; Weisberg 1980). It has been argued that negativity, not only indifference (neutrality) towards parties, is a major source of partisanship decline in the United States in the past decades (Craig 1987; Wattenberg 1981; Wattenberg 1984), as well as the main reason of the decline in the President’s party mid-term congressional vote (Kernell 1977). Competition in two-party systems, however, is antagonistic. Individuals’ likelihood of abandoning their party ID, for instance, is inversely related to the degree of hostility towards the other party (Maggiotto and Piereson 1977): “The more I hate the other party, the less likely I am to leave my own”.

Multiparty systems offer more suitable grounds than two party systems to test the idea of negative feelings towards political parties as a main element of party ID. Some scholars argue that individuals are more likely in multiparty systems than in two-party systems to be identified with more than one party (Eijk and Niemöller 1983; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). On the other hand, political independents, just as sports spectators that do not root for any team in particular, may prefer *anything but* a specific party: ‘I cheer for any soccer team but América’ in the same sense as ‘I like any party but the PRI’. Certainly, for those who lack an emotional attachment towards a political party, ‘negative’ feelings may also be an important source of partisan orientations.

There are few studies that approach negative party identification, and their authors do it from entirely different perspectives. For the British case, Crewe typified as *negative partisans* those individuals whose negative feelings towards their party were stronger than the positive ones, leaving aside contrasts between parties' performance (Crewe 1976; Crewe 1980). Crewe acknowledges, as a possible objection to his argument (without addressing it), that party ID may be the sum of positive as well as negative feelings towards different political parties:

“Another possible objection is that conventional party ID is, in fact, an *amalgamation* of positive feelings towards the one party and hostile feelings towards the other; that in declaring a ‘strength’ of party ID, the respondent is summarizing his feelings towards two parties, not one.” (Crewe 1980), p. 11
(*emphasis added*)

Besides measuring only the relative strength of individuals' positive and negative feelings towards their own party, Crewe's study does not consider political independents¹⁸, a segment of the electorate that may well express its hate towards a political party despite not being identified with any other (Blake 1982). In contrast, I argue that positive and negative feelings should be considered *jointly* as sources of partisan orientations, emphasizing the role of political independents, which represents a major proportion of the electorate in most emerging multiparty democracies. Polarized competition in two-party systems, as in Great Britain or the United States, offers a partial setting for studying individuals' negative partisan feelings.

¹⁸ The exclusion of independents in British studies is motivated in good part by the pioneering study on British party ID that suggests that the concept of ‘independent voter’ is not well established in the British electorate. See, Butler, D., and Donald Stokes. 1969. *Political Change in Great Britain*. New York: St. Martin's.

Multiparty democracies emerging in post-Communist countries, or in countries where a dominant party lost for the first time after many years, as in Mexico, are ideal to test and develop the concept of negative party ID. For example, although the debate about party ID in post-Communist countries is far from settled¹⁹ (Miller and Klobucar 2000; Miller and Klobucar 2002; Mishler and Rose 1997; Rose 1995), some researchers have labeled as *negative party identification* the answer survey respondents give to the question about which party they would *never* vote for (Rose and Mishler 1998). Mishler and Rose (1997), and Rose (1995) argue, based on previous research about post-Communist citizens' skepticism towards their institutions (especially political parties) that the *only* salient cleavage in one-party states is the affection or hate individuals develop towards the governing party (Rose and Mishler 1998), and found that while less than a third of respondents in the 1995 New Democracies Barometer survey (carried out in Romania, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia) felt close to a party (30%), over three-fourths (77%) mentioned a party they would never vote for (Rose and Mishler 1998).

The question Rose and Mishler used to measure negative party ID allowed individuals to pick more than one party²⁰, which in conjunction with highly-fragmented and numerous party systems, resulted in individuals mentioning several parties they would never vote for (including Communist, ethnic, and other small parties). For Rose

¹⁹ Without an agreement on a standard question for measuring party ID, some authors argue in favor of the lasting effects of the former Soviet regime on the deteriorated relationship between individuals and their political institutions, which result in the individuals' lack of trust on their political parties (Mishler and Rose 1997; Rose 1995). Conversely, other authors argue that the emergence of democracy in post-Communist countries conveyed the arrival of many small parties that, embedded in parliamentary regimes, led to a considerable fragmentation of the party system, which has not helped strengthening individuals' party attachments, and favor instead the 'orientation' towards a bloc of parties as the cue that eases the acquisition of party ID in post-Communist countries (Miller and Klobucar 2000; 2002).

²⁰ The questions used to measure positive and negative party ID were: "Do you feel close to one political party or movement not?" and "Now please put a cross by the names of *all those parties* that you would never vote for" (*emphasis added*) (Rose and Mishler 1998), p. 222.

and Mishler, skepticism on political institutions makes individuals more likely to name political parties they would never vote for rather than to mention parties towards they have developed any affection.

In sum, previous research on negative party ID has focused on two-party systems (Great Britain) and when assessed in multiparty systems (post-Communist countries), it presented some measurement concerns. In the next section, I will analyze negative party ID for the Mexican case by focusing specifically on the negative feelings individuals had developed towards the long-ruling PRI.

3.1.5. Negative Party Identification in Mexico

The PRI ruled Mexico from 1929 until 2000, a 70-year period in which no one observed the performance of any ‘opposition’ party at the national level. Political parties different from the PRI still participated in elections despite facing electoral fraud at times (Cornelius and Craig 1991), increasingly won elections for local and federal representatives, city mayors, state senators, and governors before 2000²¹. Despite the lack of alternation in the presidency, the Mexican transition to democracy was not hindered because federalism, understood as the victories parties had at the local level, functioned as a major key of power allocation (Lujambio 1995).

When evaluating parties’ performance at higher office levels, Mexicans faced an asymmetry between a well-known incumbent (PRI) and lesser-known challengers (PAN, PRD, and other parties). In recent years, however, the vote proportion for the two major

‘opposition’ parties, PAN and PRD, as well as their victories in municipalities and state governorships, has increased. Opposition parties strongly campaigned demonstrating their competence and extrapolating their local government experience (as city mayors) first to the state (as governors), and then to the national level, so individuals could infer their performance based on such “demonstration effect”. Further, these parties have been trying to convince individuals that alternation is a *sine qua non* requisite for democracy in Mexico, and have formed partisan coalitions at the state and national levels in order to try to defeat the PRI. Conversely, some individuals still vote for the PRI despite its consecutive economic flaws: the PRI campaigns on its expertise, appealing to the risk-aversion of a segment of the electorate that stick with the Devil it knows (Cinta 1999; Magaloni 1999; Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001). Evaluations of parties’ performance, whether deducted from previous experiences, based on cautious calculations, or simply reflected in an anti-PRI feeling, have been a major component in fostering political competitiveness in Mexico.

The PRI’s successes and failures over its long tenure have been echoed in its electoral fate. The recurring economic crises of the early 80s and mid-90s were a burden that increased the decline in the PRI’s electoral support at the national level, resulting in its loss of a majority in Congress for the first time in 1997, and its loss of the Presidency three years later for the first time as well. The late PRI poor performance made many individuals angry, especially the young ones who had grown up experiencing only economic catastrophes. Negative retrospective evaluations of the PRI, however, are not the only source for anti-PRI feelings. There might be events or circumstances besides the

²¹ It was until 1989 when a party different from the PRI, the right-wing PAN, won its first governorship in

assessment of government performance that may induce individuals to dislike a political party²².

According to scholars' analyses of parties' platforms over time, there are two dimensions of partisan competition in Mexico: one 'ideological' and one 'strategic-tactical' (Molinar 1991). On the one hand, the *ideological* dimension places the PRD at the center-left of the axis, the PRI at the center-right, and the PAN at the right (Molinar 1991). By being at the two extremes of the ideological axis, the differences between PAN and PRD have deterred them to coalesce at the national level, driving each party to run by itself in order to defeat the PRI (Magaloni 1995)²³. On the other hand, the anger towards the PRI is represented in the strategic-tactical dimension, which emphasizes the rivalry between the PRI and the major opposition parties, PAN and PRD: Based on attitudes towards the regime, parties are distributed over a *strategic-tactical* dimension that was described as a set of pro/anti-regime political postures, including authoritarianism vs. democracy, human rights, judiciary law, federalism, and voting rights. Over the *strategic-tactical* axis, the PRD is placed at an extremist position against the regime, personified by the PRI, leaving the PAN in the center, closer to the PRI than to the PRD (Molinar 1991).

the northern state of Baja California. As of today, the PRI still holds a majority of state governorships and local congresses.

²² There might be individuals that, despite evaluating the PRI performance positively, still dislike the party for other motives, such as ideology or personal experiences.

²³ Electoral rules had also put restrictions on coalition formation, see Becerra, Ricardo, Pedro Salazar, and José Woldenberg. 2000. *La Mecánica del Cambio Político en México*. México: Cal y Arena. Moreover, the *winner-takes-all* feature of presidential regimes fosters each major party to pursue victory on its own, without any interest to share the benefits with other major coalition members. For a discussion on the features of presidentialism see, for example, Linz, Juan. 1994. Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference? In *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, edited by J. Linz and A. Valenzuela. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

The *strategic-tactical* (pro/anti-PRI) dimension has influenced not only Mexicans' voting choices but their evaluations towards political parties as well (Magaloni 1995). This dimension is the most salient in guiding Mexican's voting choices as explained by a model that suggests that individuals' vote consists of 'two-steps' (Dominguez and McCann 1995): In the first step, individuals vote for *or* against the PRI, as if it was a plebiscite; in the second step, those who decided *not to* support the PRI choose between the two main opposition parties, PAN and PRD, on an ideological basis. The anti-PRI dimension has increasingly determined Mexicans' electoral decisions, as political parties have been focusing their campaigns on the issue of 'permanence' versus 'change'. Some examples of elections where voters chose *strategically* the party that could defeat the PRI with most certainty include the first-ever mayoral election in Mexico City in 1997 (Estrada 1999), and the 2000 presidential election (Magaloni and Poiré 2003b). The increasing likelihood of a PRI defeat at the national level in recent years polarized the opinions in favor and against the PRI.

Is the PRI the most hated party In Mexico? If so, which consequences have negative feelings towards the PRI had on shaping individuals' allegiances towards parties? What is the impact of party performance evaluations in the origins and development of party ID, considering the disproportion of parties' government experience? In order to find out the determinants of individuals' party allegiances in Mexico, I study party ID by pooling six national household surveys for the period 1988-2003²⁴, and suggest the following hypotheses:

²⁴ The main goal of pooling all surveys is to increase sample size and, as will be mentioned below, to get more precise estimators and test statistics with more power.

H₃: In Mexico, evaluations of parties' performance are a major cue in orienting individuals' allegiances towards political parties.

Just as sports teams' records may attract new fans or discourage weak supporters, the approval or disapproval of government performance may convince individuals to sympathize with a new party, drive them to dislike the old conniving one and then either switch to another party, or maybe not like any party at all. In the previous chapter I showed that the PAN has attracted half of its stable partisans during the past five years (a third in the last two years, after its first-ever victory in the 2000 presidential election), while the PRI and the PRD had barely gained new stable partisans in the last five-year period. Here, I expect to observe an increase over time in the proportion of partisans (other than Priistas) and independents, given the increasing number of victories from opposition parties at the local and state levels. To test H_3 , I include evaluations of the incumbent's performance at the national level (presidential approval) and evaluations of the respondents' economic situation (pocketbook evaluations) as determinants of party ID, and expect them to be statistically significant.

H₄: In Mexico, negative, not only positive feelings are a major cue in orienting individuals' allegiances towards political parties.

The seven-decade long PRI tenure in the presidency allowed individuals to observe and evaluate its successes and failures. I expect that, just as in one-party states where the *only* salient cleavage is the affection or hate individuals develop towards the governing party (Rose and Mishler 1998), the antipathy towards the PRI should be one of the key determinants in orienting individuals' political attitudes, including their party ID. The hate individuals develop towards the governing party could also be the main reason

why individuals become alienated from politics, thus converting into independents. Additionally, the aversion towards the PRI is not only determined by retrospective evaluations: other motives, including ideology or personal experiences may be among the sources that generate individuals' anti-PRI feelings. To test H_4 , I observe different measures of antipathy towards the PRI over time and expect them to increase in the late years as a consequence of its recent likelihood of defeat. Later, I include them as a determinant of party ID, and expect them to be statistically significant.

H₅: In Mexico, some individuals prefer any party but one in particular.

Specifically, most individuals who do not identify with a political party hold an aversion towards the PRI.

For more than a decade, independents in Mexico have represented over a third of the electorate (Estrada 2003a). However, the reasons why these individuals either became alienated from politics or have not developed an allegiance towards any party remains unknown. I suggest that a high proportion of individuals who are not identified with any party hold a strong aversion to the former incumbent, the PRI, or that maybe one of the main reasons they became alienated from politics in the first place was precisely their hate towards the long-ruling party. To test H_5 , I will compare the distribution of anti-PRI feelings between partisans and independents, expecting that the proportion of independents that hold an antipathy towards the PRI is higher than the one of partisans. Besides, I will observe voting trends over time for independents as well as for individuals with anti-PRI feelings, and expect the aversion towards the PRI, just as party ID, has a strong effect on vote choice.

3.1.6. Data

Reliable electoral surveys in Mexico began in 1988. Ongoing surveys from a survey firm began around 1994. As a consequence, it is difficult to find questions that are similarly phrased, or to observe same questions being asked survey after survey, especially for party ID, where there is not yet consensus among Mexican pollsters on how the question should be phrased, as will be seen below. Under the assumption that the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables I include in the following analyses remain constant over time, I identified six national electoral surveys, each one corresponding to every presidential and mid-term congressional election held from 1988 to 2003²⁵, which include variables of interest for the argument developed in the present chapter (party ID and its determinants). The questions for party ID in each of the six surveys are: (*original questions in Spanish are in italics*)

(1988) 58. – Could you mark down on this sheet (GIVE PAPER SHEET) without I notice, the political party that you prefer? When you have done so, please deposit the sheet in this booth (GIVE BOOTH). *¿Puede usted marcar en esta hoja (DAR HOJA) sin que yo lo vea, el partido político de su preferencia? Cuando lo haya hecho deposite por favor la hoja en este bote (DAR BOTE).*²⁶

²⁵ The 1988 survey was made available through The Roper Center, at the University of Connecticut. The 1994 and 1997 surveys were made available through the “Banco de Información de Opinión Pública” at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), in Mexico City. The 2000 survey is the first wave of the Mexico 2000 Panel Study, available at http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/lawson/Explanation_of_data.pdf. I would also like to thank Ulises Beltrán, from BGC, Beltrán y Asociados, for making the 2003 survey available for the present chapter. A description of the surveys included in this chapter is in the appendix.

²⁶ This question is not to be confused with the question for measuring vote choice (which was asked before the party identification question), and read as follows:
7. –Now, for this survey’s purposes only, let’s imagine that today is Election Day, and that you are going to vote for the next President. Your choice will be totally confidential and will only serve for the present survey. On this paper sheet (give paper sheet) please indicate the political party you are going to vote for in the next Presidential election and put it inside this booth (give booth). If you think you are not going to vote, if you are not sure if you are going to vote, or if you are not sure which political party you will choose, please indicate any of these options on the paper sheet, but please also indicate which candidate is the most appealing for you at this moment and that you would vote for in case you decide to do so. *Ahora, solamente para efectos de este estudio, simulemos que estamos en el día de las elecciones y que usted va a votar por el próximo Presidente de la República. Lo que señale será totalmente confidencial y sólo servirá para esta encuesta. En este papel (dar papel) marque por favor el partido por el que piensa votar para Presidente de la República y deposítelo en este bote (dar bote). Si usted no piensa votar, no está seguro*

(1991) 27. – Do you sympathize with any political party? (YES) Which one? *¿Simpatiza usted con algún partido político? (SI) ¿Cuál?*

(1994) 37. – Do you usually consider yourself Panista, Priísta, or Perredista? *Normalmente, ¿usted se considera Panista, Priísta, o Perredista?*

(1997) 14. – Regardless of the party you are going to vote, do you usually consider yourself Panista, Priísta, or Perredista? *Independientemente del partido por el que va a votar, ¿normalmente se considera Panista, Priísta o Perredista?*

(2000) 52. – In general, do you consider yourself Priísta, Panista, or Perredista? *Generalmente, ¿usted se considera Priísta, Panista o Perredista?*

(2003) 11. – Regardless of the party you vote for, do you usually consider yourself Panista, Priísta, Perredista, from the Green Party or another party? *Independientemente del partido por el cual usted vota, ¿normalmente se considera Panista, Priísta, Perredista, del Partido Verde o de otro partido?*

Table 3.1

PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN MEXICO, 1988-2003						
<i>Year</i>	PAN	PRI	PRD	Other parties	Independents*	<i>N</i>
1988	21%	45%	21%	4%	9%	2,960
1991	6	29	6	4	55	1,545
1994	21	45	9	2	23	4,629
1997	13	31	12	3	41	2,900
2000	23	38	9	0	30	2,255
2003	22	28	8	5	37	1,945
<i>Average</i>	18%	36%	11%	3%	33%	

* In order to keep the same coding across surveys, in the 2000 survey, independent 'leaners' were coded as 'independents', since the rest of the surveys did not include questions that allowed to distinguish between these types of respondents.

Table 3.1 shows the distribution of party ID in Mexico from 1988 to 2003. On average, the PRI has the highest proportion of partisans among the three major parties (36%), followed by the PAN (18%), and by the relatively young PRD (11%). While the proportion of partisans of all three major parties increases in every presidential election

todavía si va a votar, o aún no está seguro por cuál partido votar, por favor marque cualquiera de estas opciones en la hoja, pero por favor también señale cuál es el candidato que más le agrada en este momento y por el que votaría en caso de decidirse a hacerlo.

These two variables, party identification and vote choice, were clearly distinguishable in 1988, as party voting percentages demonstrate: 68.3% of Panistas who were going to vote for the PAN; 83.1% Priístas who were going to vote their party; and 67.8% of “Cardenistas” who were going to vote for the FDN.

year²⁷, the proportion of independents increases in every mid-term congressional election year (ranging from 55% in 1991 to 37% in 2003). In accordance with previous studies that show the distribution of party ID in Mexico in the last two decades (Estrada 2003a; Moreno 2003), independents in Mexico have represented a third of the electorate, on average, for the past two decades (32%), being the highest proportion among all respondents in the two most recent mid-term congressional elections (partisans and independents alike), in 1997 (41%) and 2003 (37%). Conversely, the PAN is the party that has managed in recent years to earn and keep more partisans than the PRI, which has lost the most, and the PRD, whose proportion of partisans has remained practically constant since 1997²⁸.

Despite its failure to keep followers lately, the PRI still is the party with the most partisans in Mexico at the national level. Moreover, the proportion of Panistas has increased in recent years: The PAN's growing number of victories at the local and state level has been publicized in recent state campaigns as the government performance individuals need to know in order to evaluate the party retrospectively and extrapolate its expertise from lower to higher levels of office²⁹. In contrast, the proportion of Perredistas

²⁷ The proportion of Perredistas holds an exception: PRD's Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas won in 1997 the Mexico City first-ever mayoral election, which gave the PRD an electoral lift by focusing the attention of the national media in the most important concurrent horse-race of that year. See, Bruhn, Kathleen. 1999b. The Resurrection of the Mexican Left in the 1997 Elections: Implications for the Party System. In *Toward Mexico's Democratization*, edited by J. Dominguez and A. Poiré. New York: Routledge, Estrada, Luis. 1999. *Candidatos y Voto Estratégico en la Primera Elección de Jefe de Gobierno del D.F.* BA Thesis, Departamento Académico de Ciencia Política, ITAM, México, Lawson, Chappell. 1999. Why Cárdenas Won: The 1997 Elections in Mexico City. In *Toward Mexico's Democratization*, edited by J. Dominguez and A. Poiré. New York: Routledge.

²⁸ These proportions resemble the ones presented by Moreno (2003), who shows the distribution of party ID among different firms' surveys for the Mexican case over the period 1989-2002.

²⁹ Particularly since 1997, the PAN has campaigned on its experience to govern, demonstrating their experience and extrapolating such performance from cities to states, and among states, underscoring the increasing amount of people governed by the party.

has remained relatively steady since its foundation in the late 80s (the only exception is 1997, when the PRD won the Mexico City mayoral election).

The difference in party ID trends between the PAN and the PRD seems to lie not only in how much information parties provide about their performance, but also in the desire of a segment of the electorate to “throw the PRI out” by any means. As will be seen below, the hate towards the PRI (derived, among other factors, from a poor performance over its long-ruling tenure), combined with retrospective evaluations of the opposition parties’ government performance, has attracted some Panistas and Perredistas and has alienated many other individuals. For instance, the 2000 presidential candidate of the PAN, Vicente Fox, succeeded campaigning mostly on “taking the PRI out of *Los Pinos*” (Magaloni and Poiré 2003a). Moreover, even though some scholars labeled Cárdenas’ victory in Mexico City (and its coattails throughout the country) as the ‘resurrection of the left’ in Mexico (Bruhn 1999b), it was later demonstrated that the Mexico City electorate voted the PRD candidate in order to defeat the PRI with most certainty (Estrada 1999)³⁰. Particularly, most of the PRD victories at the state level have come as a result of using an anti-PRI approach in their campaigns: PRD candidates for state governors have been former Priístas who, after losing their party nomination, turned to be PRD candidates that campaigned strongly criticizing their former party. That is, most of the PRD victories at the state level have not been as much as a reward for its previous performance, but mostly the electorate’s expression of its hostility towards the long-ruling incumbent party, the PRI (Estrada 2003b).

³⁰ Further evidence of the aversion towards the PRI by Mexico City voters is the electoral results themselves: From 1997 to 2003, the PRI has won only 1 of all 247 plurality seats and public offices in dispute, including mayors, local and national representatives, senators, and borough administrative officials

The antipathy towards the PRI has been one of the key determinants either in orienting individuals' political attitudes, including their allegiance towards a political party (party ID), or the main reason why individuals do not identify with any party at all. Table 3.2 shows how anti-PRI feelings are distributed between partisans and independents in Mexico from 1988 to 2003.

Table 3.2

ANTIPATHY TOWARDS THE PRI, 1988-2003				
Year	Partisans	Independents	All	N
1988	26%	52%	28% **	759
1991	28	36	32 *	376
1994	42	49	43 **	1,883
1997	27	36	31 **	886
2000	37	65	45 **	899
2003	34	35	35	685
<i>Average</i>	32%	45%	36%	

** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$ (Pearson χ^2 test)

Note: For 1988 and 1994, the question measured the proportion of individuals who would turn out to vote to "throw the PRI out of government".

For 1991 and 2000, respondents were asked to give the PRI a grade, from 1 to 10, as in school.

Antipathy towards the PRI was defined as the proportion of respondents who 'failed' the PRI (giving it a grade from 1 to 5).

For 1997 and 2003, the question asked was, "Which party would you *never* vote for?"

From 1988 to 2003, a third of the electorate on average (36%) holds an aversion towards the PRI. Most important, while every 1 out of 3 partisans hold negative feelings towards the PRI (32%), almost half of independents dislike the PRI (45%), this difference being statistically significant for every election year until the PRI lost the Presidency in 2000. In 2003, the difference in the proportion of partisans and independents with anti-

or *delegados* (the PRI won the mostly *delegación* or borough of Milpa Alta, in 2000). See Campos, Roy "Todas las Elecciones: Análisis de los Resultados del 6 de Julio" in *Este País*, 150, September 2003.

PRI feelings vanished, although a third of the electorate (35%) still holds an antipathy towards the PRI. Perhaps the alternation at the national level calmed the anger towards the PRI down, or maybe is just the usual decrease observed between these two groups during mid-term congressional elections. It is crucial to compare this measurement between partisans and independents again in 2006 to clarify such conjecture³¹. Moreover, the proportion of individuals with anti-PRI feelings is 1.5 times as much in presidential election years as in mid-term election years, and seems to be more unambiguous among independents than among partisans when a President is going to be elected³².

How the anti-PRI feelings are reflected in the individuals' vote is useful in grasping how the aversion towards the PRI has been a constant feature of the Mexican electorate before the PRI presidential defeat in 2000. Just as party ID is known to be the main predictor of vote choice, the aversion towards the PRI influences the way individuals choose the party they are going to vote for. Table 3.3 shows the vote distribution of those individuals with anti-PRI feelings.

³¹ The idea of the decrease in anti-PRI feelings once the PRI has been defeated will be tested in the next chapter by observing anti-PRI feelings in states where the PRI lost the governorship for the first time; in states where the PRI recovered the governorship after losing it; and in some states where it has not lost yet.

³² In the survey carried out in 2000, the question that measures party ID allowed to differentiate between strong and weak partisans and between 'leaners' and 'pure' independents. I found that the aversion towards the PRI is higher among strong partisans than among weak partisans: while 71.8% of strong Panistas held negative feelings towards the PRI, 59.8% of weak Panistas did so; 82% of strong Perredistas showed anti-PRI feelings while 70% of weak Perredistas were anti-PRI (Pearson $\chi^2(7)=572.8441$; $Pr = 0.000$). On the other hand, 73.6% of Panista leaners, 68.3% of Perredista leaners, and 70.16% of 'pure' independents held negative feelings towards the PRI. Only 23.6% of Priista leaners showed anti-PRI feelings (Pearson $\chi^2(4)=73.445$; $Pr = 0.000$). (In the survey carried out in 2000, respondents were asked to give the PRI a grade, from 1 to 10, as in school. Anti-PRI feelings were coded as those who gave the PRI a score from 1 to 5). Why strong, weak, or leaner Priistas hold anti-PRI feelings will be discussed below.

Table 3.3

DISTRIBUTION OF ANTI-PRI VOTING IN MEXICO, 1988-2003*

<i>Year</i>	PAN	PRI	PRD	Other Parties	<i>N</i>
1988	34%	23%	40%	3%	424
1991	23	25	37	15	257
1994	46	26	21	6	1,500
1997	37	3	51	9	643
2000	62	17	19	2	739
2003	51	7	27	15	562

*Percentages of *effective* vote (without considering DK and NR)

Table 3.3 shows that the anti-PRI vote, more than volatile, has been strategic, demonstrating its fundamental nature. Over the period 1988-2003, most of the anti-PRI voting is concentrated on the two major opposition parties, PAN and PRD. It swings from electoral cycle to the next, however, favoring the party of the presidential candidate that seemed to have had the most chances to defeat the PRI. There is a remarkable coordination of the anti-PRI vote around the opposition parties' presidential candidates: the PRD presidential candidate in 1988, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, on the one hand, and the PAN's presidential candidates, Diego Fernández in 1994 and Vicente Fox in 2000, on the other. It is notable how PRD's Cárdenas attracted again, in 1997, half of the anti-PRI national vote by becoming the first-elected Mexico City mayor. Furthermore, although the proportion of Perredistas with negative feelings towards the PRI is higher than the one of Panistas (not shown), when individuals wanted to express their aversion towards the PRI, they preferred the strongest option that could defeat the PRI, as the PRD in 1988 and 1997, or the PAN in 1994 and 2000.

Although there was, and still is, a risk-averse proportion of the electorate that, despite disliking the PRI, keeps voting for it preferring the Devil it knows (Morgenstern

and Zechmeister 2001), the number of individuals with anti-PRI feelings that vote the PRI has been decreasing in recent years. Furthermore, while the proportion of individuals that voted the PRI, regardless their aversion, reached a high 26 percent in 1994 (year in which the PRI heavily campaigned on frightening the electorate about the risks associated with voting for an opposition party, especially after the assassination of the PRI presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio (Oppenheimer 1996)), it barely overcame a low 7 percent in 2000 (year in which it was defeated in the race for the Presidency for the first time after more than seventy years). As alternation occurs in all levels of government, the proportion of risk-averse PRI voters (those that vote the PRI despite their anti-PRI feelings) is expected to disappear, since former opposition parties, PAN and PRD, had become a real option for the electorate, by both nominating serious contenders and governing efficiently (Lujambio 2001). That is, as individuals get to examine party substitutes for the long-ruling PRI, the political market works more in the direction of a structure of perfect competition, leaving behind the one-party era.

Just as anti-PRI feelings are amongst the main determinants of individuals' orientations towards parties, the same negative feelings could be the reason why some individuals became alienated from the political life. As it was shown in table 3.2, more independents than partisans hold an antipathy towards the PRI. It is suitable to observe what are the consequences of independents' anti-PRI feelings on their vote choice. Table 3.4 shows the distribution of independents' voting over the period 1988-2003 in Mexico.

Table 3.4

DISTRIBUTION OF INDEPENDENTS' VOTING IN MEXICO, 1988-2003*					
<i>Year</i>	PAN	PRI	PRD	Other Parties	<i>N</i>
1988	28%	43%	26%	4%	47
1991	15	61	17	7	446
1994	33	46	13	8	608
1997	30	23	33	14	608
2000	50	33	13	4	411
2003	32	30	19	18	457


*Percentages of *effective* vote (without considering DK and NR)

Until 1994, most independents still preferred the PRI to the major opposition parties, PAN or PRD, an illustration of their risk-aversion caused by the asymmetry of retrospective evaluations between the PRI and the opposition parties. After 1997, however, more independents voted the PAN or the PRD than the PRI: In 1997, more independents expressed that they were going to vote for the PRD (33%) than for any other party (30% for the PAN; 23% for the PRI). In 2000, the PAN's presidential candidate, Vicente Fox, attracted half of independents' vote choice (50%) which, as has been argued, was one of the main reasons why he defeated the PRI (Moreno 2002; Moreno 2003). In 2003, independents still preferred the PAN (32%) to the PRI (30%) or the PRD (19%). Independents in Mexico, two-thirds of which are influenced by their anti-PRI feelings, derived in part from an increasing stock of retrospective evaluations, had turned in recent years to vote strategically the candidates of former opposition parties, PAN and PRD, who could defeat the PRI with most certainty. In sum, negative feelings, as well as parties' performance, are both related to independents' an partisans' electoral decisions.

3.1.7. A Model of Party ID in Mexico

The next step is to measure the impact retrospective evaluations and negative feelings towards the PRI have in party ID. Both retrospective evaluations and negative feelings towards the PRI are main determinants of party ID in Mexico. In figure 3.1, I suggest a model of party ID for the Mexican case, in which individuals' retrospective evaluations about parties' performances determine not only party ID, but also indirectly the negative feelings towards the PRI³³.

Figure 3.1



The model I suggest is as follows:

$$Y_1 = \beta_0 + \gamma_1 x_{1i} + \gamma_2 x_{2i} + \gamma_3 x_{3i} + \gamma_4 x_{4i} + \gamma_5 x_{5i} + \gamma_6 x_{6i} + \gamma_7 x_{7i} + \gamma_8 x_{8i} + \gamma_9 x_{9i} + \gamma_{10} x_{10i} + \gamma_{11} x_{11i} + \varepsilon_i \quad (3.1)$$

Where:

Y_1	=	Party Identification
x_1	=	Negative feelings towards the PRI
x_2	=	Presidential Approval
x_3	=	Evaluation of Personal Economic Situation
x_4	=	Education
x_5	=	Interaction (Presidential Approval in 2003)
x_6	=	Interaction (Evaluation of Personal Economic Situation in 2003)

³³ As mentioned before, negative feelings towards the PRI are not only derived from the PRI's performance, critically assessed in recent years, but also by other factors as ideology or personal experiences.

x_7	=	Year 1988
x_8	=	Year 1994
x_9	=	Year 1997
x_{10}	=	Year 2000
x_{11}	=	Year 2003
β_0	=	Constant
ε	=	Error term

Following Fiorina (1981), I include retrospective evaluations of personal financial situation and presidential approval as measurements of simple and mediated retrospective evaluations³⁴. In the model, retrospective evaluations are the main input of party ID. Even though I do not discard the possibility of mutual causality between party ID and retrospective evaluations, I am not considering here the option of a non-recursive model of party identification (Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Jones 1979), which require panel data in order to explain the direction of the causality between party ID and retrospective evaluations³⁵.

Interaction terms (retrospective evaluations \times year 2003) are included to distinguish the effects on party identification of the evaluations of the first non-PRI president (the first-half of the Panista Vicente Fox's term). Moreover, I include education as the main control variable not only because of its expected effect on discriminating

³⁴ The evidence in the American voting literature on whether individuals give more weight to 'pocketbook' (personal financial situation) or to 'sociotropic' (financial situation of the country) evaluations suggests that individuals follow the 'sociotropic' model. See, for example, Kinder, Donald, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1981. Sociotropic Politics. *British Journal of Political Science* 11:129-161. In my model, only pocketbook evaluations were included because, unfortunately, not all the surveys included measurements for sociotropic evaluations. In the next chapter, where I use more recent (and more complete) surveys, I include both sociotropic and pocketbook variables as determinants of party ID.

³⁵ A first approach to a model that explains party ID from a dynamic perspective is found in Moreno (2003). The author, however, does not explicitly address any of the main concerns raised by Markus and Converse, or by Page and Jones about the causality of party ID and retrospective evaluations.

among major parties' partisans, but mostly because I lack consistent socio-demographic measurements across all surveys³⁶.

³⁶ In addition, education usually encompasses both income and occupation (variables that could not be included because their measurements were not uniform across surveys). Gender was first included in the model a control, but was not statistically significant (it is not theoretically expected to observe differences on party identification across gender). Age was not included because it did not have a uniform codification across surveys (in some surveys it was asked the year the respondent was born, but in others, the respondent was asked to locate their age inside an interval). The two surveys that included age intervals (1991 and 1994) used different cut-points, which made it impossible to have, at least, the same intervals across all surveys. In the next chapter, however, I include age as a correlate of party ID, and perform a cohort analysis of party identification.

Table 3.5

MULTINOMIAL LOGIT: PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN MEXICO, 1988-2003

	<i>Panistas vs. Independents</i>		<i>Priistas vs. Independents</i>		<i>Perredistas vs. Independents</i>		<i>Other parties vs. Independents</i>	
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>
Negative feelings towards the PRI	0.5061 **	0.0560	-1.6777 **	0.0592	0.7481 **	0.0674	0.4121 **	0.1095
Approves the president	0.0395	0.0663	0.9814 **	0.0677	-0.4412 **	0.0742	-0.0211	0.1331
Personal economic situation is better than before	0.0541	0.0381	0.3157 **	0.0332	-0.1659 **	0.0453	-0.0590	0.0777
Education	0.0279	0.0228	-0.2223 **	0.0209	-0.0592 *	0.0269	-0.0227	0.0449
Approves the president x Year 2003	1.9900 **	0.2205	-1.5935 **	0.1409	-0.2665	0.2036	-0.2057	0.2650
Personal economic situation is better than before x Year 2003	0.2873 **	0.0773	-0.1216	0.0748	0.2815 *	0.1120	0.3078 *	0.1399
Year 1988	3.2007 **	0.1513	2.9748 **	0.1245	3.3641 **	0.1576	2.1909 **	0.2129
Year 1994	1.7708 **	0.1263	1.9786 **	0.0949	0.9600 **	0.1385	0.3107	0.1945
Year 1997	0.7488 **	0.1330	0.8569 **	0.0977	0.4866 **	0.1409	-0.1026	0.2038
Year 2000	1.7037 **	0.1365	1.6789 **	0.1080	0.7847 **	0.1551	-1.5913 **	0.4143
Year 2003	-0.2235	0.2346	1.8637 **	0.1399	0.4888 *	0.1918	0.7392 **	0.2578
Constant	-2.1697 **	0.1498	-0.7597 **	0.1216	-1.8002 **	0.1612	-2.6328 **	0.2431
N	13,866							
LR chi ² (44)	5899.93							
Prob>chi ²	0.0000							
Log likelihood	-16423.647							
Pseudo R ²	0.1523							

*p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed test)

Equation 3.1 is a multinomial logit model that explains party ID. The results of the multinomial logit of party ID in Mexico, with independents as the base category, are presented in table 3.5³⁷.

Anti-PRI feelings are statistically significant in explaining individuals' allegiances towards the PAN, PRD, and other parties versus independents, and also in explaining independence versus Priísmo. Negative feelings towards the PRI explain partisanship in Mexico and are a reason individuals do not identify with any party. On the other hand, positive retrospective evaluations of Priísta governments (presidential approval and evaluations of personal economic situation) are statistically significant for explaining PRI partisanship versus independence, and independence over Perredismo. Positive evaluations of Fox's government are statistically significant for explaining Panismo versus independents, and independents versus Priísmo. Moreover, education is statistically significant for explaining independence versus Priístas and Perredistas (not

³⁷ I pooled all six surveys in a single dataset since every survey is an independent representative sample of the Mexican population. As a result, I ran regressions with an N of approximately 14,000 cases, expecting that the non-sample errors across surveys even out, and that there is no correlation in the error terms across different observations. I included year dummies in the final model after performing likelihood ratio tests on the full model, and on the presidential and the mid-term congressional models, which indicated that the data was not poolable without such dummies in either case, suggesting year-specific effects to control for such 'structural changes' (I also conducted a Hausman specification test, which confirmed the need for including such 'fixed effects'). Pooling independent cross sections across time has the advantages of increasing sample size, obtaining more precise estimators, and more robust test statistics (as long as the relationship between the dependent and at least some independent variables remain constant over time). See: Wooldridge, J. 2003. *Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach*. 2nd. ed. Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College. In addition, two alternative models, where presidential and mid-term congressional elections were considered separately, obtained basically the same results as the full model presented in table 3.5 (both models are included in the appendix –tables A3.2a and A3.2b). Finally, table A3.3 in the appendix shows statistically significant coefficients and their sign obtained from running the model in each survey, suggesting that in general, the relationship between the dependent and independent variables hold. Some studies that had pooled independent cross section surveys from different firms include: Jackman, Simon. 2004. Pooling and Smoothing the Polls over an Election Campaign. Palo Alto, CA. and Weisberg, H., and Charles E. Smith. 1991. The Influence of the Economy on Party Identification in the Reagan Years. *The Journal of Politics* 53 (4):1077-1092.

Panistas³⁸). Finally, the dummies for each year are statistically significant in explaining partisanship for the three major parties over independence in every year, except 2003, where Panistas versus independents is not statistically significant³⁹.

To ease the interpretation of these results, table 3.6 includes the most important changes in predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable (party ID), highlighting certain values of the independent variables, while maintaining everything else constant (all other variables are set at their mean value).

³⁸ This finding may be derived from the difficulty to distinguish Panistas from some independents by only considering their socio-demographic characteristics: while Panistas and some independents are well educated and with high levels of income, some other independents are low educated and have lower levels of income. A party ID question that includes an option for ‘independent leaners’ is needed to contrast different groups of independents in Mexico. Unfortunately, as was mentioned before, there is no agreement yet among Mexican pollsters on this topic. Moreno (2003) also finds that education is not statistically significant to distinguish Panistas from independents in 2000, although does not discuss in detail why this is the case. For more about the attributes of Mexican independents, see Estrada (2003a).

³⁹ The dummies for each year control for fixed effects that capture every election’s events or circumstances that might affect the distribution of party ID.

Table 3.6

CHANGES IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES*
PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN MEXICO, 1988-2003

	<i>PAN</i>	<i>PRI</i>	<i>PRD</i>	<i>Other parties</i>	<i>Independents</i>
<i>Mean</i>	22%	36%	11%	3%	29%
Negative feelings towards the PRI	11	-23	8	1	3
Approves the president	-2	7	-2	0	-3
Disapproves the president	3	-15	7	0	5
Approves the president in 2003	52	-32	-6	-1	-13
Disapproves the president in 2003	-4	4	0	0	-1
Positive pocketbook	-1	8	-3	0	-3
Negative pocketbook	1	-7	3	0	3
Positive pocketbook in 2003	5	-7	3	1	-2
Negative pocketbook in 2003	-5	6	-2	-1	1
Low education level	-5	11	-1	0	-5
High education level	4	-9	0	0	4

*Changes in percentage points. All variables set at their means unless otherwise is specified.

Over the period 1988-2003, both anti-PRI feelings and retrospective evaluations are major determinants of party ID in Mexico, although each has different relevance for explaining party ID for each major party. Having negative feelings towards the PRI increases the probability of being a partisan for any “opposition” party (the most important reason for explaining Perredismo –in agreement with its anti-PRI campaign strategy), and the probability of being an independent. On the other hand, Fox’s presidential approval substantially increases the probability of being a Panista, which is congruent with the PAN’s strategy to rely on its previous government expertise at the local level with the purpose of attracting new followers. While the basis of Perredismo expects individuals to express their aversion towards the PRI, the rationale of the Panismo expects individuals to assess its previous government performance.

Retrospective evaluations during the PRI era diminished the probabilities of being a Priista: Disapproval of presidential performance and negative evaluations of

individuals' personal economic situation disaffected Priistas and alienated individuals from politics (increasing the probabilities of becoming an independent), as well as increased the probability of being a Perredista more than becoming a Panista. Negative retrospective evaluations on the PRI are connected with the chances of being a Perredista or an independent more than being a Panista.

Finally, education levels accurately discriminate among partisan groups: while low educated individuals have more chances of being Priistas, individuals with higher education levels are more likely to be Panistas or independents (practically with no effect on Perredismo).

In sum, individuals react according to parties' strategies to attain new partisans: Negative feelings towards the PRI are an important component of both Panismo and Perredismo; positive evaluations of retrospective performance are a major determinant of Panismo; and poor government performance is a major predictor of disaffection from the PRI and an important reason to become a Perredista or an independent.

3.1.8. Conclusions

The PRI long-ruling tenure gave individuals the opportunity not only to critically assess its performance, but also to nurture both positive and negative feelings that made it the most loved and hated party in Mexico. Individuals depend mostly on retrospective evaluations of parties' performance as the key element to either increase or decrease their party attachments in a similar way sports fans root for a team based on its record. Moreover, to think of party ID as a preference for a sports team rather than following a

religion is more adequate if hate towards parties is considered as a main determinant of party ID: Some individuals may prefer *anything but* a specific political party or team.

Negative feelings towards the PRI are not only among the most important determinants of individual identification with other parties, but also explains the source of independent voters, who had represented around a third of the electorate in Mexico for over a decade (Estrada 2003a). The inclusion of anti-PRI feelings as a main determinant of party ID has confirmed the strategies opposition parties have followed to attract new partisans, and also the reason why many individuals either have become disaffected from the PRI (becoming independents). Negative –not only positive feelings– determine party ID in Mexico: Mexicans develop their party ID accordingly with both their likes and dislikes of parties, derived from the approval or disapproval of government performance. In particular, some Mexican voters would prefer *anything but* the long-ruling PRI, just as if they hold a ‘negative party identification’ towards the PRI.

The main findings of this chapter are:

- From 1988 to 2003, a third of the electorate on average has held negative feelings towards the PRI, this proportion being higher among independents than among partisans, a difference that is accentuated in presidential election years.
- Just as party ID, negative feelings towards the PRI influences individuals’ vote choice, revealing its fundamental nature: Since 1988, anti-PRI voters had swayed in every national election to support the candidate who could defeat the PRI with most certainty. On the other

hand, independents (of which 2/3 hold anti-PRI feelings), have also voted strategically in recent years, supporting the strongest opposition candidate.

- A model of party ID in Mexico indicates that negative feelings towards the PRI and individuals' retrospective evaluations on parties' performance are major determinants for explaining party ID. While positive retrospective evaluations during the PRI era increase the likelihood of being a Priísta, positive retrospective evaluations of President Fox increase the probability of being a Panista. On the other hand, negative retrospective evaluations during the PRI era increase the likelihood of being a Perredista or an independent.
- Opposition parties have followed different strategies to attract new partisans: While the PAN has emphasized its recent campaigns on its previous government experience at the local level, the PRD has prioritized the formation of anti-PRI coalitions at the state level, led by former Priístas who lost their party nomination. The multinomial logit regression shows that retrospective evaluations of performance about the PAN increase the most the probability of being a Panista, while negative feelings towards the PRI is the factor that most increases the probability of being a Perredista.
- Partisans are notably differentiated according to their education level: Panistas and independents hold higher levels of education, while Priístas hold lower levels of education. Different levels of education seem not to affect the probabilities of being a Perredista.

After the PRI was defeated for the first time in the 2000 presidential election, the proportion of anti-PRI feelings was not statistically different between partisans and independents. The enthusiasm to ‘throw the PRI out’ of the government may have ceased once Vicente Fox ended the PRI seven decade tenure. To test this and other hypotheses, the next chapter will use the same model developed here and test it in states where the PRI *has lost for the first time* the governorship, either to the PAN (Aguascalientes, Jalisco, Morelos, and Querétaro) or to the alliances led by the PRD (Baja California Sur, Mexico City, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas); in states where the PRI *has recovered the governorship after losing it* (Chihuahua and Nuevo León); and in states where the PRI *has not lost the state governorship yet* (Sinaloa and Tamaulipas).

Party Identification in Mexico Among States

4.1.1. Introduction

The evidence from the previous chapter shows that, over the period 1988-2003, negative feelings towards parties, as well as retrospective evaluations of government performance are major determinants of party identification (party ID) in Mexico. Furthermore, it shows that individuals' partisan allegiances respond to political parties' performance: Positive retrospective evaluations of government performance at the national level during the PRI era increases the likelihood of being a Priista, while positive evaluations of the first-half of Vicente Fox's *sexenio* increases those of being a Panista. On the other hand, anti-PRI feelings are the main motive that increases the likelihood of being a Perredista, while negative retrospective evaluations of the PRI performance increase the likelihood of being an independent. My findings are in accordance with recent political parties' campaigns that seek support of new partisans: while the PRI has emphasized its governmental expertise at all levels of government (trying to discourage voters from choosing other parties), the PAN has underscored its governmental experience at the municipal level in order to extrapolate success at the state and then at the national level. Conversely, the PRD has depended on the electorate's antipathy towards the PRI to win gubernatorial elections, although as I demonstrate, it has not been that successful in increasing its partisan electorate.

The purpose of the present chapter is to test the findings of the previous chapter looking at party ID at the state level during the period between 1997 and 2000. I will observe and contrast the distribution of party ID: 1) in states that were about to change government for the first time (either to the PAN or the PRD); 2) in Chihuahua, the first state that was going to change government back to the PRI after being governed by the PAN; and 3) in states that were still governed by the PRI, as a control group. Utilizing twenty state-level pre-electoral surveys from a single survey firm, I will test the model of party ID developed in chapter two (which includes retrospective evaluations of government performance and negative feelings towards parties as the main determinants of party ID), and will also compare party ID at different levels of government. I expect to find that governor and presidential approval have different effects on party ID, with both acting as major determinants of party ID in Mexico.

The present chapter proceeds as follows: First, I will describe the state surveys I utilize and explain the considerations that led me to merge them and create a dataset that contains about twenty thousand cases. Second, I will address the debate about the effect of “cross-level performance” on party ID by comparing the effects of both gubernatorial and Presidential approval. Third, following the guidelines I developed in the previous chapter, I present a model that includes retrospective evaluations of government performance, and negative feelings towards parties as main determinants of party ID, adding further socio-demographic variables such as age and income as controls. Finally, I will discuss the robustness of the overall argument of my dissertation from the perspective of the findings of the present chapter.

4.1.2. State-Level Party Competition and Strategies: PAN vs. PRD

At the demise of the PRI seven-decade presidency, the PAN and the PRD enjoyed the status of the two main opposition parties in Mexico in all three levels of government: national, state, and municipal. PAN and PRD diverse grounds and origins had denoted their political fates, especially during the past decade. The PAN was founded in 1939 in good part as a response to the nationalistic policies implemented during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, whose policies included the expropriation of both the oil and the electric industries. In contrast, the PRD was founded in 1989 after some small leftist parties backed the secession of several PRI leaders (including the son of late President Cárdenas, Cuauhtémoc) in response to the neo-liberal policies the PRI adopted during the early '80s. While the PAN has favored, since its foundation, the enhancement of municipal governments by organizing local cadres that have been the source for its national scope and its administrative expertise, the PRD has been gambling on winning higher offices (gubernatorial and presidential) without paying much attention to its administrative performance at the municipal level, discarding its local grassroots by nominating former Priístas that were unable to win their party candidacies⁴⁰ (Estrada 2003b).

The PAN's administrative skills at the municipal level have been rewarded not only with frequent victories in most state capitals, but also with several gubernatorial triumphs, starting with Baja California in 1989 (the first state won by any opposition candidate), and then its historic presidential victory in 2000. Conversely, the PRD's lack of local cadres, derived in large part from its neglected performance at the municipal

level, has forced the party to nominate former Priista candidates for office, which in turn, inhibits the potential growth for solid Perredista grassroots at the local level⁴¹. In fact, Panista candidates' previous experience is in stark contrast with the one of Perredistas: Since 1989, nearly two thirds of Panista governors (11 of 18) have been municipal presidents before (mostly of the state capital), while only two out of eight Perredista governors have had the experience of being a municipal president (one of them while he still was a member of the PRI)⁴².

An explanation for these parties' different strategies may lie in their founding ideologies. The two most important elements in the Panista doctrine have been a strong citizen commitment, especially at the municipal level, along with a catholic social advocacy (Middlebrook 2001), the former supported by Manuel Gómez Morín and the latter by Efraín González Luna, the two Panista founding fathers. Even though each one was a strong advocate for his own endeavor, both agreed that,

“... Political change in Mexico ought to begin not with alternation in the presidency, but at the most basic organizational level of Mexican federalism, the municipality” (Lujambio 2001), p. 48.

The PAN won its first municipality in 1946 in Quiroga, Michoacán, and since then, its municipal victories have been increasing, mostly in state capitals: By 1980, the PAN governed 1 percent of the total population; by 1993 this proportion was 13 percent;

⁴⁰ A municipal president lasts three years in office, without the possibility of consecutive reelection. According to the 2000 census, there are 2,443 municipalities in the country.

⁴¹ Another example of the absence of durable and experienced Perredista cadres can be found at the national level. While there have been three different Panista presidential candidates since 1988 (Manuel J. Clouthier in 1988, Diego Fernández de Cevallos in 1994, and the current president, Vicente Fox in 2000), Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas has repeated in each of these presidential elections as the PRD candidate. Surprisingly (or maybe not), Cárdenas has announced that he will run again in 2006, although this time he will have to fight for the PRD nomination against the popular Mexico City Mayor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador.

and by 1997, the same year the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time, one out of every three Mexicans (33 percent) was governed by the PAN at the municipal level (Lujambio 2001). PAN's electoral increase during the '90s explains, in part, why it became the focal point of political change in 2000 (Middlebrook 2001).

The PRD, conversely, has neglected its performance at the municipal level and its potential as a "path of power" (Bruhn 1999a). Bruhn argues that the PRD's lack of administrative experience at the municipal level could be caused either by the hostility of the PRI government during Carlos Salinas's sexenio against the PRD, when different Perredista leaders were pursued, or simply disappeared; or because the PRD is newer than the PAN, which explains its losses in important municipalities (state capitals). During Salinas's sexenio, however, the PRD earned the reputation of a violent and conflictive party, which has tarnished its image before the electorate. Unfortunately, several recent scandals of administrative corruption, at least in Mexico City, and electoral fraud in several primary elections, have not helped to disprove such negative perception of the PRD.

As a consequence, the electoral fates of these two opposition parties have been marked by their previous performance in local government. While Panista candidates have followed the strategy of extrapolating their positive performance from the municipal to the state or national levels (in a successful "demonstration effect"), Perredista candidates have failed to carry on their political careers after finishing their municipal

⁴² Leonel Cota, PRD's current governor of Baja California Sur, was the PRI municipal president of La Paz, the state capital. Zeferino Torreblanca, former PRD's mayor of Acapulco, won the governorship of Guerrero.

responsibilities⁴³, and even those who could have been successful, watch their political careers truncated when a former Priista gets in their way to win the party nomination.

The strategies followed by these two parties seem to be self-perpetuating: On average, Panista elected officials hold more administrative skills than the Perredista ones, who either do not hold previous experience (perhaps this is the main reason why some members broke away from the PRI after losing the party nomination), or have been unable to develop any, since the PRD total victories are relatively fewer and more regionalized than the ones by the PAN⁴⁴. As I discussed in the previous chapter, a winning party may attract more partisans, while a losing party may find it more difficult to create new partisan attachments among individuals. To be certain, if the PRD does not prove to be a competitive contender, especially at the municipal level, its expectations to attract new individuals will not be clear⁴⁵.

4.1.3. The Relevance of State-Level Analysis in Mexican Politics

There are several studies that underscore the importance of sub-national politics in Mexico. Some of these have used single states as their case study (Cornelius, Eisenstadt, and Hindley 1999; Snyder 2001), but the usual approach has been, first, to aggregate states into regions (from national level surveys, codifying each region as dichotomous variables), and then to include these regions as predictors of vote choice

⁴³ Bruhn (1999) mentions that at least, from 1989 to 1992, most Perredista municipal presidents dropped their careers as a consequence of an unsuccessful reputation while in government.

⁴⁴ For instance, in the 2003 mid-term Congressional elections, half of the total PRD vote was grouped in three states only: Mexico City, Michoacán, and the State of Mexico.

⁴⁵ In the previous chapter, it was shown that on average, from 1988 to 2003, only one out of every ten Mexicans (11%) identifies with the PRD, the lowest proportion among all three major parties, PRI, PAN, and PRD (see table 3.1).

(Lawson and Klesner 2004; McCann 2004). It has been common in these studies to put states together by their geographical vicinity combining, for example, individuals from Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, and Nuevo León in a single category (“northern Mexico”). I show below that despite sharing borders, these three states have experienced very different electoral dynamics, especially in recent years, and to aggregate individuals’ attitudes in such fashion seems inappropriate.

In fact, a recent study demonstrates that individuals reveal different political attitudes, according to distinct political contexts (national, state, or municipal). Hiskey and Bowler (2005) suggest that individuals’ level of engagement with the political system may be influenced by each municipality’s political background, and that local political contexts shape individuals’ attitudes towards the system as a whole (Hiskey and Bowler 2005). These authors show that individual attitudes such as turnout, expectations about fairness of elections, and opinions on whether Mexico is a democracy or not, are different in municipalities where alternation has occurred during the decade of the ‘90s compared with those where the PRI still governed. Their findings demonstrate that those individuals living under opposition governments are more likely to hold positive views about the system than those who live under governments that are still run by the PRI.

I argue that there are differences in individuals’ party ID in groups of states that were about to change from the PRI either to the PAN or to the PRD, in states that were about to return to the PRI after being governed by the PAN, and in states that were still governed by the PRI. To observe these differences I collected over fifty household (face-to-face) *pre-electoral* state surveys carried out during the 1994-2000 sexenio by the

Survey Research Unit at the Office of the President of Mexico⁴⁶, of which I chose twenty from ten states that correspond to either the two or three latest pre-electoral surveys for each campaign⁴⁷. In order to increase the number of cases, I pooled these twenty state surveys in four different groups according to their alternation experience: 1) From the PRI to the PAN (Aguascalientes, Baja California, Morelos, and Querétaro); 2) From the PAN back to the PRI (Chihuahua); 3) From the PRI to the PRD (Baja California Sur, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas); and 4) States where the PRI still governs (Sinaloa and Tamaulipas)⁴⁸. Table 4.1 describes the number of cases in each survey, together with the total number of cases for each different group of states (on average, over five thousand cases except for the group that represents Chihuahua, the state that was about to return to the PRI after being governed by the PAN, with a single survey of 1,795 cases). All told, the state-level survey dataset I constructed consists of over twenty thousand cases ($N=20,370$).

⁴⁶ These data were made available through the “Banco de Información de Encuestas de Opinión Pública”, at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. (CIDE) in Mexico City.

⁴⁷ Only those surveys that had the same questions were considered for my analyses. Surveys were carried out one or two months previous to the election.

⁴⁸ I did not include Chiapas and Nayarit, two states that changed parties during the 1994-2000 sexenio because the winning candidates were nominated by an “all-parties-against-the-PRI” coalition, led by both PAN and PRD, making it difficult to separate the effect of each of these parties on their own partisans’ party ID.

Table 4.1

STATE PRE-ELECTORAL SURVEYS		
MEXICO, 1997-2000		
<i>1: PRIOR TO CHANGE FROM PRI TO PAN</i>		
STATE	DATE	N
Aguascalientes	July 1998	1,200
Morelos	April 2000	1,079
	June 2000	1,074
Querétaro	May 1997	797
	June 1997	1,002
Nuevo León	May 1997	999
	June 1997	1,019
<i>TOTAL GROUP 1</i>		<u>7,170</u>
<i>2: PRIOR TO CHANGE FROM PRI TO PRD</i>		
STATE	DATE	N
Baja California Sur	January 1999	1,197
	January 1999v2	1,198
Tlaxcala	August 1998	800
	October 1998	999
Zacatecas	May 1998	1,008
	June 1998	1,009
<i>TOTAL GROUP 2</i>		<u>6,211</u>
<i>3: PRIOR TO CHANGE FROM PAN TO PRI</i>		
STATE	DATE	N
Chihuahua	June 1998	1,795
<i>TOTAL GROUP 3</i>		<u>1,795</u>
<i>4: STILL PRI (CONTROL GROUP)</i>		
STATE	DATE	N
Sinaloa	March 1998	898
	May 1998	899
	August 1998	900
Tamaulipas	April 1998	1,000
	August 1998	501
	October 1998	996
<i>TOTAL GROUP 4</i>		<u>5,194</u>
<i>ALL SURVEYS</i>		<u>20,370</u>

All surveys included in the dataset were carried out by the same survey firm (Office of the President of Mexico), which guarantees the same question phrasing, same question order across questionnaires, and same sampling procedures. In addition, since

all of them were carried out during the same sexenio, from 1997 to 2000, it controls for the influence of the performance of the same President, Ernesto Zedillo from the PRI. My analysis compares, for the first time, Mexican states according to their political background⁴⁹.

Table 4.2 shows the distribution of party ID according to each state, group of states, and the whole database. The similarities in the distribution of party ID within groups, and the differences among them, established the rationale to pool the surveys in different groups according to their alternation experience⁵⁰.

⁴⁹ For a similar analysis in the American case, see Erikson, Robert, Gerald Wright, and John McIver. 1993. *Statehouse Democracy. Public Opinion and Policy in the American States*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

⁵⁰ The dates and results of each election are on table A4.2, included in appendix 4.

Table 4.2

PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN MEXICO
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000

1: PRIOR TO CHANGE FROM PRI TO PAN						
STATE	DATE	PAN	PRI	PRD	Independents	N
Aguascalientes	July 1998	27%	35%	4%	33%	1,137
Morelos	April 2000	18	32	13	38	1,051
	June 2000	21	28	9	42	1,066
Querétaro	May 1997	21	41	4	35	768
	June 1997	25	32	4	38	974
Nuevo León	May 1997	33	38	1	27	957
	June 1997	32	42	1	24	966
TOTAL GROUP 1		25%	35%	5%	34%	6,919
2: PRIOR TO CHANGE FROM PRI TO PRD						
STATE	DATE	PAN	PRI	PRD	Independents	N
Baja California Sur	January 1999	10%	43%	15%	32%	1,131
	January 1999v2	9	44	22	24	1,153
Tlaxcala	August 1998	7	51	11	30	776
	October 1998	6	48	17	30	976
Zacatecas	May 1998	9	29	27	35	947
	June 1998	8	30	31	30	960
TOTAL GROUP 2		8%	41%	21%	30%	5,943
3: PRIOR TO CHANGE FROM PAN TO PRI						
STATE	DATE	PAN	PRI	PRD	Independents	N
Chihuahua	June 1998	33%	36%	2%	29%	1,739
TOTAL GROUP 3		33%	36%	2%	29%	1,739
4: STILL PRI (CONTROL GROUP)						
STATE	DATE	PAN	PRI	PRD	Independents	N
Sinaloa	March 1998	24%	36%	12%	28%	852
	May 1998	13	50	7	29	854
	August 1998	20	41	8	31	846
Tamaulipas	April 1998	17	41	11	31	971
	August 1998	10	47	10	33	491
	October 1998	11	48	9	32	972
TOTAL GROUP 4		16%	44%	10%	31%	4,986
TOTAL ALL GROUPS		19%	39%	11%	31%	19,587

Table 4.2 demonstrates the similarities in the distribution of party ID among different states that were about to be governed by the same party during the 1994-2000 sexenio. In states where the PRI was about to lose for the first time to the PAN (Aguascalientes, Morelos, Querétaro, and Nuevo León), party ID is distributed as follows: one-third Priístas, one-third independents, one-fourth Panistas, and the rest Perredistas (less than 10%, on average). In the second group, where alternation was about to occur from the PRI to the PRD (Baja California Sur, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas), the distribution of party identification is about the following: two-fifths Priístas, one-third independents, one-fifth Perredistas, and the rest Panistas (less than 10% on average). Note that the proportion of Panistas in all the states in this group (PRI to PRD) was higher than the proportion of Perredistas in some states in the previous group (PRI to PAN), where it was basically nonexistent (1% in Nuevo León). On the other hand, the only state that was about to return to the PRI after being with an opposition party (PAN) during the 1994-2000 sexenio was Chihuahua in 1998. In that year, the distribution of party ID in Chihuahua was: one-third of Priístas, one-third of Panistas, one-third of independents, and the rest of Perredistas (less than 2%). Chihuahua was the only state to return to the PRI during the Zedillo administration⁵¹. Finally, in those states where the PRI still governed during the period 1994-2000 (Sinaloa and Tamaulipas⁵²), the distribution of party identification is the following: one-half Priístas, one-third independents, one-fifth Panista, and the rest Perredista (around 10%). Within each group,

⁵¹ The other state that has returned to the PRI after being with the PAN is Nuevo León in 2003 during Fox's administration, for which I do not have data.

state surveys portray a similar distribution of party identification. What is more, note that the distribution of party ID of the whole dataset is similar to the one at the national level for the period 1988-2003 (presented in the previous chapter –see table 3.1).

The distribution of party ID in different groups of states foreshadows the party that supplants the PRI. In each case, the winner is the opposition party with most partisans. Although official results in table A4.2 in the appendix show that the vote proportion for the winning opposition party exceeds its proportion of partisans in these states, the opposition party (PAN or PRD) with most partisans ended up defeating the PRI for the first time. Allegiances precede electoral choices. The opposition party that has the largest partisan constituency is the one that has the highest probability of victory.

As I mentioned before, all these surveys utilized not only a similar format in their questionnaires, but also the same question phrasing for asking respondents' party identification. The question for measuring party identification was the following (*the original version in Spanish is in italics*):

Regardless of the party you will vote for, normally do you consider yourself as a Panista, Priísta or Perredista? 1) Panista 2) Priísta 3) Perredista 4) Other Party 5) Does not identify with any party 6) No response

Independientemente del partido por el que va a votar, ¿Normalmente usted se considera panista, priísta o perredista? 1) Panista 2) Priísta 3) Perredista 4) De otro partido 5) No se identifica con ningún partido 6) No contestó

In order to compare different levels of party identification, alternation in the states is used as a “condition”, controlling for states that are still governed by the PRI. Since both kinds of states I include in the present chapter were not chosen at random (these

⁵² These two states were chosen under the criteria that, according to their distribution of party identification, it would have been unlikely to observe alternation in the short run. As of January 2005, no party other than

states experienced alternation for the first time during the 1994-2000 sexenio), the research design could be considered as if it was a ‘quasi-experiment’ (Campbell and Stanley 1963). Such ‘quasi-experiment’ minimizes the threat of selection bias by presenting different alternations (PRI to PAN; PAN to PRI; PRI to PRD). It is aimed to provide robustness to the findings obtained in the previous chapter, and to explore other aspects of party ID, such as the effects of cross-level performance, as well as the distribution of party ID among different age cohorts that will be explored in the next chapter.

4.1.4. Retrospective Evaluations of Cross-Level Performance: Federal versus State

The party identification question formulated by Campbell et al. (1960) was not designed to find individuals’ party identification at different levels of government. Converse (1966) discarded the possibility that an individual’s party ID could have been different between the national and the state level (Converse 1966). In fact, some researchers have found that some individuals are identified with different parties at distinct levels of government (Jennings and Niemi 1966). Jennings and Niemi observed that when the SRC party ID question was followed by a battery of questions that asked individuals’ local, state and national party ID⁵³, around 84 percent of the respondents identified with a party nationally, 95 percent were “consistent” by identifying with the

the PRI has governed either of these states.

⁵³ Following the standard party ID question that measures party ID in the United States on a seven point scale, which distinguishes between strong and weak partisans and independent leaners, Jennings and Niemi asked “Generally speaking, at the local level of politics, do you generally think of yourself as a Republican,

same party at both the national and the state levels, a proportion that decreased to 78 percent when the “local” level was included. Jennings and Niemi suggested that the decrease in partisanship “consistency” was motivated by the lack of partisan activities at the local level, derived from personal contacts between elected officials and their constituencies (Jennings and Niemi 1966). Moreover, these authors found that “mixed” identifiers were younger and more educated than “consistent” partisans as a result of their higher interest in politics. Further research confirmed that “inconsistent” partisans⁵⁴ were highly educated and politically active (Perkins and Guynes 1979). Overall, it has been argued that individuals are able to develop party ID at multiple levels of government (Niemi, Wright, and Powell 1987).

Canada serves as a suitable case to assess the impact of federalism on split partisanship. Clarke et al. (1979) argue that attitudes about regional issues help to orient partisan attachments at different levels of government. These authors show that while 74 percent of Canadians are identified with a political party at the federal level, 18 percent were “split identifiers” (identified with different parties at the provincial and federal levels of government –conversely, 82 percent were “consistent”, in Jennings and Niemi terms); and 14 percent were “single partisans” (were identified with a political party at

a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” “How about at the state level of politics?” “Finally, at the national level of politics?” Jennings and Niemi (1966), p. 87 (footnote).

⁵⁴ After asking the standard seven-point party ID question, Perkins and Guynes asked the respondent “Now when you say you are a (R) (D) (I), are you thinking only of politics here in (state) or national politics, or both?” If the respondent chose either ‘national’ or ‘state’, then was asked, “How about (national politics/politics here in the state) are you ...” Perkins and Guynes compared in their experiment this question format with the one used by Jennings and Niemi (1966), and found, in the former, that 21 percent of the sample were inconsistent, a higher proportion than the one found in the latter, in which only 3 percent of the sample were inconsistent. See: Perkins and Guynes (1976) p. 376 –footnote.

one level of government but independent at the other level)⁵⁵ (Clarke et al. 1979). Even more, it was found that “split-level identifiers” participated in political activities as much as “consistent” or “partially consistent” partisans (Uslaner 1989). Furthermore, it was found that differences between provincial and federal Canadian party systems also increased the probability of individual cross-level partisanship (Martinez 1990).

For the Mexican case, unfortunately, there are no surveys that center on party ID at different levels of government. In order to observe the effects of the different levels of government on party ID in Mexico, I will compare retrospective evaluations of governors and presidential performance to see if they are relevant for explaining party ID and to observe which has a larger effect. I suggest the following hypothesis:

H₆: Presidential approval and Governor’s approval have different effects on party identification at the state level.

To test this hypothesis, I include both variables as determinants of party ID at the state level. I expect to find different effects of each across partisans and among groups of states⁵⁶.

⁵⁵ The questions used in the 1974 post-election survey were two parallel sequences, one discussing the federal and the other the provincial partisanship, each with a format similar as the standard SRC question on party ID. See Clarke, et al. (1979), p. 164 –footnotes 23-24.

⁵⁶ Table A4.1 in appendix 4 shows the correlation coefficients between governors’ and presidential approval. Since most states in the sample were governed by the PRI, the correlation between these two variables is positive (0.319), being the highest in states still governed by the PRI (0.384), and the lowest in Chihuahua, governed by the PAN (0.179). After controlling by years of education (up to sixth grade – complete primary– versus those with seven years), a higher correlation between governors’ and presidential approval is found among those with lower levels of education (0.330) than among those with higher levels of education (0.309). This is also true in states that were going to experience alternation for the first time (from the PRI to the PAN or to the PRD), but not in states that were governed by the PAN or were still run by the PRI. The effects of education on presidential and governors’ approval are beyond the scope of the present dissertation.

4.1.5. Testing the Model of Party Identification Among the States

I suggest a model in which retrospective evaluations of governors' and president's performance, as well as negative feelings towards parties, are major determinants of party ID in Mexico. The model in this chapter improves the one presented in the previous chapter in the following ways:

- Negative feelings are included for the three major parties, PAN, PRI, and PRD. This will allow me to test if negative feelings towards parties are a major determinant for partisanship in all cases, not only those against the PRI.
- A separate indicator of retrospective evaluations of government performance, either at the state (governors' approval) or national level (presidential approval) will test if they have a different impact on partisanship. An indicator that measures the overall situation of the state controls for the possible correlation of both approval measurements.
- Other socio-demographic controls are included, such as age and income. These are two important measurements that were not available for each of the surveys during the period 1988-2003. Including them will provide a better-specified and more informative model.
- Finally, dichotomous variables that specify each group of states (1=PRI to PAN; 2=PRI to PRD; 3 =PAN to PRI) are included. Interactions that specify each group and some retrospective evaluations are included as well.

The model that has party identification in Mexico at the state level is presented in table 4.3.

Table 4.3

MULTINOMIAL LOGIT: PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN MEXICO
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000

	<i>Panistas vs. Independents</i>		<i>Prístas vs. Independents</i>		<i>Perredistas vs. Independents</i>	
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>
Negative feelings towards the PAN	-1.8210 **	0.1170	1.1163 **	0.0520	1.1460 **	0.0717
Negative feelings towards the PRI	1.3298 **	0.0531	-2.0832 **	0.0832	1.2863 **	0.0629
Negative feelings towards the PRD	0.8020 **	0.0556	0.8689 **	0.0463	-2.2869 **	0.1536
Situation of the State is better than before	0.3571 **	0.1024	0.4144 **	0.0812	0.2542 *	0.1254
Situation of the State is better than before x group 1	-0.1274	0.1265	-0.3389 **	0.1085	-0.1072	0.1819
Situation of the State is better than before x group 2	0.0151	0.0814	0.0351	0.0576	-0.0138	0.0792
Situation of the State is better than before x group 3	-0.0527	0.0657	-0.1834 **	0.0582	-0.5355 **	0.1671
Approves the state governor	-0.1319	0.1013	0.3551 **	0.0884	-0.2301 *	0.1206
Approves the state governor x group 1	0.0898 *	0.0352	0.0842 *	0.0344	0.0308	0.0503
Approves the state governor x group 2	0.0475 *	0.0222	0.0508 **	0.0168	0.0469 *	0.0210
Approves the state governor x group 3	0.1216 **	0.0238	-0.0411 *	0.0182	0.0111	0.0436
Approves the president	-0.0084	0.1093	0.4844 **	0.0951	0.1448	0.1331
Approves the president x group 1	0.1608	0.1349	0.2659 *	0.1279	-0.2792	0.1911
Approves the president x group 2	-0.0088	0.0828	0.0213	0.0663	-0.0357	0.0809
Approves the president x group 3	-0.0757	0.0659	0.0147	0.0672	0.0838	0.1515
Age	-0.0020	0.0018	0.0039 **	0.0015	-0.0065 **	0.0022
Education	-0.0245 *	0.0121	-0.0900 **	0.0106	-0.0861 **	0.0149
Income	-0.0042	0.0145	-0.0522 **	0.0128	-0.0594 **	0.0181
Group 1 (PRI to PAN)	0.1433	0.1083	-0.4398 **	0.1119	-0.4892 **	0.1480
Group 2 (PRI to PRD)	-0.3235 **	0.0688	-0.0243	0.0582	0.3330 **	0.0664
Group 3 (PAN to PRI)	0.0969	0.0625	0.0137	0.0626	-0.3759 **	0.1165
Constant	-0.9099 **	0.1466	-0.3420 *	0.1337	-0.7809 **	0.1775
N	16,950					
LR chi ² (63)	9358.97					
Prob>chi ²	0.0000					
Log likelihood	-17160.51					
Pseudo R ²	0.2143					

*p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed test)

Negative feelings towards political parties are a major determinant of party identification for the three major groups of partisans and affect each partisan group (versus independence) in the expected direction. On the other hand, retrospective evaluations of government performance have differences among parties: governors' approval benefits Priísmo, negatively affects Perredismo, and has no effect of Panismo over independence, while presidential approval has only a clear benefit on Priísmo over independence. Moreover, a positive assessment of the overall situation of the state compared with the previous year benefits all groups of partisans over independence.

The effects of retrospective evaluations on party ID were expected if we consider that the PRI was the party governing at the time before all these states were about to experience alternation to either the PAN or the PRD. In Chihuahua, which was governed by the PAN but about to change back to the PRI, for example, the effect of presidential approval is not statistically significant.

Governors' approval in states that were about to change from the PRI to the PAN benefit Panismo and Priísmo over independence, while it benefits all parties' partisanship over independence in states that were about to experience alternation from the PRI to the PRD. In Chihuahua, as expected, the approval of the governor's performance benefits Panismo over independents but hinders Priísmo. On the other hand, presidential approval has a positive effect only on Priísmo over independents in the states where the PRI was about to lose the governorship to the PAN for the first time.

Finally, age only has a negative effect on Perredismo versus independence (the older the individual, the more likely to be independent rather than a Perredista) and a positive effect on Priísmo (the older the individual, the more likely to be a Priísta rather

than an independent). In contrast, education has a negative impact on all groups of partisans versus independents (a higher effect on Priismo and Perredismo and a lower effect on Panismo), just as income in Priismo and Perredismo, but not Panismo, confirming that higher levels of education and income are characteristics of independents in Mexico, similarly to other well established democracies (Estrada forthcoming).

To observe the effects of negative feelings towards political parties on party ID in Mexico, I calculated and show in table 4.4 the change in probabilities of these variables according to the specific group of states, setting all other variables at their mean value.

Table 4.4

**CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES
NEGATIVE FEELINGS TOWARDS PARTIES
PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN MEXICO
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000**

<i>MEAN PROBABILITY (%)</i>	PANISTA		PRIISTA		
	15		38		
	Anti-PRI	Anti-PRD	Anti-PAN	Anti-PRD	
<i>PRI TO PAN</i>	37	11	22		7
<i>PRI TO PRD</i>	8	-4	21		24
<i>PAN TO PRI</i>	43	8	35		18
<i>STILL PRI</i>	28	4	29		20

<i>MEAN PROBABILITY (%)</i>	PERREDISTA		INDEPENDENT		
	6		41		
	Anti-PAN	Anti-PRI	Anti-PAN	Anti-PRI	Anti-PRD
<i>PRI TO PAN</i>	4	7	-12	-9	-13
<i>PRI TO PRD</i>	16	35	-21	-9	-15
<i>PAN TO PRI</i>	-2	1	-19	-10	-20
<i>STILL PRI</i>	6	15	-20	-9	-18

Changes are in percentual points. Positive numbers are boldfaced.

Table 4.4 shows that, in every case, individuals' negative feelings towards other parties than their own increase the likelihood of becoming a partisan and decrease the probability of becoming an independent. In other words, the results clarify that negative feelings are major determinants of party ID, not independence. Anti-PRI feelings have stronger effects on *Panismo* than anti-PRD feelings, especially on those states that were still controlled by the PRI, where such proportion is seven to one (28 versus 4 percentage points). Similarly, anti-PRI feelings have higher effects on *Perredismo* than anti-PAN feelings, especially in those states that were going to change from the PRI to the PRD, where such proportion is twice as much (35 versus 16). Moreover, anti-PAN feelings have higher effects on *Priísmo* than anti-PRD feelings, except in those states that were going to change from the PRI to the PRD, where anti-PRD feelings have only slightly higher effects than anti-PAN feelings. According to the changes in predicted probabilities, it seems that the way individuals evaluate the incumbents' performance could be the origin of negative feelings towards parties.

4.1.6. Conclusions

This chapter confirms the importance of analyzing sub-national politics for understanding the Mexican road to democratic consolidation. The present chapter has showed how grouping states, not by their geographical vicinity but by their political resemblance, makes a better case for observing the early formation of party identification in the months previous to the first alternation at the state level. The main objective has been to consider each state as a micro-model of politics at the national level, having experienced alternation in the governorships from 1997 to 2000 before the first-ever PRI

defeat in the Presidency. A research design that controls for several factors allows reaching a higher level of certainty in the findings presented here.

The main findings of the present chapter are:

- During the period 1997-2000, there are differences across groups of states that were about to experience alternation at the state level, but not within groups of states. Different political experiences shape individuals' attitudes towards the system in general, and as I demonstrated, towards their allegiance with political parties.
- Many individuals are able to attentively evaluate their incumbents at different levels of government, and to use these evaluations as a major input that serves to orient their feelings towards political parties. Specifically, I show that Presidential approval has a different effect than governors' approval on party ID in Mexico at the state level. Positive retrospective evaluations of government performance are relevant to understand Priísmo (and Panismo in Chihuahua), while the reverse is true for understanding independence; findings that corroborate the ones outlined in the previous chapter that analyzed party ID at the national level.
- Retrospective evaluations of government performance, at the state and national levels, as well as negative feelings towards political parties, are major determinants of party ID in Mexico, even after controlling for several socio-demographic variables such as age, education, and income.

- Negative feelings towards political parties clearly influence party ID but not independence. The possibility of evaluating an incumbent seems to be a major reason for originating negative feelings among individuals towards that specific party.

Negative feelings towards political parties as well as retrospective evaluations of government performance are major determinants of party ID in Mexico. Utilizing this same dataset, in the next chapter I will observe the evolution of both party ID and negative feelings towards parties across age cohorts in order to observe in which age groups parties have been more successful in attracting new partisans, and in which they are generating more aversion.

Age Cohort Analyses of Party Identification in Mexico Among States

5.1.1. Introduction

In the previous two chapters I presented a model of party ID in Mexico at the national level and tested it among the states. More specifically, in the preceding chapter I generated a dataset that contains twenty state-level surveys and over twenty thousand cases that were carried out by the same survey firm during the second part of President Zedillo's sexenio (1997-2000), which allowed me to observe the determinants of party ID in states that were about to change government, from the PRI to the PAN or to the PRD, and from the PAN back to the PRI, controlling for states that remained under the PRI.

In a multinomial logit model of party ID at the state level, I included age as a control variable. Age proved to be statistically significant to explain Priísmo and Perredismo (not Panismo) versus independents: On the one hand, while *older* individuals were more likely to be Priístas rather than independents, *younger* individuals were more likely to be Perredistas rather than independents. On the other hand, age was not statistically significant to explain Panistas versus independents, confirming one of the many socio-demographic similarities between these two groups (Estrada forthcoming).

In the present chapter, I will use the same state-level surveys dataset to observe the distribution of partisanship according to age cohorts. Respondents are grouped in ten six-year cohorts according to the first year they were eligible to vote in a federal election, either presidential or mid-term congressional. By analyzing age cohorts, I expect to answer the following questions: Where can more partisans (or independents) be found, among younger or older cohorts? Which party, either PAN or PRD, has been successful in attracting partisans in recent years? Which cohorts, either younger or older, are more likely to hold anti-party feelings and against which party? The present chapter proceeds as follows: First, I review the discussion about age cohorts in the American literature. Second, I observe the distribution of party ID among age cohorts and across groups of states according to their alternation experience, as specified in the previous chapter. Third, I observe the distribution of negative feelings towards the three major parties, PAN, PRI, and PRD among age cohorts and across groups of states according to their alternation experience. Finally, I discuss the relevance of potential dealignments and realignments in Mexico.

5.1.2. Age Cohort Analyses of Party Identification in the United States

Philip Converse (1969) argued that partisanship can be divided into two items, one that measures the level of partisanship that people begin their adult lives with, which is ‘inherited’ from their parents, and a second one that measures the level of electoral ‘experience’, measured in terms of the number of years individuals have been eligible to vote, most of the times, for their own party (Converse 1969). According to Converse,

ceteris paribus, the longer the identification is held, the greater the reinforcement, and as a consequence partisanship should increase with age.

‘Inherited’ partisanship implied early socialization processes, where family, peer groups, and other factors influence the acquisition of partisanship by younger voters, whereas ‘electoral experience’ was related to the dynamics of partisanship through individuals’ aging. Converse’s theory implied three effects to be measured: ‘generational’, ‘life-cycle’, and ‘period’ effects. ‘Generational’ or ‘cohort’ effects are understood as variations in the degree of partisanship by cohort, due to the differences in their level of partisanship at the time they entered the electorate. ‘Life-cycle’ or ‘aging’ effects are those changes in the levels of partisanship of each cohort as it ages. ‘Period’ effects are measured as those special events or other factors that cause the whole population to simultaneously shift their levels of partisanship over time.

Converse’s model is one of ‘individual life-cycle and strength of partisanship’. He claims that what is important here is not age itself, but “...the length of psychological membership in a particular party” (Converse 1969, p.144), and suggests that ‘maturity’ or stability in levels of partisanship is acquired approximately after 2.5 generations (considering a 30-year generation). Converse’s model has been tested in Germany (Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981; Norpoth 1978; Norpoth 1984), and in other European countries as well (Niemi et al. 1985) with mixed results.

Moreover, several cohort analyses of party identification concluded that partisan strength is a function of the saliency or relevance of partisan politics at the time, especially when individuals are young and flexible. For instance, in the United States the greater partisan strength of older cohorts is attributed to their more immediate experience

with the Great Depression realignment (Abramson 1976; Abramson 1979; Glenn 1972). The debate, however, has always been related to the interaction of these three effects (cohort, aging, and period effects), and their relative importance in explaining party ID. Some authors claimed that three-way cohort analysis is difficult unless the researcher entertains relatively strong hypotheses about the nature of any cohort, aging, or period effects. Otherwise, researchers face an ‘identification problem’:

“Unless two of the three effects (age, cohort, and period) are viewed as indexing identical unmeasured causal factors, any analysis which makes estimates for only two of the three variables is subject to spurious results. But three-way cohort analysis is problematic because age, time period and birth cohort are linearly dependent on each other” (Mason et al. 1973).

The debate on the identification effect was settled by Abramson (1989), who concluded that in the United States, each of the aforementioned effects prevailed over the other two at different points in time (Abramson 1989).

5.1.3. Age Cohort Analyses of Party Identification in Mexico

Even though there has not been a similar debate regarding the Mexican case, some authors have underscored generational differences associated mostly with the declining economic performance of the PRI in recent years. Magaloni (1999) employs a Bayesian-learning model to show how older individuals who experienced the years of the PRI ‘economic miracle’ (from 1940 until the early 1970s), were more inclined to hold positive retrospective evaluations towards the PRI as well as to vote for that party (even after controlling for the impact of recent economic crises), while younger individuals,

who had experienced mostly the PRI's poor economic performance, were less inclined to hold positive retrospective evaluations towards, and to vote for, the PRI (Magaloni 1999).

According to Converse's argument that as individuals age, their allegiance is reinforced, not weakened (1969), I suggest the following two hypotheses:

H₇: In Mexico, the proportion of individuals who are identified with the long-ruling incumbent is higher among older cohorts than among younger cohorts.

H₈: In Mexico, the proportion of individuals who hold negative feelings towards the long-ruling incumbent is higher among younger cohorts than among older cohorts.

To test these hypotheses, I group individuals in ten six-year cohorts according to the first year they were eligible to vote in a federal election, either presidential or mid-term congressional, as follows:

<u>Cohort</u>	<u>Year of birth</u>	<u>Year of first vote</u>
1	<i>1977 or after</i>	<i>from 1995 to 2000</i>
2	<i>between 1971-1976</i>	<i>from 1989 to 1994</i>
3	<i>between 1965-1970</i>	<i>from 1983 to 1988</i>
4	<i>between 1959-1964</i>	<i>from 1977 to 1982</i>
5	<i>between 1953-1958</i>	<i>from 1971 to 1976</i>
6	<i>between 1947-1952</i>	<i>from 1965 to 1970</i>
7	<i>between 1941-1946</i>	<i>from 1959 to 1964</i>
8	<i>between 1935-1940</i>	<i>from 1953 to 1958</i>
9	<i>between 1929-1934</i>	<i>from 1947 to 1952</i>
10	<i>1928 or before</i>	<i>from early1900s until 1946</i>

For example, those individuals included in the first cohort (who were born in 1977 or after) were able to vote for the first time either in the mid-term congressional election of 1997, or in the presidential election of 2000 (in which Vicente Fox was elected). Conversely, those in the seventh cohort (who were born between 1941 and

1946) were able to vote for the first time in the mid-term congressional election of 1961 or the presidential election of 1964 (in which Gustavo Díaz Ordaz was elected). The six-year interval for each cohort is designed so that individuals within cohorts had the possibility of having voted in the same number of federal elections (two)⁵⁷.

Table 5.1 shows the distribution of party ID according to ten six-year cohorts. It is clear that the proportion of Priístas is higher in older than in younger cohorts, contrary to the proportion of independents, which is higher in younger than in older cohorts, whereas there is a slight tendency to find more Panistas and Perredistas in younger than in older cohorts.

Table 5.1

**COHORT ANALYSIS OF PARTY ID IN MEXICO
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000**

Cohort number	<i>Year of birth</i>	PAN	PRI	PRD	Independents	<i>N</i>
1	<i>1977 and after</i>	20%	33%	15%	32%	2,316
2	<i>1971-1976</i>	20	35	11	33	3,042
3	<i>1965-1970</i>	20	36	11	33	3,098
4	<i>1959-1964</i>	18	39	11	32	2,920
5	<i>1953-1958</i>	18	40	10	32	2,284
6	<i>1947-1952</i>	17	44	9	30	1,757
7	<i>1941-1946</i>	15	45	10	30	1,363
8	<i>1935-1940</i>	17	44	9	30	1,149
9	<i>1929-1934</i>	16	48	10	26	773
10	<i>1928 or before</i>	18	46	11	26	885
ALL		<i>19%</i>	<i>39%</i>	<i>11%</i>	<i>31%</i>	19,587

Pearson χ^2 (27) = 202.1697; Pr = 0.000

⁵⁷ Although the Mexican Constitution did not grant women their right to vote until 1953, I am including women in all cohorts, and leave the discussion about the impact of women's vote for future research. Table A5.1 in appendix 5 shows each cohort by individuals' year of birth and first year eligible to vote in a federal election.

These differences, however, become more visible by observing the variation in the distribution of each group of partisans according to the different groups of states and their alternation experiences, from figure 5.1 to figure 5.4⁵⁸.

Figure 5.1

COHORT ANALYSIS OF PARTY ID IN MEXICO
DISTRIBUTION OF PANISTAS
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000





Figure 5.1 shows the cohorts' distribution of Panistas among different groups of states. There is not a clear trend that shows that there are more Panistas in younger than in older cohorts, although there are specific trends (in states where alternation was about

⁵⁸ Tables A5.2 to A5.5 in appendix 5 show the distribution of party ID according to each group of states.

to occur from the PRI to the PAN, and in states that were still governed by the PRI) that there were slightly more Panistas in younger than in older cohorts. It is clear, however, that Panismo is stronger in all cohorts in the state where it governed (before returning to the PRI), and weaker in all cohorts in states where alternation was about to occur from the PRI to the PRD. On the whole database (“All”), the proportion of Panistas seems to be constant in each cohort, in the vicinity of 20 percent.

Figure 5.2


COHORT ANALYSIS OF PARTY ID IN MEXICO
DISTRIBUTION OF PRIISTAS
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000



According to figure 5.2, it is visible that in every group of states, as well as in the average, there are more Priistas in older than in younger cohorts. It is also interesting to observe that there is more dispersion in the levels of Priismo within younger cohorts (higher in states still governed by the PRI –over 40 percent, and lower in states that were about to change to the PAN –below 30 percent) than in older cohorts (where despite of the group of state, the proportion of Priistas is nearly 50 percent).

Figure 5.3

**COHORT ANALYSIS OF PARTY ID IN MEXICO
DISTRIBUTION OF PERREDISTAS
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000**



The distribution of Perredista cohorts is shown in Figure 5.3. Again, just as the figure that showed the distribution of Panistas, in this one there is not a clear trend that shows that there are more Perredistas in younger than in older cohorts. Nevertheless, in states where alternation was about to occur from the PRI to the PRD, the proportion of Perredistas is higher in each cohort than in other groups of states, especially than in states where alternation was between PAN and PRI. On average, the proportion of Perredistas is situated around 10 percent in all cohorts, except in the youngest one, where it reaches 15 percent.

Figure 5.4

**COHORT ANALYSIS OF PARTY ID IN MEXICO
DISTRIBUTION OF INDEPENDENTS
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000**




Figure 5.4 shows that there are more independents in younger than in older cohorts, a pattern contrary to the distribution of Priístas (more in older than in younger cohorts). Also, there is little variance in the distribution of independents and Priístas across groups of states. This finding might suggest that, at least in the aggregate, what the PRI has been losing in terms of partisanship has been the gain of independents, while the proportion of PAN and PRD partisans depends upon these parties' government experiences at the state level.

Finally, table 5.2 shows the distribution of negative feelings towards the three major parties, PAN, PRI, and PRD across cohorts. Just as the distribution of partisans, the distribution of anti-party feelings is different across groups of states. As expected, the proportion of individuals with negative feelings towards the PRI is higher in younger than in older cohorts, being statistically significant in states that were about to have a change in government to either the PAN or the PRD. On the other hand, the proportions of individuals that would never vote for the PAN or the PRD are lower in younger than in older cohorts. The differences across groups of states are statistically significant for the proportions of individuals with negative feelings towards the PAN in every case, while in the case of individuals with negative feelings towards the PRD they are significant only in those states prior to alternation from the PRI to the PRD.

Table 5.2

COHORT ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE PARTY ID IN MEXICO
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000

Cohort	Anti-PAN					Anti-PRI					Anti-PRD				
	<i>PRI to PAN</i>	<i>PRI to PRD</i>	<i>PAN to PRI</i>	<i>Still PRI</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>PRI to PAN</i>	<i>PRI to PRD</i>	<i>PAN to PRI</i>	<i>Still PRI</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>PRI to PAN</i>	<i>PRI to PRD</i>	<i>PAN to PRI</i>	<i>Still PRI</i>	<i>All</i>
1	12	26	23	18	19	31	26	28	19	26	33	14	42	26	26
	<i>102</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>51</i>	<i>105</i>	<i>458</i>	<i>252</i>	<i>197</i>	<i>62</i>	<i>107</i>	<i>618</i>	<i>268</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>94</i>	<i>151</i>	<i>623</i>
2	14	26	16	19	19	25	25	27	19	24	35	17	42	31	29
	<i>159</i>	<i>261</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>135</i>	<i>598</i>	<i>282</i>	<i>253</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>140</i>	<i>745</i>	<i>396</i>	<i>170</i>	<i>112</i>	<i>226</i>	<i>904</i>
3	16	25	20	17	19	26	24	28	20	24	36	18	40	28	29
	<i>174</i>	<i>254</i>	<i>51</i>	<i>141</i>	<i>620</i>	<i>291</i>	<i>242</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>163</i>	<i>766</i>	<i>405</i>	<i>179</i>	<i>99</i>	<i>232</i>	<i>915</i>
4	15	29	20	23	22	26	23	27	22	24	35	17	42	30	29
	<i>155</i>	<i>291</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>169</i>	<i>670</i>	<i>273</i>	<i>236</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>157</i>	<i>738</i>	<i>365</i>	<i>174</i>	<i>113</i>	<i>218</i>	<i>870</i>
5	17	30	20	21	22	24	23	30	19	23	39	19	45	29	31
	<i>138</i>	<i>209</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>132</i>	<i>519</i>	<i>199</i>	<i>160</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>121</i>	<i>541</i>	<i>326</i>	<i>136</i>	<i>92</i>	<i>182</i>	<i>736</i>
6	15	33	27	23	24	25	21	30	20	23	34	22	46	30	30
	<i>96</i>	<i>179</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>111</i>	<i>431</i>	<i>158</i>	<i>113</i>	<i>49</i>	<i>96</i>	<i>416</i>	<i>215</i>	<i>118</i>	<i>76</i>	<i>147</i>	<i>556</i>
7	21	30	26	26	25	21	22	25	19	21	38	24	51	31	33
	<i>105</i>	<i>122</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>101</i>	<i>360</i>	<i>104</i>	<i>87</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>73</i>	<i>295</i>	<i>191</i>	<i>95</i>	<i>62</i>	<i>123</i>	<i>471</i>
8	23	31	26	28	27	22	18	28	20	21	38	20	42	35	33
	<i>98</i>	<i>106</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>92</i>	<i>327</i>	<i>95</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>255</i>	<i>163</i>	<i>69</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>112</i>	<i>394</i>
9	28	29	28	32	29	22	15	21	21	20	40	22	44	35	34
	<i>80</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>73</i>	<i>236</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>49</i>	<i>163</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>81</i>	<i>278</i>
10	23	38	32	31	30	23	21	33	18	22	35	24	47	34	33
	<i>82</i>	<i>85</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>83</i>	<i>281</i>	<i>81</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>208</i>	<i>122</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>93</i>	<i>313</i>
TOTAL	17%	28%	22%	22%	22%	25%	23%	28%	20%	23%	36%	19%	43%	30%	30%
N	<i>1,189</i>	<i>1,768</i>	<i>401</i>	<i>1,142</i>	<i>4,500</i>	<i>1,800</i>	<i>1,428</i>	<i>497</i>	<i>1,020</i>	<i>4,745</i>	<i>2,568</i>	<i>1,149</i>	<i>778</i>	<i>1,565</i>	<i>6,060</i>
Pearson χ^2 (9)	76.345	28.760	18.592	58.054	127.003	24.053	20.611	4.552	4.073	25.523	14.343	28.903	5.845	15.123	49.457
Pr	0.000	0.001	0.029	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.014	0.871	0.907	0.002	0.111	0.001	0.755	0.088	0.000

5.1.4. Conclusions

This chapter demonstrates that there are marked differences in the distribution of party ID and negative party ID in Mexico across cohorts and among different groups of states. While there are more Priistas in older than in younger cohorts, the reverse is true for independents, which represent a higher proportion in younger than in older cohorts. As for the proportion of Panistas and Perredistas, even though there are not clear overall trends, the distribution within each group of states reveals a slight trend with more partisans in younger than in older cohorts, especially in those states that were governed by them already, or that were about to start governing. As for the distribution of negative party ID across cohorts, the patterns are clearer: There are more individuals that hold negative feelings towards the PRI in younger than in older cohorts, while the reverse is true for the distribution of individuals with negative feelings towards the PAN or the PRD: there are fewer anti-PAN or anti-PRD individuals in younger than in older cohorts. Again, the statistical significance of these distributions depends upon which group of states is considered, making this classification a relevant criteria for analyzing party ID in Mexico.

The main findings of the present chapter are:

- A cohort analysis of party ID shows that older cohorts contain more Priistas than younger cohorts, which in turn contain more independents than older cohorts, and in some specific groups of states, contain more Panistas and Perredistas. Moreover, negative feelings towards parties have distinctive distribution across cohorts: Younger cohorts are more anti-PRI, while older cohorts are more anti-PAN and anti-PRD.

In the previous two chapters I have presented a model of party identification that suits the Mexican case. In this chapter I tested the differences among age cohorts in the development of party ID. In order to further test this model, in the next chapter I will observe the ideological components of party ID in Mexico, scrutinizing issue preferences as inputs for ideology, and examining whether ideology is a determinant of party ID or vice versa.

Party Identification and Ideology in Mexico

6.1.1. Introduction

In the previous chapters I discussed the determinants of party identification in Mexico. I first demonstrated that party identification is different from, and more stable than vote choice. Second, I showed that negative as well as positive feelings towards political parties orient party identification in Mexico. That is, many individuals who do not identify with any party do have “negative party identification”, an aversion towards a specific party. Specifically, negative feelings towards the long-ruling PRI are a major determinant of PAN and PRD identification. Also, retrospective evaluations of government performance are, as I show as well, major determinants of party ID in Mexico. My findings are consistent both at the national and the state level. In particular, in chapter three I made the analogy of party ID as a preference for sports teams, in which partisans, just as fans, develop their emotional attachment based on keeping track of their parties’ (or teams’) performance. Individuals may like (or dislike) the PRI, PAN, or PRD based on their success or failure at any level of government.

In the present chapter I examine the relation between issues, ideology, and party ID in Mexico (specifically the relationship between ideological self and party-placements and party ID). Is ideology a determinant of party ID in Mexico? Even more, are there any ideological orientations in Mexico? That is, do individuals utilize ideology as a cue

to orient their political attitudes just as they rely on their partisan orientations? If ideology is a useful cue, what is its relationship with party ID? I argue that ideology is less relevant than party ID as a cue to orient Mexicans' political attitudes. In fact, I argue that ideology is *a product* of partisan attachments. That is, party ID determines ideology. This implies that Mexicans, when placing themselves or the parties over the 'left-right' ideological continuum, are most likely to rely on their partisan attachments rather than consider their issue preferences. In other words, I argue, individuals first choose their party and then place themselves accordingly, rather than choosing a specific party mostly because it is closer to their ideological position.

To explore the relationship between party ID and ideology, I assess the content of individuals' ideological self and party placements to know whether issues or party ID is the most important component: If issue preferences are statistically significant while party ID is not, then ideology will be explained mostly by issue opinions (after having controlled for partisanship), and could be seen as a valid and useful cue for orienting individuals' political attitudes. On the other hand, if party ID is statistically significant while issue preferences are not, then ideology will be explained by partisanship (after having controlled for issue opinions). In this case, ideology will be an 'echo' of partisanship, indistinguishable from party ID and useless to orient individuals' political attitudes.

To test if ideology is a determinant of party ID, just as negative feelings towards parties and retrospective evaluations of government performance, I run a model that includes lagged values of ideology and party ID, and current values of retrospective evaluations and negative feelings towards parties as independent variables. If ideology is

statistically significant (after controlling for other major determinants), then it will be demonstrated that ideology is a determinant of party ID. If, as I argue, ideology is not a determinant of party ID, then it should not be statistically significant.

To test which is causally prior, either party ID or ideology, I run a ‘cross-lagged model’ of party ID and ideology (which corresponds to a ‘Granger test’ for causality) on longitudinal data (Mexico 2000-2002 Panel Study). If lagged values of partisanship have a statistically significant effect on current values of ideology, after having controlled for lagged values of ideology, then it can be said that party ID is a determinant of ideology. If the reverse is true, then it can be said that ideology is a determinant of party ID.

This chapter proceeds as follows: First I review the debates on whether party ID determines ideology or vice versa, and on whether the ‘issue-based’ or the ‘partisan’ component is the most important in determining ideological self and party placements. Second, using data from the 1st and 5th waves of the Mexico 2000-2002 panel study⁵⁹, I describe the distribution and changes in ideological self and party-placements over this two-year period. Third, I regress ideological self and party placements on issue preferences and party ID on both waves of the panel, and observe which is more important. Fourth, I present a logit model for each group of partisans that includes lagged values of both party identification and ideological self-placements, as well as current values of negative feelings towards parties, retrospective evaluations of the economic situation of the country, and presidential approval, controlling for education

⁵⁹ Participants in the Mexico 2000 Panel Study included (in alphabetical order) Miguel Basañez, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Federico Estévez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Pablo Parás, and Alejandro Poiré. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-9905703) and *Reforma* newspaper. Technical details on the Mexico 2000 Panel Study, as well as copies of the survey instruments, are available at: http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/lawson/Explanation_of_data.pdf.

and age as determinants of party ID in Mexico. Finally, I present a ‘cross-lagged effects’ model (Finkel 1995), which corresponds to the ‘Granger test’ for causality will help me find out which is causally prior, either party ID or ideology. I conclude by discussing the relative impact of ideology and party ID in the context of the Mexican transition to democracy at the end of a seven-decade one-party regime.

6.1.2. Party Identification and Ideology in Well-Established Democracies

Some scholars argue that political parties’ most important function is to institutionalize the conflicts that rest in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In most European countries, for instance, social cleavages such as class or religion have been the cues that orient individuals’ political attitudes, even after having experienced authoritarian disruptions. In fact, social cleavages have been the source of ideological orientations that determine partisan attachments in France, Spain, Italy, and Germany (Converse and Dupeux 1962; Fleury and Lewis-Beck 1993; McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Piña 1998; Sani 1976b; Shively 1972; Sivini 1967). In these countries, the relative importance of social cleavages has been declining, however, whereas party labels have become more salient to the electorate (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984).

For instance, French voters were more likely to associate themselves either with the ‘left’ or ‘right’ ends of the ideological spectrum rather than to develop an emotional attachment towards a political party, exhibiting just a political leaning or ‘tendance’ (Converse and Dupeux 1962). In fact, ideology exceeded partisanship as a major predictor of vote choice in France (Fleury and Lewis-Beck 1993). In the German case, blocs of parties were aligned by class or religion, and the social groups associated with

such cleavages were the ones who provided the necessary cues to orient the electorate (Shively 1972). In Spain, ideological ‘left’ and ‘right’ self-placements were developed prior to party ID (McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Piña 1988), and such identifications could not be removed throughout Franco’s dictatorship:

“Repression virtually smothered their institutional bases, yet it could not expunge ideological leanings or extirpate cultural memories” (McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Piña 1998), p. 134.

In Italy, both Catholic and Socialist ‘subcultures’ have been the political homogeneous social contexts where previous partisan preferences have been transmitted and sometimes reinforced (Sani 1976b). Just as in Spain, not only was there a marked continuity in the distribution of electoral preferences between the pre-fascist and the post-war era (when the Republican period began), but such stability remained, at least in subsequent decades (Sivini 1967).

In recent years, however, there is evidence that supports the idea that party labels have become the most important cue in determining vote intention in these European countries. On the one hand, while there are a growing proportion of individuals who has expressed their emotional attachments towards political parties, social groups’ influence has been on the decline, showing an increasing ‘social heterogeneity’ within groups of identifiers who vote their party. That is, party ID has become more ‘attitudinally’ than ‘socially’ driven (Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt 1981). On the other hand, it was demonstrated that socio-demographic variables were relatively weaker than political variables as predictors of vote choice in younger generations (Baker 1978). Still, as will be explained below, party ID and ideology are major influences of individual attitudes, and the debate about which one precedes the other remains unsettled.

6.1.3. Party Identification and Ideology as Heuristics

Individuals may use schemas or cues as information ‘shortcuts’ to lower the costs of acquiring and processing political information (Gant and Davis 1984; Popkin 1994). While *schemas* are organized cognitive structures that help individuals process new information or retrieve stored one, allowing them to develop general political orientations and subsequent opinions on certain issues (Conover and Feldman 1984; Fiske and Linville 1980), political *cues*, or *heuristics*, are signals that contain useful information to orient individuals’ political decisions (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin 2001; Popkin 1994; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Both partisanship and ideological (either ‘left-right’ or ‘liberal-conservative’) identifications are significant political cues that help orient individuals’ political attitudes by reducing information costs (Downs 1957; Popkin 1994; Shively 1979). It has been argued that party ID and ideology are strongly related by a constant feedback from issues and party performance to partisanship, converting the latter into a ‘running tally’ of party performance assessments (Fiorina 1981; Popkin et al. 1976).

While many individuals may use party ID as an ‘information shortcut’ (Popkin 1994), some scholars argue that ideological thinking is more accurate among those who are politically ‘sophisticated’ or ‘knowledgeable’: Converse (1964) argued that a majority of individuals were not only less coherent than members of political and intellectual elites when relating analogous issues (showing lack of ‘constraint’), but also less stable in their ideological left-right self-placements over a two-year period (Converse 1964). Later, Converse’s argument was rationalized by mentioning that most individuals

answer survey questions with responses that are at the ‘top of their minds’ (Zaller and Feldman 1992). In contrast, Achen (1975) challenged Converse’s differentiation between mass and elites’ beliefs by mentioning that the lack of stability in individuals’ responses was due to measurement errors in the survey instrument (both ‘sophisticated’ and ‘unsophisticated’ individuals showed the same distribution in their issues responses). That is, once measurement error was detached from the analysis, Achen proved that most individuals held ‘true’ (stable) attitudes, at least with respect to issues (Achen 1975).

Some evidence supports the argument that individuals with higher levels of education use ideology as the most important cue for making political decisions, while those with lower levels of education consider group references, such as party ID, to orient their political choices (Fleishman 1986; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Education has been positively correlated with political knowledge and sophistication (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). That is, individuals’ skills and resources (including not only education, but exposure to different media, and political awareness as well) reduce the costs of acquiring political information and increase the ability of processing it (Dalton 2002). Education has the advantage of being a simple and direct measure that is asked in a vast majority of surveys. In fact, more accurate analyses are obtained when samples are stratified by education or political sophistication⁶⁰ (Converse 2000). In the

⁶⁰ For instance, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) have found great inequality in the levels of political knowledge of the American electorate, according to their gender, age, ethnicity, and education, with the latter the best predictor of such knowledge, and argue that individuals’ costs and ability to acquire new information is not only related to their amount of previous information, but it is also associated with higher levels of education Delli Carpini, Michael, and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why it Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.. In other words, those with higher levels of political knowledge will find it easier to get new information and process it with fewer difficulties than those with lower levels of political knowledge. In sum, education is expected to influence ideological thinking because higher levels of education provide individuals with exposure to information and training in the usage of conceptual knowledge Jacoby, William. 1991. Ideological Identification and Issue Attitudes. *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (1):178-205..

analyses to follow, I will use the term “sophisticates” to refer to those individuals whose education levels are above the average.

There are many examples that show attitude differentiations between ‘sophisticated’ and ‘non-sophisticated’ individuals. Norpoth and Lodge (1985) distinguished ‘sophisticates’ from ‘non-sophisticates’ by assessing the ideological direction of twenty issues, and found that political sophistication makes a clear difference not only for the *reliability* but also for the *structure* of individual responses on political attitudes, with the ‘sophisticated’ half of their sample exhibiting both greater issue ‘constraint’ and higher response reliability than the ‘non-sophisticated’ half (Norpoth and Lodge 1985). Sharp and Lodge (1985) argue that even though the cognitive attributes of partisan and ideological belief systems are similar (issues, groups, and leaders), the two are *highly* related among politically ‘sophisticated’ individuals, and only *moderately* related among the ‘non-sophisticated’, and support the argument that although the ‘non-sophisticated’ are not able to evaluate political information in ideological terms, they are still able to handle such information if it is provided on partisan terms (Sharp and Lodge 1985).

6.1.4. Partisan and Issue-Components of Ideological Self and Party

Placements

It has been argued that issue evaluations as well as partisan (affective) evaluations provide the content of ideological labels. Levitin and Miller (1979) mention that many Americans partially understand the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’, and argue that ‘liberal-conservative’ ideological self-placements are based more on the perceptions of

the *partisan* nature of candidates and issues than on individuals' prior ideological self-placements, and conclude that when individuals place themselves on the ideological continuum, they are also disclosing their positions about parties and candidates, which are different from their issue or policy placements (Levitin and Miller 1979). Levitin and Miller go on to demonstrate that issue voting and ideological voting are not identical, questioning the argument that ideological self-placements are based mostly on public policies.

Conover and Feldman (1981) confirm Levitin and Miller's argument by arguing that ideological labels derive their content from those symbols related with long-term predispositions such as party ID. They find that the meanings of 'liberal' and 'conservative' self-identifications are largely a product of *affection* and slightly reflect issue positions; that is to say, they are not 'issue' but 'partisan' oriented (Conover and Feldman 1981). Conover and Feldman conclude that changes in the aggregate distribution of ideological self-placements are explained by changes in the symbolic meaning of politics, rather than by major changes in issue orientations.

Why could ideology be 'partisan' rather than 'issue' oriented? Party leaders and candidates are the main sources that provide the information individuals need to place themselves over the ideological continuum. Individuals rely on political leaders to provide cues about what issues are important and what positions are appropriate (Carmines and Stimson 1989). If members of the political elite highlight certain issues, individuals would base their opinions on the considerations made more salient (Zaller and Feldman 1992). When judging where such candidates stand ideologically, apparently, individuals do not consider candidates' specific issue positions. Instead, individuals are

more likely to infer candidates' ideological stances from party cues and infer, for example, that a candidate of a conservative party may also be labeled a conservative (Feldman and Conover 1983).

When politicians emphasize their ideological differences, then such political stimuli are more salient and should influence whether and how individuals identify themselves ideologically (Fleishman 1986). It has been argued that the electorate may respond accordingly to the clarity of the messages provided by political elites: On the one hand, when political elites present clearly contrasting issue positions, the electorate usually responds by thinking in more ideological terms. On the other hand, if candidates belittle issue differences, then voters respond by becoming less ideologically oriented (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979). That is, the level of ideological thinking rises or falls in response to the salience of political events and to the nature of the debate offered by political elites. Moreover, self-placements may reflect whatever ideological label is currently in vogue. For instance, it has been argued that ideological self-placements may fluctuate depending on the frequency with which the terms 'liberal' and 'conservative' are presented in the political environment (Fleishman 1986). Actually, for political parties and voters to take corresponding issue stands, both elites and masses must have similar perceptions of the dominant issue dimension (Inglehart and Sidjanski 1976).

The closeness of the relationship between ideological self-placement and party ID has been tested at the aggregate level, and it has been demonstrated that party ID time series are more consistent over time than the ones of ideological identification ('macropartisanship' is more consistent than 'macroideology'), since while partisanship is transmitted in the bosom of the families, the meanings of the terms 'liberal' and

‘conservative’ have experienced alterations over time, making both macropartisanship and macroideology independent from one another in the short and long run (Box-Steffensmeier, Knight, and Sigelman 1998). In further research, however, these authors find that for the most sophisticated portion of the electorate (who are also most likely to vote), macropartisanship and macroideology reinforce each other in both the short and the long run (Box-Steffensmeier and DeBoef 2001).

Still, the controversy remains on whether party ID causes ideology or the reverse. Although some scholars argue that ideological self-placements might influence individuals’ attachment to a certain political party, others claim that it is party ID that determines ideology, mostly because party ID is formed early in life, that is, before individuals can be aware of ideological preferences (Abramson 1983; Pierce, Beatty, and Hagner 1982). For example, Jacoby (1988) argues that partisanship provides the necessary cues for guiding individuals’ political orientations, being more relevant the stronger the party attachment. If party ID is the result of a process of early socialization, then the party should become the most important reference for the individual, and the position of the party on different issues is therefore the information individuals utilize to orient their issue attitudes (Jacoby 1988). Party-based cues influence issue attitudes among individuals who are attached with or at least lean towards any political party (Jacoby 1988), and such reliance is stronger among those individuals with lower levels of education (Jacoby 1991).

The argument that party ID is causally prior to ideology has been reinforced by explanations of the main determinants of left-right ideological self-placements, which suggest that such self-placements are not prior to party ID, but a derivative of it (Inglehart

and Sidjanski 1976). Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) argue that left-right self-placements reflect party attachments rather than ‘issue preferences’ or value orientations, favoring the ‘partisan’ component over the ‘issue’ component of ideological self-placements,

“Individuals may recognize and use ideological labels in connection with political parties without knowing or considering the implications of such concepts for their own issue positions. If a respondent feels close to a given party and knows that people say it is located on the extreme left, he may place himself accordingly. Thus party loyalties could lead members of the public to adopt ideological labels for themselves that are unrelated to their current issue positions” (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976), p. 244.

As party ID is a more conventional cue than ideology, these authors argue, it should be expected that the ‘partisan’ component would outweigh the ‘ideological’ component of left-right self-placements. In other words, ‘left-right’ self-placements are simply a reflection of the placement individuals perceive of their political party. Using multiple regression analyses, Inglehart and Klingemann confirm that the ‘partisan’ component is stronger than the ‘issue-based’ component of ‘left-right’ self-placements. Again, however, different education levels affect the relationship, suggesting that the ‘issue-based’ component is stronger among the highly educated.

Some research, however, favors the ‘issue-based’ component of ideological self-placements over the ‘partisan’ component. Huber (1989) regresses ideological self-placements on issue preferences and vote choice on several western European countries, finding that issues are more significant than vote choice in explaining ‘left-right’ self-placements (Huber 1989).

Additionally, Knutsen (1997; 1998) dealt with the question of which component, either ‘partisan’ or ‘issue-based’, is the most important for understanding left-right ideological self-placements, and favors party choice as the dominant predictor of left-right self-placements. By decomposing the variance of the left-right ten point scale into a ‘party choice’, a ‘value’ (issues), and a ‘compounded’ component (an interaction of both), Knutsen finds that while a strong ‘compounded’ component is characteristic in advanced societies, a strong ‘partisan’ component is found in less advanced societies and less fragmented party systems (Knutsen 1997; Knutsen 1998).

In sum, analyses of the relationship between partisan and ideological identifications have provided conclusions regarding: 1) their relative importance as a major political cue; 2) the role of political ‘knowledge’ or ‘sophistication’ in an adequate understanding of the meaning and interpretation of ideology; and 3) the relationship between party ID and ideology by means of testing which component, either the partisan or the issue-based, is the most relevant in explaining ideological self-placements.

6.1.5. Issues and Cleavages in Mexican Politics

Most Latin American party systems, it has been argued, instead of reproducing early cleavages (such as “center-periphery” or “church-state”) as several European party systems do (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), reflect contemporary political conflicts and mobilizations (Dix 1989). Dix mentions that most Latin American parties are ‘catch-all’ in nature, that is, multi-class personalistic instruments of ‘caudillos’ that leave aside ideology in order to maximize the probability of being elected with the broadest electoral

base. Furthermore, if a party had a defined ideology in its origins, once it is elected to the presidency, it makes sure to sustain a wider multi-class constituency in order to minimize the risk of losing power (Dix 1989). Specifically, Mexican parties have been characterized as ‘catch-all’, since ‘alternation’ has been the most relevant cleavage driving electoral competition in recent years (Klesner 2005).

Mexican political parties distinguished their proposals at their beginnings on ideological terms, although these ideological differentiations have vanished in recent years: The comprehensive transformation brought about by the Mexican Revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century was notorious in the formation of the PRI, which was first a coalition of ‘caudillos’, and then an organization of ‘masses’ that included all sectors: peasants (rural), labor, and the military (Krauze 1997). Moreover, a new PRI president elected every six years represented an ideological change that swayed the party as if it was a ‘pendulum’ (Cornelius and Craig 1991). Ideologically, that is, the PRI was “all over the place”: It could support the unions’ and the entrepreneurs’ whims at the same time; it could claim to be secular while PRI party leaders and Church archbishops bargained power quotas; it could expropriate ‘with the stroke of a pen’ the banking system only to privatize it ten years later. The PRI, this is to say, has had a chameleonic feature that served it to sustain power for over seven decades, at least at the national level.

Despite the PAN starting as a conservative (right-wing) party (Lujambio 2001; Middlebrook 2001), its increasing electoral success has forced it to moderate some of its principles, becoming a ‘catch-all’ party (Magaloni and Moreno 2003), sometimes considered even more centrist than the PRI (Magaloni 1995). Many of the PAN claims

about democracy and valid elections have supported its reputation as the strongest opposition party (that is, the most likely to defeat the PRI), attracting individuals from wide-ranging ideological currents and stances, who nevertheless were coordinated by their desire to throw the PRI out of the presidency (Moreno 2002). The election of the PAN's presidential candidate in 2000, Vicente Fox, by the vote of an ideologically heterogeneous constituency is the best example (Dominguez and Lawson 2003).

Conversely, despite the fact that the PRD was formed in 1989 from a coalition of several leftist parties and currents that supported the 1988 presidential candidacy of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (former Priísta, son of the late PRI President Lázaro Cárdenas who was popular for having expropriated the oil industry in the late 1930s), until very recently the party's strategy has been to focus on winning the presidency rather than earn victories in state governorships and municipalities (contrary to the PAN), and to stress the authoritarianism and anti-democratic practices of the PRI by, for example, claiming fraud in most if not all the elections instead of accentuating its ideological distinctiveness. In fact, even though many founding members of the PRD are everlasting leftist activists, the party leadership has found it more profitable, in terms of electoral victories, to nominate former Priístas that, as soon as they lost the PRI nomination, joined the PRD adopting anti-PRI campaigns, empty of any ideological content (Estrada 2003b). As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the PRD's strategy has neglected the local grassroots opportunities to build a political career, weakening the identification with the PRD not only among their local cadres, but also among its constituencies.

Even though it seems that Mexican political parties' strategies had stimulated a discreet ideological debate among the electorate by focusing instead on how to defeat the

PRI by any means (or in the case of the PRI on how to keep power), some authors insist that ideology is deeply-rooted in the Mexican political environment, and even more, argue that ideology is a relevant cue that individuals use for orienting their political attitudes (Beltrán 2002; Moreno 1998; Moreno 1999; Moreno 2003; Moreno 2004; Moreno and Zechmeister 2002; Zechmeister 2002). The shortcomings of these studies are twofold: First, they fail to tackle the differences between ‘sophisticated’ and ‘non-sophisticated’ individuals. In fact, they assume that the Mexican electorate, as a whole, understands and makes an appropriate usage of the terms ‘left-right’ (Moreno 1998; Moreno 1999; Moreno 2003), and ‘liberal-conservative’ (Beltrán 2002) for placing parties and candidates. Second, some of them reach limited (non-generalizable) conclusions by employing non-representative samples, considering either federal deputies to observe the distributions of ‘left-right’ self and party placements (Moreno 2004; Moreno and Zechmeister 2002), or college students to unveil the meanings of ‘left’ and ‘right’ (Zechmeister 2002). Moreover, an example that underscores the vacuity of the debate about ideology in Mexico is the lack of consensus in the format, phrasing, and contents of the different issue questions. Typically, the issues included in surveys vary dramatically, even across surveys from the same firm, whereas the phrasing of the same issue questions changes from survey to survey, even in panel studies, as it will be shown below⁶¹.

Although it looks like the findings of the literature on ideology in Mexico have not been disputed, there are more basic questions about the meaning and impacts of ideology among the Mexican electorate that still have to be addressed, including the

⁶¹ The responsibility does not lie on pollsters but mostly on party leaders who are expected, as it was

effect of party ID on ideological self-placements and the causality direction between the two variables. According to the arguments and the findings about the relationship between party ID and ideology, I suggest the following two hypotheses for the Mexican case:

H₉: In Mexico, the partisan component of ideological self and party placements is stronger than the issue-based component.

As I argue, the contents of the labels ‘left’, ‘right’, ‘liberal’, and ‘conservative’ are not related to issue preferences but to partisan allegiances, mainly because party leaders, who are the electorate’s main providers of ideological cues, have not competed on ideological terms. On the one hand, opposition parties were concerned with the defeat of the PRI while the PRI, on the other, has been changing ideological stances indiscriminately through its seven-decade hegemony at the executive level. As a consequence, when asked to place themselves on the ideological continuum, Mexicans are influenced mostly by partisan rather than issue-content cues. To test this hypothesis, I regress ‘left-right’ and ‘liberal-conservative’ self and party placements on both party ID and issue stances (controlling for age and education) to measure and compare the effects of each component.

H₁₀: In Mexico, party ID is a determinant of ideology rather than the reverse.

I argue that individuals first look at their party (rather than at their issue stances), and only then place themselves accordingly on the ideological ‘left-right’ dimension without thinking about their issue stances. For example, some individuals locate themselves on the ‘left’ side of the ideological spectrum because they like the PRD, not

mentioned above, to be the most important source for setting the agenda on certain issues.

necessarily because their issue attitudes are oriented towards the ‘left’. To test this hypothesis, I utilize longitudinal data (1st and 5th waves of the Mexico 2000-2002 Panel Study⁶²) to run a ‘cross-lagged effects’ model that allows the possibility of finding the causality direction between party ID and ideology.

6.1.6 Ideological Determinants of Party ID in Mexico


Previous analyses of the 2000-2002 Mexico Panel Study have found that party ID is more stable than ideological self-placements. Moreno (2003) shows party ID as the most stable attitude between the 1st and the 5th waves of the panel (a contingency coefficient of 0.67), more stable than vote choice (0.58), and twice as stable as ideological self-placements (0.34). Moreover, the analysis of ideological self-placements in Mexico has been mostly descriptive (Moreno 1998; Moreno 1999; Moreno 2003). In fact, if we only consider the distribution of ideological self-placements of the 2000-2002 Mexico Panel Study, it seems that they did not suffer major changes from the 1st to the 5th waves, as figure 6.1 shows⁶³.

⁶² The 1st and 5th waves of the 2000-2002 Mexico Panel Study were chosen because they are the most similar in many ways: 1) They are the farthest apart from election day (the 1st wave was carried out five months previous to the 2000 Presidential election, while the 5th wave was carried out eleven months previous to the 2003 mid-term Congressional election); 2) The 1st wave contains the most cases of all panel waves (N = 2,355), whereas the 5th wave contains N = 2,183, of which 994 were interviewed in the 1st wave. Unfortunately, only ‘public electricity’ was asked in both waves although using different phrasing.

⁶³ A closer look at individual change from 2000 to 2002, however, reveals that only a fifth of those interviewed in both waves did not move any place over the ideological ten-point scale (19.8%), while over half of them moved up to three places (53.8%), and a tenth moved five places (10.7%). The median number of shifts was 2, higher, for instance, than the one showed from the 1st to the 3rd waves by Magaloni and Poiré (2003), which was 1.

Figure 6.1

**LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGICAL SELF-PLACEMENTS
1ST AND 5TH WAVES*, MEXICO 2000-2002 PANEL**



"In politics, people talk about "Left" and "Right". On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is "left" and 10 is "right", where would you place yourself?"

*Proportion of non-respondents: 1st wave: 28.1%; 5th wave: 15.9%.

The distribution of 'left-right' ideological self-placements in both 2000 and 2002 is bi-modal, skewed to the 'center-right' side of the ideological spectrum. The distribution of ideological self-placements of the Mexican electorate over the period 2000-2002 is in accordance with previous studies that show a clear tendency of a majority of the electorate in recent years to be located in the center-right of the ideological spectrum (Moreno 1998; Moreno 1999; Moreno 2003). Such studies, however, did not mention the proportion of individuals that were not able (or did not want) to respond to the self-placement question. Although in this case there is an

important decrease of non-response from the 1st to the 5th wave (28.1 to 15.9 percent), usually a third of the electorate does not place itself over the ‘left-right’ continuum⁶⁴.

The distribution of ideological self-placements in Mexico, however, is not equal across different levels of individual ‘sophistication’ (which in this case is defined by using education levels⁶⁵), just as the American literature has demonstrated (Converse 1964; Converse 2000; Dalton 2002; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Fleishman 1986; Jacoby 1991; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Norpoth and Lodge 1985; Sharp and Lodge 1985; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Zaller and Feldman 1992). Indeed, the mean self-placements of those individuals with primary school or less, and of those with more than primary school are different and statistically significant for all three groups of partisans, as table 6.1 shows.

⁶⁴ Ten cross-section household surveys, carried out by *Reforma* newspaper from December 1999 to November 2000 show that, on average, 28.3 percent of the sample did not place themselves over the ‘left-right’ continuum. Nearly two thirds of such non-respondents on average (59.7%) hold education levels up to primary school.

⁶⁵ There are two sophistication levels: those individuals with up to complete primary school, and those who have more than primary school. The ‘primary’ threshold considers the latest INEGI census (2000), which shows that the average years of education in Mexico is 7.3, that is, slightly more than the first year of secondary school (the equivalent of junior-high). For more details, see: www.inegi.gob.mx. Thus, the ‘sophistication’ variable divides between those who are below the average levels of education and those who are above it (59.6% of ‘sophisticates’ in the 1st wave, and 60.2% in the 5th wave).

Table 6.1

**IDEOLOGICAL MEAN SELF-PLACEMENTS
BY PARTISANS, MEXICO 2000-2002 PANEL**

EDUCATION LEVELS	1 st wave			5 th wave		
	Up to primary school	More than primary school	p > t	Up to primary school	More than primary school	p > t
Panistas	7.01	5.85	0.000	7.58	6.86	0.000
<i>N</i>	141	392		187	472	
Priistas	7.72	7.08	0.003	7.65	6.83	0.000
<i>N</i>	267	445		293	311	
Perredistas	6.05	4.36	0.001	6.71	5.22	0.000
<i>N</i>	76	107		92	157	

Not only are the mean self-placements of those partisans with up to primary school ('non-sophisticates' henceforth) more skewed to the 'right' side of the ideological spectrum than the ones of those individuals with more than primary school ('sophisticates' hereafter), but they also seem less dispersed (more close to one another than the ones of those 'sophisticates'). In all, the distribution of ideological self-placements is different between 'sophisticates' and 'non-sophisticates' in Mexico, a fact that was not considered in previous studies, making necessary the inclusion of education as a control in further analyses. It seems then more accurate to present only the distribution of ideological self-placements of 'sophisticated partisans', not only because they possess higher education levels (having a better comprehension of the usage of ideology), but also because it has been demonstrated that partisans are more involved in politics than independents (Estrada forthcoming; Keith et al. 1992), which may reflect also a better connection between issues and ideology. Sophisticated partisans' 'left-right'


ideological self-placements in the 1st and the 5th waves of the panel are shown in figures 6.2a and 6.2b respectively⁶⁶.

⁶⁶ Hereafter, the rest of the analyses will be carried out only on ‘sophisticated’ individuals, those who have at least primary education.

Figure 6.2a

**LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGICAL SELF-PLACEMENTS
BY PARTISANS*, MEXICO 2000-2002 PANEL**


1st wave, February 2000



N = 392 Panistas; 445 Priistas; 107 Perredistas.

Figure 6.2b

5th wave, August 2002



N = 472 Panistas; 311 Priistas; 157 Perredistas

*Only individuals with more than primary school

The distribution of ideological self-placements in groups of ‘sophisticated partisans’ is standard (instead of the distribution considering the whole electorate): Although a plurality of each group of partisans is located at the center of the spectrum, the next to the highest proportion of each is located accordingly to the conventional wisdom, showing most Panistas and Priistas on the ‘right’ side of the ideological spectrum, and most Perredistas on the ‘left’ side. Segregating by education and partisanship provides a more accurate picture of how Mexicans place themselves over the ideological continuum.

Observing the distribution of ideological self-placements does not provide, however, a full understanding of the ideological sources of such locations. Actually, the scholars who have analyzed ideology in Mexico have focused on both showing the distribution of self-placements, and on grouping individuals’ opinions on issues (usually through the usage of exploratory factor analysis). These scholars, however, do not discuss the link between individuals’ issue preferences and ideological self-placements. In other words, they do not explain the content of the latter⁶⁷ (Moreno 1998; Moreno 1999; Moreno 2003; Zechmeister 2002). Moreover, no study has utilized party ID as a partisan control of ideological self-placements (these studies have used either vote

⁶⁷ For instance, Moreno (1998; 1999; 2003) uses principal components factor analysis to group issues that, he argues, are explained originally by two latent dimensions (‘economic issues’ and ‘democratic performance’ 1998; 1999), and then also by a third one, represented by ‘liberal-fundamentalist’ issues (2003). These studies do not explain, however, the theoretical support of each dimension, or how different issues were chosen to be included in the analysis. In fact, by reviewing the 2000 World Values Survey, which is the base for the author’s 2003 piece, I found additional issues that were more typical than the ones included for explaining the three main dimensions (for instance, it is not explained why the issue “Private ownership of business and industry should be increased” versus “Government ownership of business and industry should be increased” was not included to be part of the “economy” factor). It is not clear as well why alpha coefficients (for measuring the adequateness of grouping issues) were not reported. In all, these studies do not provide enough information that allows the reader to understand the criteria for choosing the issues and dimensions that explain ‘left-right’ ideological self-placements. Provided this lack information,

intention –for individuals, or party membership –for members of Congress (Moreno 2004; Moreno and Zechmeister 2002)). The impact of party ID on ideology and vice versa has yet to be assessed.

Do individuals place themselves on the ideological continuum after having considered their own issue preferences, or do individuals place themselves either on the ‘left’, ‘center’, or ‘right’ side of the ideological spectrum according to where their party stands? In Mexico, as I argue, it is not that individuals do not have issue preferences. It is just that most issues (or at least those that have been asked in surveys) are not associated with the ideological labels ‘left’ and ‘right’. At least since 1988, political parties have prioritized ‘alternation’ and ‘change’ as the issue that has guided the political debate. The absence of discussion about other issues than ‘change’ or ‘alternation’ has been reflected in a clear lack of consensus about which issues to include in electoral surveys, and the question format that should be used⁶⁸.

The Mexican literature has neglected the relationship between party ID and ideology (focusing instead on the relationship of ideology and vote choice). Moreover, scholars who have discussed the impact of both party ID and issues on ideological self-

it remains intriguing how these studies obtained the same two (and then three) dimensions using three different surveys (1990, 1997, and 2000), and different issue questions with different question phrasing. ⁶⁸ Table A6.1 shows that even panel data does not consider the same issues from one wave to another, and if considered, then they are not phrased similarly. The issues included here were the ones more closely related with the traditional meaning and understanding of ‘left’ and ‘right’. See Huber, John, and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies. *Party Politics* 1 (1):73-111. Among these issues, only ‘public electricity’ was asked in both waves, although question phrasing is different. This is why the regressions that include issues as determinants will be run separately, one for each wave, as seen below. Issues asked in the 1st wave but not included in this chapter are: ‘increase of salaries versus increase of investment’; ‘efficiency of the role of the state to reduce poverty’; ‘best way to increase government resources’. Issues asked in the 5th wave not included here are: ‘political reform’; ‘autonomy of indigenous communities’. All these issues were not considered in the present chapter either because they do not relate with the traditional concept of ‘left’ and ‘right’, or because it was not clear what the goal of the question was (answers were not mutually exclusive). The exact phrasing of all issues contained in the first and the fifth waves of the Mexico 2000-2002 Panel Study is in appendix 6.

placements in European countries have used the correlation between these variables to compare the strength of their relationship. Since my interest concentrates on observing the relative impact of party ID and issues on ideological self-placements, the best approach is to regress ideological self and party placements on partisanship and issues rather than base my analysis on correlations (King 1986), controlling for education and age⁶⁹. After including party ID and issues as determinants of ideological self and party placements I am able to observe the relative contribution of each, as table 6.2 shows⁷⁰.

⁶⁹ Different education levels, as mentioned in the literature, affect how individuals understand ideology, becoming a useful proxy for ‘sophistication’. Age differences, on the other hand, may reveal the potential distinctions between the elder who experienced the years in which the PRI pursued a leftist economic agenda, and the younger that in more recent years, have experienced the structural adjustment of PRI neo-liberal administrations.

⁷⁰ The issues considered in the regressions were not correlated even for the ‘sophisticates’, as the table below shows. The highest statistically significant (although negligible) correlation is between ‘allowing gay marriage’, and ‘allowing abortion’ (0.21), while the expected correlation of ‘public electricity’ in both waves was negligible (0.12, statistically significant). In the latter case, some could argue differences in question phrasing, although I think that the change in wording did not alter the essence of the question. Perhaps, the impact of such issue was highly influenced by media and campaigns (in that case, 2000 was a presidential election year, while 2002 did not represent any motivation for parties to discuss it). It seems that even the sophisticated Mexican electorate does not show issue ‘constraint’ (Converse 1964).

	<u>Strong leaders</u>	<u>Public electricity (1)</u>	<u>Tough on crime</u>	<u>Death penalty</u>	<u>Abortion</u>	<u>Gay marriage</u>	<u>Public electricity (5)</u>
<u>Strong leaders</u>	1.0000						
<u>Public electricity (1)</u>	-0.0323 (0.4784)	1.0000					
<u>Tough on crime</u>	0.1675 (0.0001)	-0.0103 (0.8214)	1.0000				
<u>Death penalty</u>	-0.0012 (0.9793)	-0.0066 (0.8835)	0.1832 (0.0000)	1.0000			
<u>Abortion</u>	-0.0176 (0.6857)	0.0405 (0.3603)	-0.0298 (0.4914)	0.0668 (0.1216)	1.0000		
<u>Gay marriage</u>	0.0309 (0.4761)	-0.0440 (0.3211)	0.0014 (0.9750)	-0.0210 (0.6273)	0.2111 (0.0000)	1.0000	
<u>Public electricity (5)</u>	0.0095 (0.8285)	0.1819 (0.0000)	0.0106 (0.8081)	-0.0265 (0.5425)	-0.0194 (0.4891)	-0.0293 (0.2958)	1.0000

Table 6.2

	<i>1st Wave (February 2000)</i>			<i>5th Wave (August 2002)</i>		
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Robust Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Robust Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>
Party Identification						
Panista	0.403	0.295	0.173	1.113	0.185	0.000
Priista	1.695	0.283	0.000	1.044	0.207	0.000
Perredista	-0.955	0.428	0.026	-0.479	0.259	0.065
Issues						
Strong leaders ^a	0.005	0.188	0.978			
Public electricity ^b	-0.349	0.183	0.057	-0.091	0.142	0.524
Government tough on crime ^c	-0.063	0.188	0.736			
Allow death penalty ^d	-0.071	0.185	0.701			
Women must decide about abortion ^e				-0.052	0.052	0.315
Allow civil gay marriage ^f				-0.018	0.048	0.713
Controls						
Age	0.002	0.008	0.798	0.013	0.006	0.024
Constant	5.637	0.390	0.000	5.399	0.269	0.000
	N = 928			N = 1,140		
	R ² = 0.0969			R ² = 0.0768		

^a"For the country to work well, it is best to have strong leaders rather than strong laws and institutions"

^b"Privatizing the electric industry should be bad for the country, rather than privatizing it to make it more efficient"

^c"The best way to reduce crime is for the government to get tough rather than create economic opportunities for the people"

^d"The death penalty should be allowed in order to reduce crime"

^e"Women must have the right to decide whether or not to have an abortion"

^f"Allow civil marriage between homosexuals"

The relative contribution of party ID to ideological self-placements is clearly superior to that of issues. Panismo and Priísmo are statistically significant in explaining 'left-right' ideological self-placements while Perredismo is not, although it shows the expected sign. There is a strong relationship between party ID and ideological self-placements. Conversely, the impact of issues on ideological self-placements is irregular and negligible. According to table 6.2, the issues included, some of them claimed in the

past to delineate the Mexican electorate's 'left-right' self-placements, are not statistically significant.

The partisan component is stronger than the issue-based component in determining individuals' 'left-right' ideological *self*-placements. Is it the same for individuals' *party*-placements? Yes. Table 6.3 shows that the partisan component is more important than issues in determining party placements in both the 1st and the 5th wave of the Mexico 2000-2002 Panel Study.

Table 6.3

OLS REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
PARTISAN AND ISSUE COMPONENTS OF LEFT-RIGHT
PARTY-PLACEMENTS AMONG SOPHISTICATES
MEXICO 2000-2002 PANEL

	<i>1st Wave (February 2000)</i>			<i>5th Wave (August 2002)</i>		
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Robust Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Robust Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>
PAN						
Panista	1.274	0.208	0.000	1.873	0.137	0.000
Strong leaders	-0.124	0.207	0.550			
Public electricity	-0.314	0.202	0.120	0.062	0.147	0.676
Government tough on crime	-0.150	0.207	0.469			
Allow death penalty	-0.035	0.204	0.865			
Women must decide about abortion				0.042	0.050	0.403
Allow civil gay marriage				-0.065	0.050	0.191
Age	0.014	0.008	0.101	0.022	0.006	0.000
Constant	5.123	0.351	0.000	4.805	0.245	0.000
	N = 889; R ² = 0.0448			N = 1,145; R ² = 0.1417		
PRI						
Priista	1.878	0.208	0.000	2.047	0.150	0.000
Strong leaders	-0.115	0.221	0.601			
Public electricity	-0.014	0.216	0.949	-0.047	0.152	0.757
Government tough on crime	0.154	0.216	0.476			
Allow death penalty	-0.107	0.216	0.620			
Women must decide about abortion				-0.005	0.052	0.918
Allow civil gay marriage				0.065	0.051	0.204
Age	0.015	0.009	0.103	0.004	0.006	0.497
Constant	5.457	0.399	0.000	5.182	0.245	0.000
	N = 891; R ² = 0.0848			N = 1,137; R ² = 0.1217		
PRD						
Perredista	0.776	0.394	0.049	1.049	0.231	0.000
Strong leaders	0.146	0.203	0.473			
Public electricity	-0.083	0.198	0.676	0.232	0.144	0.107
Government tough on crime	-0.518	0.199	0.009			
Allow death penalty	0.244	0.198	0.219			
Women must decide about abortion				-0.083	0.049	0.094
Allow civil gay marriage				0.012	0.048	0.804
Age	-0.016	0.008	0.055	-0.019	0.006	0.002
Constant	4.079	0.341	0.000	4.844	0.233	0.000
	N = 877; R ² = 0.0206			N = 1,124; R ² = 0.0393		

Party ID is statistically significant in both waves in explaining ideological party placements for all parties, contrary to issues, which are not. Only ‘government’s toughness on crime’ is relevant in explaining the placement of the PRD. In Mexico, the partisan component of ideological self and party placements is relatively (and consistently) more important than the issue component, suggesting that individuals think about parties, rather than about issues, before locating them (and themselves) on the ‘left-right’ ideological spectrum⁷¹.

Table 6.4 presents logit models for each group of partisans in order to observe the effects of lagged values of both party ID and ideological self-placements (1st wave of the panel) on current values of party ID (5th wave of the panel), including current values as well of negative feelings towards parties, retrospective evaluations of economic performance and presidential approval, education and age.

⁷¹ I include a table in appendix 6 that shows whether this finding is sustained when the dimension considered is ‘liberal-conservative’ rather than ‘left-right’. According to table A6.2, the partisan component (specifically Panismo and Perredismo) is statistically significant, while ‘public electricity’ and ‘gay marriage’ are statistically significant, although the former in the unexpected direction –higher values of the dependent variable are related to ‘conservatism’) in explaining ‘liberal-conservative’ ideological self-placements in the 5th wave of the Mexico 2000-2002 panel.

Table 6.4

PARTY IDENTIFICATION LOGIT MODELS
(5th wave, August 2002), MEXICO 2000-2002 PANEL

<i>Independent vars. *</i>	PANISTA			PRIISTA			PERREDISTA		
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> z </i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> z </i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> z </i>
Panista (1)	1.931	0.220	0.000						
Priista (1)				2.501	0.234	0.000			
Perredista (1)							2.758	0.327	0.000
Ideological Self-Placements (1)	0.006	0.034	0.869	0.070	0.036	0.053	-0.095	0.043	0.025
Anti-PRI (5)	0.538	0.224	0.016				0.632	0.302	0.036
Anti-PRD (5)	0.105	0.233	0.653	0.215	0.233	0.357			
Anti-PAN (5)				0.605	0.251	0.016	0.104	0.334	0.755
Country's Economic Situation is Better than Before (5)	0.272	0.129	0.035	-0.206	0.129	0.110	0.224	0.168	0.182
Approves the President (5)	0.774	0.086	0.000	-0.451	0.090	0.000	-0.301	0.116	0.009
Education (5)	0.154	0.100	0.123	-0.190	0.104	0.068	0.029	0.131	0.822
Age (5)	0.001	0.008	0.859	0.010	0.008	0.201	-0.011	0.011	0.279
Constant	-2.387	0.595	0.000	-2.906	0.632	0.000	-1.971	0.777	0.011
	N = 661			N = 654			N = 667		
	LR chi2 (8) = 271.94			LR chi2 (8) = 261.83			LR chi2 (8) = 113.44		
	Prob > chi2 = 0.0000			Prob > chi2 = 0.0000			Prob > chi2 = 0.0000		
	Pseudo R2 = 0.3132			Pseudo R2 = 0.3207			Pseudo R2 = 0.2264		
	Correctly classified = 78.8%			Correctly classified = 82.1%			Correctly classified = 89.7%		


*Numbers in parenthesis correspond to the wave of each variable, either the first or the fifth waves.

In all three cases, previous values of party ID are statistically significant determinants of party ID, whereas lagged values of ideological self-placements are only statistically significant for the case of Perredismo. Negative feelings towards parties remain a strong predictor of party ID, especially those against the PRI, which are determinants of Panismo and Perredismo, while anti-PAN feelings are statistically significant for determining Priísmo. The different impact of retrospective evaluations on each group of partisans confirms my findings in chapter three: While both evaluations of

the country's economic situation and presidential approval are statistically significant for explaining Panismo, only negative values of presidential approval are statistically significant for explaining Priísmo and Perredismo. After including ideology as a possible determinant of party ID in Mexico, it is demonstrated that it is not an important element compared to the rest of the variables whose inclusion has been theoretically and empirically supported throughout this dissertation. For Panismo, previous values of party ID, presidential approval and anti-PRI feelings are its major determinants. The major determinants of Priísmo are previous values of Priísmo, anti-PAN feelings, and presidential disapproval. Finally, for determining Perredismo, previous values of Perredismo, anti-PRI feelings and presidential disapproval are the most important.

As shown in tables 6.2 and 6.3, the relationship of ideological self and party placements with party ID in Mexico is more consistent than the relationship with issues. Does party ID determine ideology or the reverse? Taking advantage of longitudinal data, I run a 'cross-lagged effects' model that estimates the reciprocal effects of the two variables, party ID and ideology, performing a 'Granger causality' test, in which is said that a variable *A* "Granger causes" *B* if lagged values of *A* have a significant effect on the current value of *B*, controlling for all *B*'s lagged values (Finkel 1995). The diagram of the model is depicted in figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3
**A ‘CROSS-LAGGED EFFECTS’
 MODEL OF PARTY ID AND
 IDEOLOGY IN MEXICO**



For this model, I ran a total of nine versions, that is, for each combination of groups of partisans (Panistas, Priístas, and Perredistas) and levels of individual ‘sophistication’ (primary school or less, more than primary school, and the whole sample). Table 6.5 shows the standardized estimates for all nine models⁷².

⁷² Table A6.3 in the appendix shows the unstandardized estimates, standard errors and covariances for all nine models.

Table 6.5

CROSS-LAGGED EFFECTS MODEL
STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
MEXICO 2000-2002 PANEL

	ALL		SOPHISTICATES		NON-SOPHISTICATES	
	<i>Estimate</i>		<i>Estimate</i>		<i>Estimate</i>	
Panista1 to Panista5	0.452	**	0.446	**	0.449	**
Ideology1 to Ideology5	0.311	**	0.305	**	0.306	**
Panista1 to Ideology5	0.014		0.056		0.001	
Ideology1 to Panista5	0.001		0.040		-0.049	
	<i>N = 643</i>		<i>N = 412</i>		<i>N = 204</i>	
Priista1 to Priista5	0.491	**	0.430	**	0.596	**
Ideology1 to Ideology5	0.289	**	0.286	**	0.286	**
Priista1 to Ideology5	0.092	*	0.065		0.096	
Ideology1 to Priista5	0.048		0.040		0.036	
	<i>N = 643</i>		<i>N = 412</i>		<i>N = 204</i>	
Perredista1 to Perredista5	0.457	**	0.517	**	0.437	**
Ideology1 to Ideology5	0.299	**	0.279	**	0.298	**
Perredista1 to Ideology5	-0.104	**	-0.136	**	-0.088	
Ideology1 to Perredista5	-0.098	**	-0.103	*	-0.048	
	<i>N = 643</i>		<i>N = 412</i>		<i>N = 204</i>	

* $p > 0.05$; ** $p > 0.01$ (one tailed)

These models were run on AMOS v.4.0, using the database without missing data. Since the cross-lagged effects model is "exactly identified", measures of fit are not reported (the model has zero degrees of freedom).

According to table 6.5, the effect of party ID over ideology is higher than the reverse in all nine models. Such effect, however, is not statistically significant in all groups of partisans: In the case of Panistas there is nothing that can be said about the causality direction between party ID and ideology. Perhaps ideology, just as it has been argued for party ID in the case of Panistas, is determined by other elements, such as retrospective evaluations of government performance, or negative feelings towards political parties, specifically the PRI. In the case of the PRI, party ID determines ideology, being statistically significant only in the model that considers all respondents in the survey. Priístas, then, observe first at their party and then locate themselves on the ideological spectrum accordingly. Finally, for Perredistas, both directions of causality are statistically significant, but the effect of party ID as causally prior to ideology is higher than the reverse. For Perredistas, both party ID and ideology are cues that are useful either for placing themselves ideologically or to attach themselves to a party based on an ideological background. In sum, the evidence suggests that party ID determines ideology, confirming that the absence of an ideological debate among parties in Mexico has resulted in the electorate's inclination to use their partisan attachments rather than issue preferences to locate themselves (and their parties) over the ideological continuum, which has been the main argument of the present chapter.

6.1.7. Conclusions

The present chapter has demonstrated that party identification is a determinant of ideology in Mexico, rather than vice versa. By focusing their campaigns on how to defeat the PRI, it seems that parties have put ideology aside. The issue of 'change' has

characterized the competition among parties in recent years. Individuals, I argue, think first on parties rather than on issues when placing themselves on the ‘left-right’ ideological continuum.

The main findings of the present chapter are:

- There is a clear difference between considering the whole electorate and only those ‘sophisticated’ individuals’ ideological self-placements. While previous studies have reached conclusions about the behavior of the Mexican electorate as a whole, I demonstrate that by considering those individuals who are above the average levels of education provides more robust evidence and therefore is the distinction to be used when analyzing ideological self and party placements.
- In Mexico, the partisan component is more important than the issue-based component in explaining ideological self and party placements: By regressing ideological self-placements on both issues and party ID I demonstrate that issues are not connected with ‘left-right’, while party ID is a major predictor of such placements. This is the case for party placements as well, where the partisan component (party ID) is the major predictor, showing the negligible effect of several issues that are supposed to be related, according to previous studies on the subject in Mexico, to the left-right dimension. Furthermore, this result is practically the same when the ‘liberal-conservative’ dimension is analyzed. Even

though Mexicans do hold issue preferences, these opinions are not related to the ideological debate, mostly because party leaders, who are the most reliable cue providers, have not been interested in priming such debate, focusing instead on ‘alternation’ and the defeat of the long-ruling PRI (in the case of PRI leaders, on debating why they should keep power), both at the state and the national levels.

- A model that considers the major determinants of party ID discussed in the present dissertation, confirms that the effect of ideology on party ID is negligible. Other variables, such as negative feelings towards parties, retrospective evaluations of government performance, and presidential approval are major determinants of party ID, elucidating the origin and evolution of partisan attachments during the Mexican transition to democracy, right after the defeat of the long-ruling seven-decade PRI government at the national level.
- In Mexico, party ID determines ideology rather than the reverse: Further evidence that demonstrates that individuals think first about their party instead of issues to place themselves accordingly on the ‘left-right’ ideological continuum, is the ‘cross-lagged effects’ model I present for discovering the causality direction between party ID and ideology. In the model I show how the effect of lagged values of party ID on current values of

ideological self-placements is higher than the reverse. Such effect, however, is different across groups of partisans: For Priístas, the effect of lagged party ID on current ideological self-placements is statistically significant. For Perredistas, both effects (lagged party ID on current ideology and lagged ideology on current party ID) are statistically significant, although it is clear that the one of party ID over ideology is higher. Finally, in the case of Panistas nothing can be said about the direction of causality between party ID and ideology (neither effect is statistically significant), due, perhaps, to the influence of other factors such as anti-PRI feelings or retrospective evaluations of government performance on both party ID and ideology. In all, party ID seems to be causally prior to ideological self-placements in Mexico, with different magnitudes according to the group of partisans: explicitly higher for Priístas and Perredistas, and uncertain for Panistas.

To successfully defeat the PRI at any level is a unique phenomenon. After doing so, what is left for parties? If parties still focus on defeating the incumbent by any means (or on keeping power), without paying attention to other latent public discussions and public necessities, the democratic transition is foreseen to be slow and polarized. Party leaders need to differentiate, on ideological terms, their parties, rather than being involved in scandalous campaigns without content. The electorate, on the other hand, is clearly aware and attentive of the framing of the debates, and it is clearly seen that is

completely partisan. Party ID has proven to be, once again, a crucial variable whose analyses have to be undertaken in a more systematic fashion in the years to come.

Conclusions

Most studies in American electoral behavior agree that party identification (party ID) is the variable that best predicts vote choice. While in the United States, party ID has been studied for over five decades now, in Mexico, despite more than a decade of reliable survey data, it has not been the subject of much analysis. The main goal of the present dissertation has been to overcome such deficit, and to contribute to the understanding of partisan attachments from the perspective of a regime in democratic consolidation.

Why has party ID in Mexico not been studied as much as in other well-established democracies? In the second chapter I argue this is a consequence of a misconception: Many scholars favored the idea that party ID was too similar to vote choice, that its explanatory power to explain vote choice was worthless, and they avoided its usage as an independent variable. Nevertheless, I demonstrate that party ID is different from, and more stable than vote choice. From 2000 to 2002, about two out of three partisans from the three major parties (PAN, PRI, and PRD) were loyal to their party allegiance, even after the ‘pivotal’ presidential election of 2000, when the PRI lost for the first time after more than seven uninterrupted decades of government at the national level. Furthermore, I showed that not all partisans vote their party every time (about 75 percent of them do so), and that party ID is more stable than vote choice even though seven out of ten individuals who changed their vote also changed their party. The enormous fluidity

in the Mexican party system, a consequence of the end of the seven-decade hegemony of the PRI at the national level, has brought with it major instability in voting preferences, and in a minor fashion, in partisan attachments. Potential realignments (and dealignments) may be the rule rather than the exception, mostly related with parties' successes or failures at different levels of government. A good example is the time length of partisan attachments of stable partisans in Mexico: While 71 percent of stable Priistas have been with their party at least for a decade, 64 percent of stable Perredistas have been attached with the PRD since 1997, and about 59 percent of stable Panistas have been with their party since 1997, half of them (27 percent) since 2000, the same year Vicente Fox, PAN's presidential candidate, won the presidential election. Winning or losing elections have a strong impact either in attracting new partisans or in keeping them away.

The relationship between positive performance evaluations and the attraction of more and new partisans was further developed in the argument presented in chapter three, where I argue that negative, not only positive feelings, are major determinants of party ID. The Mexican case provides suitable grounds to test such an argument: The PRI long-ruling tenure gave individuals the opportunity to critically assess its performance and nurture both positive and negative feelings that has made it the most loved and hated party in Mexico. These sentiments are generated through the accumulation of retrospective evaluations of government performance, which in the case of the PRI, are poor in comparison with the ones by the opposition parties (PAN and PRD), who have been increasingly earning new governmental responsibilities, and improving their governmental reputation in recent years. This holds especially true for the PAN.

Moreover, the analogy of party ID as a preference for a sports team strengthens my argument: Partisans may think of their party just as fans think of their team: Both may acquire their emotional attachment early in life; such emotional attachment becomes a perceptual screen that eases and colors the interpretation of the environment; fans and partisans show different behavior according to the degree of their allegiance; fans and partisans root for their party/team despite knowing that their contribution to the outcome of the match/election is practically marginal; fans and partisans are more likely to support ‘successful’ teams/parties.

Moreover, there are many reasons to think of party ID as a preference for a sports team rather than religion, as many scholars claim: partisans and fans adjust the intensity of their attachment by constantly evaluating the performance of their party/team; there is a pervasive rivalry in politics and in sports, and partisans (just as fans) can *choose* their party/team. To think of party ID as a preference for a sports team is to say: “I am a Dodgers’ fan”, or “We support Real Madrid”, in the same sense as “I am Panista” or “We support the PRD”. Thinking about party ID as a preference for a sports team rather than a religion is more appropriate in terms of the dynamism that such attachments have throughout individuals’ life. Furthermore, it allows the possibility that some individuals who, despite not being identified with any political party, may dislike a specific one, a term I call ‘negative party identification’. In the Mexican case, about half of independents dislike the PRI (in Mexico City such proportion could even reach two thirds!). To hold a negative party identification is to say: “I like any team but the NY Yankees” in the same sense as “I like any party but the PRI”. According to my argument, negative not only positive feelings, as well as retrospective evaluations of

government performance are major determinants of party ID in Mexico. In chapter three I show that while positive retrospective evaluations of the PRI era increase the likelihood of being a Priísta, President Fox's approval increases the probability of being a Panista. On the other hand, negative feelings towards the PRI increase the likelihood of being a Perredista or an independent. The differences in the effects of negative feelings towards the PRI and retrospective evaluations on party ID between Panistas and Perredistas correspond with the different strategies these two parties have followed in recent years: While the PAN has emphasized in recent campaigns its previous government experience at the local level, the PRD has prioritized the formation of anti-PRI coalitions at the state level, led by former Priístas who lost their party nomination. The consolidation of the Mexican democracy occurs not only through the successful or regretful reputation political parties (especially those opposed to the PRI) have experienced throughout their years as incumbents in all levels of government, but also through their campaign strategies based on previous government performance. It seems that the PAN and the PRD have positive prospects in the years to come, although support for the PRI is still strong in most if not all the states of Mexico.

In chapter four I test the model of party ID at the state level, through a research design that classifies states according to their first change in government, from the PRI to either the PAN or the PRD, and states that were about to go back to the PRI (after being governed by the PAN), controlling for states that were still governed by the PRI. In each state, the opposition party (PAN or PRD) that had the highest proportion of partisans, was the one that ended up defeating the PRI for the first time. Party identification precedes vote choice. A comparison between the distribution of party identification and the

official results suggests that, in order to secure the defeat of the PRI for the first time, independent voters were most likely to support the strongest party in the state. It seems that the voting behavior of independents at the state level is in accordance with their behavior at the national level, where they have been supporting the strongest opposition party or candidate in recent years. I show that the different political experiences shape individuals' attitudes towards their allegiance with political parties. Presidential and governors' approval both have different effects on party ID in Mexico at the state level. That is, positive retrospective evaluations of government performance increase the likelihood of being a Priísta (and a Panista) in states where these parties are incumbents, especially where those partisans are from the same party as the governor. Finally, a model that includes negative feelings towards the three major parties and presidential and governors' approval, confirms my argument, and provides further information that may guide the future research agenda in the subject.

In chapter five, I observe the distribution of party ID according to age cohorts. I show that older cohorts are more Priístas than younger cohorts, while the opposite is true for independents. Conversely, younger cohorts hold more anti-PRI feelings than older cohorts, while older cohorts are more anti-PAN and anti-PRD than younger cohorts.

In chapter six I argue that party ID is a determinant of ideology rather than the reverse. In fact, I demonstrate that 'left-right' ideological self and party placements are determined by partisan attachments and not by issue preferences. This implies that Mexicans, when placing themselves or the parties over the 'left-right' ideological continuum, are most likely to rely on their partisan attachments rather than consider their issue preferences. Moreover, using longitudinal data I demonstrate that party ID is

causally prior to ideological self-placements: lagged values of partisanship are statistically significant in explaining ideology after controlling for lagged values of ideology in the case of Priísmo and Perredismo, although nothing can be said in the case of Panismo.

The far-reaching fight in recent years to defeat the PRI by any means has been the obsession of both major opposition parties, PAN and PRD, who have left aside ideological differences by prioritizing alternation or ‘change’ over the discussion of further cleavages. Political parties in Mexico as in other presidential democracies, end up becoming ‘catchall’ (appealing to heterogeneous constituencies) in order to maximize their vote share. In addition, party leaders have not emphasized the discussion of other issues than alternation. With the PRI loss of the presidency in 2000, however, it could be expected that other issues will emerge, and that ideology will become more issue based rather than partisan based.

A vast research agenda on party ID in Mexico exists for the years to come. Although the five-decade advantage the American voting literature displays over the Mexican one may seem insurmountable, there is today a critical mass of highly trained political scientists (in Mexico and abroad) that approach Mexican political science with the most advanced quantitative skills and an increasingly inquiring perspective. The research agenda on Mexican voting behavior, and especially the one of party ID, is inevitably linked to the continuous improvement of the quality of survey data. There are several debates about question phrasing and placement, as well as validity and reliability of certain indicators that need to be addressed. It seems, fortunately, that in the past years

the collaboration between scholars and practitioners has grown interestingly advantageous for both sides and it is expected to remain so in the near future.

As the first systematic approach to party ID in Mexico, the present dissertation is far from providing a full understanding on the topic. My dissertation, however, shows the importance and the utility of analyzing Mexicans' attachments to political parties. Furthermore, it is expected to provide the bases for answering questions such as the following:

- How does coalition formation affect the dynamics of party ID? That is, how would partisan attachments be affected once different parties form a coalition to compete for office, especially if these alliances are not ideologically driven? If parties coalesced with some certain parties in one election, and with some others in another election, what is the net effect on the attraction of partisans? How would party ID be affected if a party that is supported by some partisans makes a coalition with a party or candidate disliked by these same partisans?
- Which issues will emerge and how will they affect the dynamics of party ID? Specifically, under what bases are the three major parties going to compete once the relevance of the pro/anti-PRI issue has lost most of its substance? It is difficult to define which issues should be asked in surveys when party leaders have not adopted any clear stances with respect to the issues that traditionally define the content of left and right, or liberal and

conservative. In the years to come, however, pollsters and researchers should pay close attention to any signal that political parties and their leaders provide with respect to issue stances.

- Could the Mexican democratic consolidation carry major partisan realignments or dealignments? Can the trends that show an increase in Panismo and independents as well as a decrease in Priísmo continue in the next years? Under what conditions (other than strong anti-PRI feelings) can the PRD increase its proportion of partisans?
- What role will party leaders play in the development of party ID? Which will prove more relevant for attracting partisans: personal charisma or previous government performance of public officials?
- How stable will party ID continue to be in the years to come? Which variables are most likely to be affected by party ID? Will the stability of party ID be the measure of the Mexican democracy consolidation?

Despite the antipathy some individuals hold towards the PRI, recent electoral results at the state level have shown that it is still the party preferred by a plurality of voters. Meanwhile, despite having defeated the PRI in 2000 after a seven-decade ruling period, the PAN has lost its momentum, and according to recent surveys, it does not seem that it will keep the presidency for the next presidential term.

Party identification is to blame for the electoral fates of the three major parties, PAN, PRI, and PRD: The PRI is still the party that has the most partisans, it is the one that earns the most victories. The PAN, on the other hand, drew its supporters in 2000 mostly from independents that became disappointed with its performance in government, and are expected to change their vote either to favor other parties, or even to abstain. The PRD, in the meantime, is increasing its proportion of partisans with the aid of a charismatic leader (Mexico City Mayor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador), with major public works, and with the extensive reach of social programs that which recreate old clientelistic patterns. Clientelistic relations could still be among the major determinants of liking or disliking political parties. The social programs established by the Mexico City government have attracted new partisans, especially those who have received their benefits directly.

Individuals' retrospective evaluations of government performance, which are determinants of party allegiances, are increasingly considered by party leaders and voters as the main criteria to conduct public policy or political campaigns. Alternation at all levels of government has allowed parties to display their previous government actions by diminishing individuals' risk aversion towards formerly unknown challengers. Moreover, negative feelings are increasingly related not only to the long-ruling PRI, but also to the other two major parties, PAN and PRD. There is a price that incumbents have to pay. Government performance of the PAN and PRD was not as known as the PRI's, but today the electorate has the elements needed to assess their job, and decide first whether to support them or not, and then whether to become attached to them or not.

The findings of the present dissertation are expected to provide the foundations for the analyses of party ID in the years to come. It is expected that in the years to come, party identification becomes increasingly meaningful and useful for understanding and explaining Mexicans' electoral behavior.

Table A2.1

PID STABILITY IN MEXICO				
2000-2002				
Vote intention (Congress)				
		<i>Stable</i>	<i>Variable</i>	
PID	<i>Stable</i>	37	18	55
	<i>Variable</i>	9	36	45
		47	53	<i>N</i> = 935

*Includes 'independents', 'small parties', and 'do not know'.

Source: 1st and 5th waves, Mexico 2000-2002 Panel Study

Table A3.1

NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS IN MEXICO, 1988-2003			
<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Survey Firm</i>	<i>N</i>
1988	Pre-electoral	IMOP/Gallup Mexico	2,960
1991	Pre-electoral	CEOP/Este País	1,617
1994	Post-electoral	Office of the President	5,000
1997	Pre-electoral	Office of the President	2,965
2000	Pre-electoral	Reforma Newspaper	2,398
2003	Pre-electoral	BGC, Beltrán y Asociados	1,985
<i>TOTAL</i>			<i>16,925</i>

Table A3.2a

MULTINOMIAL LOGIT: PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN MEXICO, 1988-2000

	<i>Panistas vs. Independents</i>		<i>Prüistas vs. Independents</i>		<i>Perredistas vs. Independents</i>		<i>Other parties vs. Independents</i>	
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>
Negative feelings towards the PRI	0.4226 **	0.0759	-1.5945 **	0.0738	0.4749 **	0.0912	0.2188	0.1623
Approves the president	0.0050	0.0842	1.0190 **	0.0918	-0.4507 **	0.0949	0.0274	0.1786
Personal economic situation is better than before	-0.0192	0.0520	0.3292 **	0.0488	-0.2689 **	0.0626	-0.0583	0.1124
Education	0.0803 *	0.0310	-0.2169 **	0.0292	-0.0184	0.0364	-0.0393	0.0662
Year 1988	1.4352 **	0.1145	1.0231 **	0.1074	2.3916 **	0.1256	1.8361 **	0.1924
Year 2000	-0.0635	0.0874	-0.2934 **	0.0823	-0.1663	0.1152	-1.9004 **	0.3971
Constant	-0.5043 **	0.1495	1.1486 **	0.1412	-0.7983 **	0.1740	-2.1815 **	0.3147
N	8,225							
LR chi ² (24)	2957.59							
Prob>chi ²	0.0000							
Log likelihood	-9640.2495							
Pseudo R ²	0.1330							

*p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed test)

Table A3.2b

MULTINOMIAL LOGIT: PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN MEXICO, 1991-2003

	<i>Panistas vs. Independents</i>		<i>Prúistas vs. Independents</i>		<i>Perredistas vs. Independents</i>		<i>Other parties vs. Independents</i>	
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Std. Err.</i>
Negative feelings towards the PRI	0.6171 **	0.0869	-2.2435 **	0.1303	1.1444 **	0.1038	0.5330 **	0.1477
Approves the president	0.1760	0.1170	0.9148 **	0.1036	-0.4321 **	0.1284	-0.0922	0.2057
Personal economic situation is better than before	0.1543 *	0.0597	0.2675 **	0.0467	-0.0277	0.0673	-0.0692	0.1099
Education	-0.0576	0.0361	-0.1979 **	0.0311	-0.1155 **	0.0424	-0.0083	0.0612
Approves the president x Year 2003	1.8436 **	0.2408	-1.5194 **	0.1623	-0.2887	0.2312	-0.1356	0.3088
Personal economic situation is better than before x Year 2003	0.2009 *	0.0900	-0.0731	0.0822	0.1438	0.1234	0.3121	0.1600
Year 1997	0.8305 **	0.1362	0.8389 **	0.1004	0.5801 **	0.1461	-0.1253	0.2116
Year 2003	-0.1150	0.2450	1.8021 **	0.1580	0.5181 *	0.2026	0.6918 *	0.2789
Constant	-2.0656 **	0.1919	-0.7271 **	0.1599	-1.8890 **	0.2069	-2.6860 **	0.3032
N	5,641							
LR chi ² (32)	1933.34							
Prob>chi ²	0.0000							
Log likelihood	-16423.647							
Pseudo R ²	0.1255							

*p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed test)

Table A3.3

**MULTINOMIAL LOGITS: PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN MEXICO
BY ELECTION YEAR, 1988-2003**

		1988	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003
PAN vs. Independents	Negative feelings towards the PRI	_*		**	**		**
	Approves the president		+				**
	Personal economic situation is better than before				**		**
	Education		**	**	*		*
	Constant	**	**	**	**		**
PRI vs. Independents	Negative feelings towards the PRI	_*	**	**	**	**	**
	Approves the president	**		**	**	**	**
	Personal economic situation is better than before	+		**	**		**
	Education	_*	**	_*	_*	_*	_*
	Constant	**	**	+	+	**	**
PRD vs. Independents	Negative feelings towards the PRI		+	**	**	+	**
	Approves the president		**	_*	_*		**
	Personal economic situation is better than before			_*			
	Education		**		**	**	
	Constant	**	**	**	**		**
Other parties vs. Independents	Negative feelings towards the PRI	_*		**			**
	Approves the president						
	Personal economic situation is better than before		*				+
	Education	_*		+			
	Constant		**	**	**	**	**
N	2,461	982	4,137	2,745	1,627	1,914	
LR chi ² (16)	502.86	141.11	1526.16	883.5	600.00	867.11	
Prob>chi ²	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
Log likelihood	-2952.822	-1131.1614	-4728.8762	-3273.1203	-1821.5095	-2259.075	
Pseudo R ²	0.0785	0.0587	0.1389	0.1189	0.1414	0.161	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed test)

Table A4.1

**CORRELATION BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL
AND GOVERNOR'S APPROVAL IN MEXICO
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000**

	Education*		
	All	Up to 6th grade	7th grade or more
<i>PRI TO PAN</i>	0.342 (6,061)	0.365 (2,710)	0.320 (3,351)
<i>PRI TO PRD</i>	0.318 (5,586)	0.331 (2,637)	0.307 (2,949)
<i>PAN TO PRI</i>	0.179 (1,671)	0.174 (711)	0.184 (960)
<i>STILL PRI</i>	0.384 (4,723)	0.373 (2,141)	0.389 (2,582)
<i>ALL</i>	0.319 (18,041)	0.330 (8,199)	0.309 (9,842)

* According to the 2000 Census, the average years of education was 7.3. See: www.inegi.gob.mx

Table A4.2

**STATE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS
ELECTORAL RESULTS, 1997-2000**

1: CHANGE FROM PRI TO PAN					
STATE	DATE	PAN	PRI	PRD	Other
Aguascalientes	August 1998	53%	38%	7%	2%
Morelos ^a	July 2000	56	28	13	3
Querétaro	July 1997	45	40	7	7
Nuevo León ^b	July 1997	49	42	3	6

2: CHANGE FROM PRI TO PRD					
STATE	DATE	PAN	PRI	PRD	Other
Baja California Sur	February 1999	6%	37%	56%	0%
Tlaxcala ^c	November 1998	9	44	47	1
Zacatecas	July 1998	13	38	44	4

3: CHANGE FROM PAN TO PRI					
STATE	DATE	PAN	PRI	PRD	Other
Chihuahua	July 1998	42%	50%	5%	2%

4: STILL PRI (CONTROL GROUP)					
STATE	DATE	PAN	PRI	PRD	Other
Sinaloa	November 1998	33%	48%	18%	2%
Tamaulipas	November 1998	27	55	16	2

Source : CIDAC (www.cidac.org)

^a The PRD participated in a coalition with the CD, PCD, and PSN.

^b The PRD participated in a coalition with the PVEM.

^c The PRD participated in a coalition with the PT and the PVEM.

Table A5.1

COHORT	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	<i>Year of first vote</i>	<i>President elected</i>
<i>Year of birth</i>	:										:	
	1916										1934	Lázaro Cárdenas
	1917										1935	
	1918										1936	
	1919										1937	
	1920										1938	
	1921										1939	
	1922										1940	Manuel Avila Camacho
	1923										1941	
	1924										1942	
	1925										1943	
	1926										1944	
	1927										1945	
	1928										1946	Miguel Alemán Valdez
		1929									1947	
		1930									1948	
		1931									1949	
		1932									1950	
		1933									1951	
		1934									1952	Adolfo Ruiz Cortines
			1935								1953	
			1936								1954	
			1937								1955	
			1938								1956	
			1939								1957	
			1940								1958	Adolfo López Mateos
				1941							1959	
				1942							1960	
				1943							1961	
				1944							1962	
				1945							1963	
				1946							1964	Gustavo Díaz Ordaz
					1947						1965	
					1948						1966	
					1949						1967	
					1950						1968	
					1951						1969	
					1952						1970	Luis Echeverría
						1953					1971	
						1954					1972	
						1955					1973	
						1956					1974	
						1957					1975	
						1958					1976	José López Portillo

Table A5.1 (*cont.*)

COHORT	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	<i>Year of first vote</i>	<i>President elected</i>
							1959				1977	
							1960				1978	
							1961				1979	
							1962				1980	
							1963				1981	
							1964				1982	Miguel de la Madrid
							1965				1983	
							1966				1984	
							1967				1985	
							1968				1986	
							1969				1987	
							1970				1988	Carlos Salinas
									1971		1989	
									1972		1990	
									1973		1991	
									1974		1992	
									1975		1993	
									1976		1994	Ernesto Zedillo
									1977		1995	
									1978		1996	
									1979		1997	
									1980		1998	
									1981		1999	
									1982		2000	Vicente Fox

Table A5.2

COHORT ANALYSIS OF PARTY ID IN MEXICO
ALTERNATION FROM PRI TO PAN
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000

Cohort number	<i>Year of birth</i>	PAN	PRI	PRD	Independents	<i>N</i>
1	<i>1977 and after</i>	31%	27%	8%	35%	800
2	<i>1971-1976</i>	26	33	4	37	1,111
3	<i>1965-1970</i>	28	31	5	36	1,095
4	<i>1959-1964</i>	25	33	6	36	1,010
5	<i>1953-1958</i>	25	38	4	33	811
6	<i>1947-1952</i>	25	39	5	32	599
7	<i>1941-1946</i>	18	42	6	34	479
8	<i>1935-1940</i>	21	41	6	32	404
9	<i>1929-1934</i>	20	49	6	25	278
10	<i>1928 or before</i>	24	45	7	23	332
ALL		25%	35%	5%	34%	6,919

Pearson χ^2 (27) = 135.4665; Pr = 0.000

Table A5.3

COHORT ANALYSIS OF PARTY ID IN MEXICO
ALTERNATION FROM PRI TO PRD
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000

Cohort number	<i>Year of birth</i>	PAN	PRI	PRD	Independents	<i>N</i>
1	<i>1977 and after</i>	9%	33%	27%	31%	744
2	<i>1971-1976</i>	9	36	24	32	963
3	<i>1965-1970</i>	10	39	20	31	983
4	<i>1959-1964</i>	8	42	21	30	953
5	<i>1953-1958</i>	8	41	20	31	669
6	<i>1947-1952</i>	7	47	17	29	521
7	<i>1941-1946</i>	8	47	16	29	387
8	<i>1935-1940</i>	5	49	16	30	320
9	<i>1929-1934</i>	11	46	20	23	198
10	<i>1928 or before</i>	10	48	20	21	205
ALL		8%	41%	21%	30%	5,943

Pearson χ^2 (27) = 88.9857; Pr = 0.000

Table A5.4

COHORT ANALYSIS OF PARTY ID IN MEXICO
ALTERNATION BACK TO THE PRI (FROM THE PAN)
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000

Cohort number	<i>Year of birth</i>	PAN	PRI	PRD	Independents	N
1	<i>1977 and after</i>	27%	31%	5%	37%	217
2	<i>1971-1976</i>	40	30	2	28	260
3	<i>1965-1970</i>	33	33	2	32	244
4	<i>1959-1964</i>	32	36	1	31	263
5	<i>1953-1958</i>	37	38	2	23	196
6	<i>1947-1952</i>	32	43	3	22	162
7	<i>1941-1946</i>	29	39	2	30	116
8	<i>1935-1940</i>	34	38	0	28	113
9	<i>1929-1934</i>	25	45	1	29	77
10	<i>1928 or before</i>	26	44	1	29	91
ALL		33%	36%	2%	29%	1,739

Pearson χ^2 (27) = 47.2550; Pr = 0.009

Table A5.5

**COHORT ANALYSIS OF PARTY ID IN MEXICO
STILL GOVERNED BY THE PRI
STATE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, 1997-2000**

Cohort number	<i>Year of birth</i>	PAN	PRI	PRD	Independents	<i>N</i>
1	<i>1977 and after</i>	17%	43%	12%	28%	555
2	<i>1971-1976</i>	19	41	9	31	708
3	<i>1965-1970</i>	18	39	10	33	776
4	<i>1959-1964</i>	18	43	9	30	694
5	<i>1953-1958</i>	15	43	7	34	608
6	<i>1947-1952</i>	13	47	9	32	475
7	<i>1941-1946</i>	14	49	11	26	381
8	<i>1935-1940</i>	17	45	10	29	312
9	<i>1929-1934</i>	13	50	8	30	220
10	<i>1928 or before</i>	12	46	11	31	257
ALL		<i>16%</i>	<i>44%</i>	<i>10%</i>	<i>31%</i>	<i>4,986</i>

Pearson χ^2 (27) = 47.2681; Pr = 0.009

Table A6.1

MEXICO 2000-2002 PANEL

FREQUENCIES, ISSUES 1ST WAVE
(February, 2000)

N = 2,355	
<i>With which of the following phrases do you most agree?</i>	
Strong leaders	%
For our country to work well, it's best to have strong laws and institutions.	49.8
For our country to work well, it's best to have strong leaders.	38.5
DK/NR	11.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>
Public electricity	%
The electric industry should be privatized to make it more efficient.	31.7
Privatizing the electric industry would be bad for the country.	52.1
DK/NR	16.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>
Government tough on crime	%
The best way to reduce crime is to create economic opportunity for people.	46.9
The best way to reduce crime is for the government to get tough.	44.7
DK/NR	8.4
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>
Allow death penalty	%
The death penalty should be allowed in order to reduce crime.	40.7
The death penalty should not be allowed under any circumstances.	50.3
DK/NR	9.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>

FREQUENCIES, ISSUES 5TH WAVE
(August, 2002)

N = 2,183						
<i>How much do you agree or disagree with the following phrases?</i>						
Women must decide about abortion	%					
	Very	Somewhat	Not very	Not at all	DK/NR	<i>Total</i>
Women must have the right to decide about abortion.	40.0	22.6	11.0	22.4	4.0	100
Allow civil gay marriage	%					
	Very	Somewhat	Not very	Not at all	DK/NR	<i>Total</i>
Allow civil marriage between homosexuals.	8.7	15.9	13.5	53.0	9.0	100
<i>Which of the following postures do you prefer?</i>						
Public electricity	%					
The electric industry should be under government hands.	58.2					
The generation and distribution of electricity should be open to private investment.	35.6					
DK/NR	6.2					
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>					

Table A6.2

OLS REGRESSION
PARTISAN AND ISSUE COMPONENTS
OF LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SELF-PLACEMENTS
AMONG SOPHISTICATES
MEXICO 2000-2002 PANEL

5th Wave (August 2002)

	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Robust Std. Err.</i>	<i>P> t </i>
Party Identification			
Panista	0.453	0.198	0.022
Priista	0.304	0.220	0.167
Perredista	-1.080	0.264	0.000
Issues			
Public electricity	0.356	0.156	0.022
Women must decide about abortion	-0.095	0.054	0.080
Allow civil gay marriage	-0.105	0.053	0.045
Controls			
Age	0.012	0.007	0.059
Constant	5.153	0.279	0.000

N = 1,185
R² = 0.0532

Table A6.3

CROSS-LAGGED EFFECTS MODEL
UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
MEXICO 2000-2002 PANEL

	ALL			SOPHISTICATES			NON-SOPHISTICATES		
	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>		<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>		<i>Estimate</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	
Panista1 to Panista5	0.475	0.037	**	0.457	0.045	**	0.520	0.073	**
Ideology1 to Ideology5	0.244	0.030	**	0.245	0.038	**	0.225	0.049	**
Panista1 to Ideology5	0.073	0.198		0.273	0.23		0.007	0.412	
Ideology1 to Panista5	0.000	0.006		0.007	0.007		-0.007	0.009	
Intercept Panista5	0.226	0.042	**	0.201	0.055	**	0.257	0.069	**
Intercept Ideology5	5.073	0.224	**	4.737	0.277	**	5.652	0.392	**
Cov. Panista1 Ideology1	-0.116	0.056	*	-0.104	0.069		-0.085	0.095	
Cov. U1 U2	0.127	0.039	**	0.185	0.049	**	-0.005	0.068	
	<i>N = 643</i>			<i>N = 412</i>			<i>N = 204</i>		
Priista1 to Priista5	0.462	0.033	**	0.388	0.041	**	0.594	0.057	**
Ideology1 to Ideology5	0.227	0.030	**	0.230	0.039	**	0.210	0.050	**
Priista1 to Ideology5	0.450	0.186	*	0.310	0.231		0.473	0.336	
Ideology1 to Priista5	0.007	0.005		0.006	0.007		0.005	0.008	
Intercept Priista5	0.071	0.038		0.073	0.046		0.084	0.066	
Intercept Ideology5	5.006	0.214	**	4.804	0.262	**	5.499	0.392	**
Cov. Priista1 Ideology1	0.335	0.062	**	0.312	0.072	**	0.348	0.120	**
Cov. U1 U2	0.105	0.037	**	0.096	0.044	*	0.050	0.065	
	<i>N = 643</i>			<i>N = 412</i>			<i>N = 204</i>		
Perredista1 to Perredista5	0.500	0.038	**	0.621	0.050	**	0.401	0.058	**
Ideology1 to Ideology5	0.235	0.029	**	0.225	0.038	**	0.219	0.049	**
Perredista1 to Ideology5	-0.820	0.295	**	-1.146	0.396	**	-0.600	0.453	
Ideology1 to Perredista5	-0.011	0.004	**	-0.012	0.005	*	-0.005	0.006	
Intercept Perredista5	0.147	0.028	**	0.150	0.034	**	0.097	0.050	
Intercept Ideology5	5.243	0.216	**	5.058	0.266	**	5.786	0.390	**
Cov. Perredista1 Ideology1	-0.099	0.038	**	-0.127	0.041	**	-0.102	0.086	
Cov. U1 U2	-0.075	0.027	**	-0.092	0.031	**	-0.008	0.049	
	<i>N = 643</i>			<i>N = 412</i>			<i>N = 204</i>		

* $p > 0.05$; ** $p > 0.01$ (one tailed)

These models were run on AMOS v.4.0, using the database without missing data. Since the cross-lagged effects model is "exactly identified", measures of fit are not reported (the model has zero degrees of freedom).

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