

ELECCION PUBLICA II

2º. Semestre 2008
Lunes y miércoles, 7-8:30 AM
ITAM Río Hondo

Luis Estrada
lestrada@itam.mx
Atención alumnos: Por cita

Objetivo

Elección Pública II busca que conozcas los fundamentos de la teoría de elección social, en la que las preferencias individuales son agregadas para conformar un resultado colectivo deseado y en el mejor de los casos, óptimo. *Elección Pública II* discute cuál es la funcionalidad de la democracia, los procesos electorales, y la teoría de comportamiento electoral en el arreglo de las preferencias que tienen como fin la consecución del bien común, y cuáles son las paradojas que se presentan al observar simultáneamente ordenamientos *individuales* transitivos y resultados *agregados* intransitivos.

Desarrollo del curso

Durante *Elección Pública II* analizarás trabajos de investigación desde el punto de vista metodológico y argumentativo, presentarás tareas con ejercicios y dos exámenes, el parcial y el final. Un requisito indispensable es que leas ANTES de cada sesión, pues habrá controles de lectura aleatorios. Los exámenes son a modo de control de lecturas, pero incluyen ejercicios vistos en clase.

Calificaciones

Examen parcial:	45%
Examen final:	35%
Tareas	10%
Participación:	10%

Temas

Votaciones sobre Alternativas Discretas

(Shepsle and Bonchek 1997) Caps. 1 a 3, (Riker 1982a) Caps. 1 a 3, (Green and Shapiro 1994) Caps. 1 y 2.

Paradojas de votación y Teoremas de Imposibilidad

(Riker 1982a) Cap. 4, (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997) Caps. 4 y 7

El Modelo Espacial de votación

(Shepsle and Bonchek 1997) Cap. 5, (Riker 1982a) Cap. 5, (Schwartz 1987), (Shepsle 1989), (Krehbiel 1997) Caps. 1 y 2, (Heller and Weldon 2003)

OPT: (Plott 1967), (McKelvey 1979), (Shepsle 1979)

Caos y Teoría de Elección Social

(Riker 1980), (Cox and McCubbins 1994), (Green and Shapiro 1994) Caps. 6 y 7.

OPT: (Rohde and Shepsle 1987)

Partidos Políticos y la Conexión Electoral

(Aldrich 1995) Cap. 2, (Mayhew 1987), (Cox and McCubbins 1993) Caps. 4 y 5, (Cox and McCubbins)

OPT: (Poiré 2002), (Schwartz 1995), (Weingast 1979), (Cox and McCubbins 2005) Caps. 1 a 3

Votaciones en Electorados Masivos

(Downs 1957) Cap. 3, (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), (Magaloni 1994), (Rossi 1959)

Participación Racional

(Aldrich 1993), (Poiré 2000a), (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) Caps. 1 a 3, 7 y 8, (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995), (Cox 1999), (Green and Shapiro 1994) Cap. 4, (Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008)

- OPT: (Jackman 1993), (Jackman 1987), (Powell 1986), (Lijphart 1997), (Buendía and Somuano 2003), (Mueller 2003), (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974), (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1975), (Poiré 2001)
- Voto Retrospectivo y Partidismo**
(Downs 1957) Caps. 7 y 8, (Fiorina 1981) Caps. 1 a 5 y 10, (Estrada 2005) Caps. 1 a 3, (Buendía 1996)
- Voto Prospectivo, Información e Incertidumbre**
(Downs 1957) Caps. 11 y 12, (Enelow and Hinich 1981), (Bartels 1986), (Alvarez and Franklin 1994), (Popkin 1992), (Shepsle 1972)
OPT: (Brady and Ansolabehere 1989), (Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004), (Magaloni and Poiré 2003a)
- Voto Estratégico**
(Riker 1982a) Cap. 6, (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997) Cap. 6, (Calvert and Fenno 1994), (Riker 1982b), (Cox 1987), (Cox 1997) Caps. 1, 2 y 4, (Niou 2001), (Magaloni 1995)
OPT: (Magaloni and Poiré 2003b), (Alvarez and Nagler 2000), (Poiré 2000b), (Ordeshook and Zeng 1997), (Gladwell 2000)

BIBLIOGRAFIA:

- Aldrich, John. 1993. Rational Choice and Turnout. *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (1):246-278.
- Aldrich, John. 1995. *Why Parties?* Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press.
- Alvarez, Michael R., and Charles H. Franklin. 1994. Uncertainty and Political Perceptions. *Journal of Politics* 56 (3):671-688.
- Alvarez, Michael R., and Jonathan Nagler. 2000. A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections. *British Journal of Political Science* 30:57-75.
- Bartels, Larry. 1986. Issue Voting Under Uncertainty: An Empirical Test. *American Journal of Political Science* 30 (4):709-728.
- Brady, Henry E., and Stephen Ansolabehere. 1989. The Nature of Utility Functions in Mass Publics. *American Political Science Review* 83 (1):143-163.
- Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1995. Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation. *American Political Science Review* 89 (2):271-294.
- Buendía, Jorge. 1996. Economic Reform, Public Opinion and Presidential Approval in Mexico, 1988-1993. *Comparative Political Studies* 29 (5):566-592.
- Buendía, Jorge, and Fernanda Somuano. 2003. Participación Electoral en Nuevas Democracias: La Elección Presidencial de 2000 en México. *Política y Gobierno* 10 (2):289-323.
- Calvert, Randall L., and Richard F. Fenno. 1994. Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate. *Journal of Politics* 56 (2):349-376.
- Cox, Gary. 1987. *Duverger's Law: An Interpretive Review of Research*. La Jolla, CA.
- Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Edited by J. Alt and D. North, *Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, Gary. 1999. Electoral Rules and the Calculus of Mobilization. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24 (3):387-419.
- Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. *Theories of Legislative Organization*. La Jolla, CA.
- Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 1994. Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19 (2):215-231.
- Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Enelow, James, and Melvin Hinich. 1981. A New Approach to Voter Uncertainty in the Downsian Spatial Model. *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (3):483-493.
- Estrada, Luis. 2005. Party Identification in Mexico. Doctoral Dissertation, Political Science, University of California, San Diego, San Diego, CA.

- Ferejohn, J., and Morris Fiorina. 1974. The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 68:525-536.
- Ferejohn, J., and Morris Fiorina. 1975. Closeness Counts Only in Horseshoes and Dancing. *American Political Science Review* 69:920-925.
- Fiorina, Morris. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Freedman, Paul, Michael Franz, and Kenneth Goldstein. 2004. Campaign Advertising and Democratic Citizenship. *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4):723-741.
- Gerber, Alan, Donald P. Green, and Christopher Larimer. 2008. Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-scale Field Experiment. *American Political Science Review* 102 (1):33-48.
- Gladwell, Malcolm. 2000. *The Tipping Point*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro. 1994. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Heller, William, and Jeffrey Weldon. 2003. Legislative Rules and Voting Stability in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. Paper read at the Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, at Chicago, Ill.
- Jackman, Robert W. 1987. Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies. *American Political Science Review* 81 (2):405-424.
- Jackman, Robert W. 1993. Response to Aldrich's "Rational Choice and Turnout": Rationality and Political Participation. *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (1):279-290.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1997. *Pivotal Politics*. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1997. Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma. *American Political Science Review* 91 (1):1-14.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 1994. Elección Racional y Voto Estratégico: Algunas Aplicaciones para el Caso Mexicano. *Política y Gobierno* 1 (2):309-344.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 1995. Party Dominance and Duvergerian Dilemmas in the Mexican 1994 Elections. *Papers in International Political Economy* (Duke University).
- Magaloni, Beatriz, and Alejandro Poiré. 2003a. The Issues, the Vote and the Mandate for Change. In *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Candidates, Voters, and the Presidential Campaign of 2000*, edited by J. Dominguez and C. Lawson. Stanford and La Jolla, CA: Stanford University Press and Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD.
- Magaloni, Beatriz, and Alejandro Poiré. 2003b. Strategic Coordination in the 2000 Mexican Presidential Race. In *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Candidates, Voters, and the Presidential Campaign of 2000*, edited by J. Dominguez and C. Lawson. Stanford and La Jolla, CA: Stanford University Press and Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD.
- Mayhew, David R. 1987. The Electoral Connection and the Congress. In *Congress: Structure and Policy*, edited by M. McCubbins and T. Sullivan. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- McKelvey, Richard D. 1979. General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models. *Econometrica* 47 (5):1085-1112.
- Mueller, Dennis. 2003. *Public Choice III*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Niou, Emerson M. S. 2001. Strategic Voting under Plurality and Runoff Rules. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13 (2):209-227.
- Ordeshook, Peter, and Langche Zeng. 1997. Rational Voters and Strategic Voting: Evidence from the 1968, 1980 and 1992 Elections. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 9 (2):167-187.
- Plott, Charles R. 1967. A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule. *American Economic Review* 57 (4):787-806.
- Poiré, Alejandro. 2000a. Turnout as a Rationally Careless Investment Decision: An Application to the Mexican Case in 1994. In *ITAM Working Papers in Political Science*. Mexico City.
- Poiré, Alejandro. 2000b. Un Modelo Sofisticado de Decisión Electoral Racional: El Voto Estratégico en México, 1997. *Política y Gobierno* 7 (2):353-382.
- Poiré, Alejandro. 2001. Turnout in Mexico's Presidential Election: Evidence from the Mexico 2000 Panel Study. In *ITAM Working Papers in Political Science*. Mexico City.
- Poiré, Alejandro. 2002. Bounded Ambitions. Party Nominations, Discipline and Defection: Mexico's PRI in Comparative Perspective. Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

- Popkin, Samuel L. 1992. Information Shortcuts and the Reasoning Voter. In *Information, Participation, and Choice*, edited by B. Grofman. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Powell, G. Bingham. 1986. American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective. *American Political Science Review* 80 (1):17-43.
- Riker, William. 1980. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. *American Political Science Review* 74 (2):432-446.
- Riker, William. 1982a. *Liberalism Against Populism*. Prospect Heights, Ill: Waveland Press, Inc.
- Riker, William. 1982b. The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science. *American Political Science Review* 76 (4):753-766.
- Riker, William, and Peter Ordeshook. 1968. A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. *American Political Science Review* 62 (1):25-42.
- Rohde, David W., and Kenneth Shepsle. 1987. Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process. In *Congress: Structure and Policy*, edited by M. McCubbins and T. Sullivan. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America*. New York: Allyn and Bacon.
- Rossi, Peter H. 1959. Four Landmarks in Voting Research. In *American Voting Behavior*, edited by E. Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck. Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press.
- Schwartz, Thomas. 1987. Voters, Strategies, and Institutions: An Introduction to the Theory of Collective Choice. In *Congress: Structure and Policy*, edited by M. McCubbins and T. Sullivan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schwartz, Thomas. 1995. The Paradox of Representation. *Journal of Politics* 57 (2):309-323.
- Shepsle, Kenneth. 1972. The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition. *American Political Science Review* 66 (2):555-568.
- Shepsle, Kenneth. 1979. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium un Multidimensional Voting Models. *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (1):27-59.
- Shepsle, Kenneth. 1989. Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1 (2):131-147.
- Shepsle, Kenneth, and Mark Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics*. New York: Norton.
- Weingast, Barry. 1979. A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms. *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (2):245-262.